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1. the far-right in the media: introduction, theoretical framework and research questions     
chAPter one
the fAr-right in the MediA: introduction, 
theoreticAl frAMeWorK And reseArch Questions
1.1 the far-right in a comparative perspective
in civil society, politics and in academia the developments in the popularity of the far-
right, as well as the activities of far-right groups and political parties, have been followed 
closely ever since the end of World War ii. the main reason for this vigilance was, and 
is, the fear that the far-right could once again become a relevant faction in the political 
landscape in West european countries. until the mid-eighties the far-right had never es-
tablished a position where it was considered a serious threat. Although far-right parties 
managed to win sporadic parliamentary seats, they never consolidated their electoral 
successes. from the mid-eighties onwards, however, the far-right started to gain ground 
in electoral competition (cole, 2005: 204).  By the mid-nineties the state of affairs had 
become such that the far-right had gained some stable ground in various West european 
countries like Belgium, italy, denmark and Austria, and lately in the netherlands. 
in recent years, an increasing amount of research has been dedicated to the success and 
failure factors of far-right political parties in elections. Academics from disciplines such as 
sociology, social psychology and political science have found distinct explanations for the 
varying levels of success of far-right parties in (West) european countries. By now there is 
fairly clear evidence of the influence of different variables on the level of individual voters, 
social-structural factors, political and election opportunity structures, historical and – to 
a lesser extent - cultural factors (for overviews see: Kitchelt, 1997; rydgren, 2005; ignazi, 
2006). 
one important field in contemporary societies, however, the media, has hardly been 
investigated for its role in the popularity of the far-right. the media are considered an in-
creasingly important player in the political constellation and in the relationship between ci-
vilians (voters) and politics (Brants & Van Praag, 2000; Kleinnijenhuis et al, 2003; Weaver, 
Mccombs & shaw, 2004; Walgrave, soraka & nuytemans, 2007). some even suggest that 
we are moving from democracy towards mediacracy (Brants, 2002: 163). Also in the spe-
cific matter of the position of the far-right in different (West) european societies, the media 
have been mentioned by academics as a factor not to be ignored (see lubbers & scheepers, 
2001; Van donselaar, 1998; Walgrave & de swert, 2004). the role of the media in this 
matter has also been conceived as ‘discursive opportunity structures’ (Koopmans & olzak, 
2004), meaning media offer essential and directing opportunities for public debate. how-
ever, systematic empirical research on the matter is scarcely available. some of the available 
studies suggest a relationship between media attention and the popularity of the far-right. 
lubbers & scheepers found a significant relationship between the amount of attention in 
a german newspaper and the popularity of far-right parties in germany (2001: 441, 443). 
the scope and level of detail of this study, however, are very limited. lubbers did not find a 
similar result in the dutch context (lubbers, 2001: 165). 
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other studies focussed on the relationship between attention to ‘far-right issues’ and 
far-right voting (Walgrave & de swert, 2004; Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007). the 
relationship between the content of the media coverage and the popularity of the far-right 
has not been investigated systematically, let alone longitudinally and cross-culturally, until 
now. numerous questions about media coverage of the far-right remain unanswered. 
this study attempts to provide answers to some of these. newspaper coverage of the far-
right in three countries (each with very different positions in respect of the far-right) will 
be investigated, across time and cross-culturally. the findings will be used to develop a 
theoretical understanding of the meaning of the variation in the media image of the far-
right.
the study is grounded in a theoretical understanding of the far-right, the historical back-
ground of the far-right in flanders, germany and the netherlands, and in media theories. 
the remainder of this chapter will discuss these bases and elaborate the central problem 
into research questions and hypotheses. in the following section the way the far-right is 
conceptualised will be described. section three gives a preliminary short overview of rel-
evant characteristics of the far-right in the three contexts. then, in section four, the way 
the role of the media in explaining electoral successes of the far-right has been studied will 
be reviewed critically. this review will then result in the identification of the central focus 
and perspective of this study. in section five the three dimensions of the comparative ap-
proach of this study - across time, between types of newspapers and cross-culturally - will 
be elaborated.
1.2 defining the far-right
A significant proportion of the extensive body of literature on the far-right is dedicated 
to the problem how to define the far-right (for an overview see ignazi, 2006; Kitchelt, 
1997; Mudde,1998). All of these studies emphasise that establishing a proper definition 
remains problematic. one of the reasons for this difficulty is the huge difference in histori-
cal contexts in which the far-right operates, even within Western europe. the terminology 
is confusing at times; ‘extreme right’, ‘radical right’, ‘far-right’, ‘anti-immigration parties’ 
and even more specific terms such as ‘fascism’ are used, sometimes interchangeably, in 
other cases they have specific and distinct meanings. fascism, of course, is a specific politi-
cal ideology that is located at the far-right of the political left-right spectrum. in germany 
a distinction has been made between radical right and extreme right. the german ‘Verfas-
sungsschutz’ reserves the term extreme right for those formations that potentially endan-
ger the constitution, while the radical right is considered to contain no such risk1. there 
are more examples of such specific use of these terms (see ignazi, 2006: 28). in this study 
the term ‘far-right’ is used because it is to-the-point and is less problematic than ‘extreme 
right’ due to its specific meaning in other literature, or symbolic meaning in public debate. 
others have opted for populist right or anti-immigrant right. however, i agree with ignazi 
that “it is not appropriate to reduce the far (extreme) right to its most publicized issue”, 
1	  http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/FAQ/ (12-07-2005)
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or to its most recently emphasised feature, for that matter (2006: 229). here, the far-right 
refers to all groups, parties and organisations as well as ideologies at the far-right of the 
political spectrum. far-right groups and organisations take all kinds of shapes and forms, 
from ad hoc formations to hierarchically structured military(-esque) organisations and 
political parties.
 
the conceptualisation of far-right is greatly influenced by its historical roots, both in 
specific situations and more generally by the fascist and nazi regimes of Mussolini (1924-
1943) and hitler (1933-1945). the specific history of the three contexts in this study, 
will be discussed in section 1.3 (dutch, german and flemish far-right). here we focus on 
two general aspects of the conceptualisation of the far-right, namely its sociogenesis and 
its ideologies. the different aspects of the sociogenesis and ideologies together form the 
guidelines along which the various manifestations of the far-right can be recognised in 
the field (Blumer, 1954: 7). the far-right, as such, is defined as a ‘sensitising concept’ (cf 
Blumer, 1954; tennekes, 1990). in different contexts and times the term far-right covers 
different formations and sets of ideologies. “Because of this varying nature of the concrete 
expressions (…) we have to rely on general guides and not on fixed objective traits or 
modes of expression (Blumer, 1954: 8).” these dynamics must be included in a conceptu-
alisation of the far-right, in order to record differences and changes in how the far-right 
features in the newspapers. the sensitising concept, as it is introduced in sections 1.2.1 
and 1.2.2, is not an attempt to formulate a definition of the far-right, but serves to iden-
tify the various aspects of the far-right identity in order to be able to recognise them in  
the content analysis of the newspaper coverage.
1.2.1 the sociogenesis of the far-right
it is sometimes hard to draw the line between what is a far-right group or party and what 
is not. such a difficulty appeared, for example, in the netherlands with the rise of Pim 
fortuyn, his parties and successors in 2002-2004. it is difficult to determine the status of 
these and other contemporary political parties or social movement groups by considering 
exclusively their ideological standpoints, as some authors do (Mudde, 1997; cole, 2005). 
Political organisations and scarcely organised political groups are much more than their 
political programme. their identity also consists of their sociogenesis. the concept of so-
ciogenesis is coined by norbert elias in his civilisation Process (1982). here we use it to 
refer to the characteristics of far-right formations that are not part of official ideology, but 
originate in the figuration of individuals, groups and organisations of which a far-right 
formation is part and the interaction that takes place therein. the sociogenesis of far-right 
formations contains all their explicit and implicit social ties and sheds light on the sort of 
relations between the far-right formation and its environment. We distinguish core mem-
bers of the formation (such as party officials, MP’s, founders, group organisers) and fol-
lowers (such as party members, voters, fans and sympathisers). for both of these groups, 
five aspects of their sociogenesis should be examined.
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first we need to consider to what extent members of far-right formations, and especially 
their leading figures, have individual deviating ideological standpoints. these might be 
much more extreme or explicit than the official or public programme. in the case of for-
tuyn’s lPf and rotterdam’s local party leefbaar rotterdam2, the parties’ sociogenesis 
turned out to be more radical than Pim fortuyn himself, or their party programme. Vari-
ous members, and especially voters, had strong anti-immigrant views. less organised far-
right formations may have no programme at all, in spite of radical and explicit statements 
or actions of their members. this first aspect becomes increasingly important because new 
far-right parties often have a minimal official programme, while their leaders continuously 
make bold statements in public. 
the actions and behaviour of a far-right formation and its individual members (foremost 
its leaders and spokesmen) also add to its identity. Action must be understood in a very 
broad sense, from behaviour in parliament to public occasions, and even in their private 
lives politicians’ actions will be remarked and therefore must be taken into account. some 
far-right parties are known for the unorthodox behaviour of their leaders.  
A third aspect of the sociogenesis of political formations consists of the ties with other, 
sometimes much more explicitly extreme, far-right formations. far-right formations with 
a relatively ‘normal’, or mainstream image or mild party programme, sometimes have 
strong ties with more radical social movement organisations. the ties between vlaams 
blok and voorpost and the flemish nationalist student organisation nsV are well 
known examples of this (deschouwer, 2001). such relations were an issue that created a 
high degree of tension within fortuyn’s leefbaar rotterdam and lPf, resulting in party 
splits3.  
A fourth aspect contains the historical roots of a far-right actor, or what Van donselaar 
& rodriques call the social genealogy of the formation (2002: 77). Most far-right parties 
are successors of previous ones, or are founded by ex-members of other (prior) far-right 
organisations. As will be shown in section 1.3, a large part of the histories of various 
dutch, flemish and german far-right groups is a long succession of splits and fusions 
(Mudde, 1998), sometimes dating back to nsdAP memberships, or nazi-collaborators. 
this aspect is described by Van donselaar on various occasions, one of his examples con-
cerning former nsB4 members who joined the far-right boerenpartij in the sixties (Van 
donselaar 1995: 16).
A last aspect that is considered part of the sociogenesis, but must also be examined sepa-
rately in the light of this project, is the depiction of far-right formations. the sociogenesis 
might not have been the first concern of researchers of the far-right, but the media seem 
to have an eye for it. the way the media depict or label far-right formations seems of con-
siderable concern to their sociogenesis. dubious relationships or ideas of far-right leaders 
2 Fortuyn was party leader of both the local party Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR) during the local elections  
 of March 6th 2002 and the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) for the national election of May 15th 2002.
3 The LR city council member Michiel Smit eventually left to start his own party Nieuw Rechts, after  
 he was expelled for openly having friendly relations with Fillip Dewinter of the Vlaams Blok.
4 The NSB was a Dutch political party which collaborated with the Nazis in WWII.
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are popular topics for journalists. More precisely, we include how far-right formations are 
depicted by third parties, such as the media, competing politicians, or other formations 
interested in clarifying their standpoint in relation to the far-right formation. this depic-
tion is closely related to what gitlin calls ‘the public image’ of a movement (gitlin, 1980). 
Again, in the example of Pim fortuyn this aspect was very influential in the election 
campaigns of 2002. fortuyn’s lPf was accused of being ‘extreme right’ in the media and 
by competing party leaders (d’66 leader de graaff referred to Anne frank in his reaction 
to fortuyn’s plan to abolish the anti-discrimination article from the constitution5), which 
had far-reaching complications for people and organisations involved (fennema, 2005). 
depiction also involves what is called positive identification, which means that other 
far-right formations openly associate themselves with the formation in question. this hap-
pened frequently with lPf, greatly against their own inclination. Many far-right actors, 
such as small far-right or even nazi parties, websites and groups (such as the national-
socialist group around the widow ross-van tonningen: consortium de levensboom) 
publicly sympathised with the lPf and its leader and some of them even tried to create 
bonds with the lPf that were not answered positively (Van donselaar & rodriques, 
2002: 78-81).
the sociogenesis of far-right formations thus consists of their relationships with other far-
right formations, their historical roots, the non-official ideological standpoints and actions 
of the members and the public depiction of the far-right by others.
1.2.2 far-right ideologies
the literature on the far-right discusses a wide variety of ideological issues, attitudes and 
standpoints. in most cases these investigations include multiple variations of the far-right, 
not infrequently put in a binary timeframe of ‘old’ and ‘new’ far-right. on an ideologi-
cal level, there are serious differences between contemporary far-right parties (fennema, 
2005). Mudde (1998) distinguished as many as 52 definitions of what the far-right is (de-
fined by ideologies). in an attempt to order this jumble, some authors created typologies 
to distinguish far-right formations from each other, based on the most relevant aspects of 
their ideologies (e.g. Kitchelt, 1997; rydgren, 2005, ignazi, 2006)
According to Mudde, from the long list of issues that are recognised as a part of far-
right ideologies, five points are mentioned in almost all relevant literature (1998: 274). 
‘Mudde’s five’ are anti-democratism, nationalism, racism, xenophobia and an emphasis 
on the strong state. this is not to say that these are the only relevant standpoints. the fol-
lowing picture draws on a vast body of studies of the far-right (Maoláin, 1987; Kitchelt, 
1997; holsteyn & Mudde, 1998; lucardi, 1998; Mudde, 1998; Minkenberg, 2000; lub-
bers, 2001; Van donselaar & rodrigues, 2002; coffé, 2005; cole, 2005; rydgren, 2005; 
fennema 2005; ignazi, 2006) here we use ‘Mudde’s five’ only as a starting point to draw 
up a portrait that best suits the purpose of this study.
5	 Het	nationale	chagrijn	;	De	brede	steun	voor	Pim	Fortuyn, Nrc handelsblad 9 maart 2005.
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the anti-democratic attitude is strongest in circles of traditional far-right formations. 
Among post-industrial far-right formations the anti-democratic attitude is not always 
present; sometimes it is replaced by more populist attitudes, or anti-political establishment 
sentiments or even advocacies of direct democracy (fennema, 2005; rydgren, 2005). 
often, far-right actors’ attitudes towards democracy are somewhat unclear, or democratic 
values are expressed primarily for strategic reasons. According to most authors reviewed, 
populism features at least as much as anti-democratism in contemporary far-right ide-
ologies. Both populism and anti-democratic attitudes are related to concepts such as 
charismatic leadership, anti-political establishment, intolerance for political plurality, 
anti-progressive and conspiracy theories. they can overlap as well as being two ends 
of a continuum. in finding a family resemblance they will be grouped together as a first 
ideological orientation, because they are both expressions of political attitudes against the 
political status quo. 
next, Mudde mentions three different, but closely related issues, namely nationalism, 
racism and xenophobia. nationalism is a key concept in all reviewed descriptions and 
can be divided in state nationalism and ethnic nationalism. the former is often linked 
to more moderate and to original fascist far-right parties (i.e. Mussolini’s fascism), 
whereas the latter is attributed to more extreme formations, as well as generally to post-
industrial far-right formations (Kitchelt, 1997). ‘Parochial’ ideologies, often meaning 
ethnic homogenous communities bound to a certain territory, in terms of ‘Blut (ethnic) 
und Boden (soil)’, are usually expressed in nationalist terminology, taking the nation state 
as the territorial unit of the community. german far-right parties, deutsche Volksunion 
(dVu, german People’s union) and nationaldemokratische Partei deutschlands (nPd, 
national-democratic Party of germany) for example, claim former german territories 
because they ‘belong’ to the german people (lubbers 2001: 12). nationalism as such (in 
both its ethnic and state versions) will be included in our family resemblance as the first 
standpoint within the ethnic community orientation. 
the second term in this trilogy, racism is probably seen as the most central aspect of 
far-right ideology in both academic and public discourse. despite that preconception, rac-
ism is not central or even present in all far-right ideologies. in certain interbellum fascist 
formations it was not present at all (Kitchelt, 1997: 31). fennema states it is not present 
in all ‘new’, post-industrial, or as he calls them “anti-immigrant” formations (2005: 17). 
racism maybe the most well-known discriminatory attitude, but it is not the only one in 
many far-right ideologies. the problem with the concept of racism is that it is somewhat 
diffuse. from its original meaning “a complex of more or less related beliefs that envision 
a biologically determined relation between genotype and cultural behaviour of races (eis-
inga & scheepers 1989: 11)”6, it has become an emotionally charged term. for the more 
distant and also broader concept of xenophobia, such problems are not expected. Xeno-
phobia basically is the fear or aversion of the stranger, or everything that differs from the 
own ethnic group, or is Volksfremde. to put it in another way, there is a strong prefer-
6 My translation.
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ence for the own ethnic group, or ethnic particularism. Xenophobic attitudes may cause 
racist behaviour. Xenophobia, as such, is included in our family resemblance of far-right 
ideology as the second standpoint within the ethnic community orientation. exclusionist 
policies (such as welfare chauvinism) however, must be mentioned separately, precisely 
because not all far-right formations are racist according to fennema (ibid), but do ad-
vocate exclusionist policies. racist or xenophobic ideologies are often difficult to trace 
in news coverage, while exclusionist policies can be expected to be more easily traced. 
exclusionism, as a general term to encapsulate a multitude of social phenomena related to 
individuals or organisations that try, or set out to exclude minorities from certain rights, 
or communal membership (scheepers et al. 2002), is the third standpoint included in the 
ethnic community orientation. 
the strong state is the last of ‘Mudde’s five’. in the concluding chapter of his dissertation 
the strong state is replaced by ‘law and order’, meaning “… in which the state should 
maintain a strict legal system and should enforce these rules actively and rigorously” 
(Mudde, 1998: 272). ‘law and order’ thus includes a strong state, but concentrates 
mostly on law enforcement within the state and protection of the national community 
from the outside (i.e. from immigrants). contemporary far-right actors seem to be con-
cerned first with inner state homogeneity and stability and less with militarism and expan-
sion (cole, 2005; Kitchelt, 1997; Mudde, 1998). in line with this argument, from most 
literature reviewed it can be concluded that such a conception of law and order is more 
relevant to all forms of contemporary far-right, than the more traditional far-right ‘strong 
state’ in which it originates. therefore it is included in the family resemblance within the 
third conservative orientation.
not listed as one of the five most mentioned features of the far-right, but put forward as 
a central part of far-right ideologies in most reviewed literature is the idea of advocating 
and protecting traditional values. this includes firstly a strong emphasis on the traditional 
family as a central unit in society. this emphasis is accompanied by other traditional 
values, such as strict division of roles for men and women, anti-abortion, anti-euthanasia 
and often homophobic standpoints. it fits in the conservative orientation, next to law and 
order standpoints. All together, the ideological issues of the far-right can be summarised 
as in figure 1.1.
1.2.3 dimensions of variety within the far-right
Above, i elaborated on two different core elements of the far-right, its sociogenesis and 
ideological standpoints. As central elements of the family resemblance, they provide a 
cadre within which there is much room for variation, between far-right parties, within 
parties at a certain moment in time, within parties across time and within the far-right as 
a whole. therefore, at first sight, some far-right formations may have little in common 
and still belong to the far-right family. like other institutions, far-right formations change 
constantly and their far-right identity is captured in the continuity of successive changes 
(see goudsblom, 1988).  
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figure 1.1 ideological standpoints of the far-right
Orientation Ideological Standpoints Key words
Political orientation 1. Anti-democratic 
2. Populism
Anti-democratic
Authoritarianism
Populism
Charismatic leadership
Anti-political establishment
Intolerance for political pluralism
Ethnic community 
orientation
3. Nationalism
4. Xenophobia
5. Exclusionism
Ethnic homogeneous community
Blut und Boden
Ethnic threat
(ethno-cultural) Particularism
Exclusionist policies (i.e. welfare chauvinism)
Conservative 
orientation
6. Law & Order
7. Traditional Values
Strong state
Strong leader
Repressive law enforcement 
Traditional family
Paternalism
Homophobia
differences between far-right formations are often easy to detect and have had most 
scholarly attention. A range of typologies have been developed; roughly speaking, these 
all make a division between old and new far-right. to be accurate though it is better - fol-
lowing ignazi - to put it in terms of ‘traditional’ and ‘post-industrial’ far-right (2006: 
34), because both ‘old’ and ‘new’ characteristics are to be found among contemporary 
far-right formations. traditional refers to formations that draw on the tradition of inter-
bellum fascism that includes corporatism, anti-democracy and authoritarianism with 
strong hierarchical structures (Kitchelt 1997: 30; ignazi, 2006: 34), whereas the new, or 
post-industrial far-right emerged in the early eighties as a result of the ‘silent revolution’ 
of post-industrial society, simultaneously with the green party family (ignazi, 2006: 34; 
cole, 2005: 205). the french national front is identified as the first, or prototype, post-
industrial far-right party with its ‘nouvelle droite’ (rydgren, 2005: 475; ignazi, 2006: 
22-23). needless to say, this distinction consists of ideal types. other authors use more or 
less similar typologies, moderate versus radical (Mudde, 1998), extreme right versus racist 
versus populist (fennema, 2005), old versus new radical right (Kitchelt, 1997), new versus 
old (cole, 2005), radical right wing populist versus old (rydgren, 2005).
sometimes there are serious differences between ideologies put forward in official party 
publications and statements and other outlets (of one and the same party). Van der Brug, 
fennema & tillie use the difference between front and back stage ideologies here (2005). 
front stage statements are often more mellow than back stage, not only for legal reasons 
(anti-discrimination legislation has led to many convictions already), but also attempts 
to increase acceptance as a ‘normal party’ leads to such differences between front and 
backstage standpoints (Van der Brug, fennema & tillie 2005). in this way considerable 
differences may occur within one party at a particular moment in time.
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some far-right formations have made significant changes and have become more radical, or 
moderate across time. one such example is the flemish party vlaams blok. in its first years 
it held a primarily regionalist or flemish-nationalist programme directed at protecting the 
flemish people from the federal government and the french speaking part of Belgium, and 
striving for flemish independence. from 1984 on its programme included an anti-immi-
grant standpoint and with that became more radical. in 1992 it published a 70 point anti-
immigrant programme in which what can be considered its most radical standpoints were 
formulated. A law-suit in 2004 forced vlaams blok to moderate its programme again. in 
the early nineties it recruited many cadre members from militant groups and was involved 
in violent incidents. this became less apparent at least in recent years. other far-right par-
ties that changed significantly over time for example were the Austrian freiheitliche 
partei österreichs (more radical) and the italian alleanza nazionale (more moderate) 
(ignazi, 2006: 230).
this fluidity, as opposed to rock-steady rigidity, explains the enduring confusion and discus-
sion about what exactly is the far-right. here it serves to explain the main dimensions of 
variety within the family resemblance. Piero ignazi gives an additional guide in the epilogue 
of the paperback edition of his extreme right parties in Western europe; a formation is far-
right, when it (1) is at the furthest right of the left-right spectrum in a given society and (2) 
ideologically rejects “the principles of equality and plurality”, as these are central values of 
contemporary liberal democracies (ignazi, 2006: 225). for the purpose of this study, it is 
important to emphasise the broadness of the family resemblance, because all of this varia-
tion may appear in the media coverage of the far-right without explicit mention.
1.3 short overview of the far-right in the netherlands, germany  
 and flanders
A short look into the recent histories of the far-right in the three national contexts fea-
tured in this study will give some insight in the variation within the family resemblance 
of the far-right and show why these three countries are particularly relevant cases for this 
study.
the dutch far-right is characterised by a lack of continuity. Various parties and lead-
ers constantly competed for hegemony within the far-right. during the research period 
three parties succeeded in gaining seats in the dutch parliament. until 1986 this was the 
centrumpartij (cP) and from 1989 on, its successor centrumdemocraten (cd) under 
the same leader, hans Janmaat. this party reached its peak in 1994, when three of its 
candidates were elected to parliament. in 1998 they were not re-elected and the party 
vanished from the political scene. in 2002, Pim fortuyn stormed into the dutch electoral 
competition with his lijst pim fortuyn (lPf). fortuyn was assassinated nine days before 
the elections. his party still collected 26 seats in parliament and entered the coalition 
government, which fell a few months later due to continual infighting within the lPf 
leadership. in the following elections the party lost considerable ground. during the entire 
research period there were countless smaller far-right parties, with no real significance at 
the national or european level (see lucardi, 1998; Van donselaar & rodrigues, 2003).
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since the mid-eighties three legal far-right parties have been active in germany. the most 
well known of these is the republikaner (rep), which is the only one to have enjoyed 
considerable electoral success, this being in the european Parliament elections in 1989. 
the other two parties, deutsche volksunion (dVu) and nationaldemokratische 
partei deutschlands (nPd), never crossed the threshold at national nor european 
levels. in 2001 these three parties were joined by a fourth and new party led by a former 
judge roland schill (schill partei). After a local success in hamburg, it met with failure 
in the national elections in 2002 and was dissolved soon after. from the early nineties on, 
a violent extra-parliamentary far-right became increasingly active and caused a wave of 
anti-immigrant violence that reached a peak in 1994. traditionally, the german far-right 
is concentrated in the southern states, but has become increasingly popular in the ‘new’ 
eastern states and had electoral successes on local and regional levels (lubbers & scheep-
ers, 2000: 63-64; ignazi, 2006: 70-1).
Belgium consists of three political regions, of which only the flemish one is included in 
this study. flanders has its own political parties and a unique position in the far-right. 
since the late seventies, vlaams blok (VB) is the only far-right party in flanders. the 
party has been successful in elections almost since its beginnings, but especially from 1987 
on it grew in every election at all political levels (local, regional, national or european). 
since its electoral breakthrough in 1991 VB has become a significant opposition party. 
in Antwerp it collected almost 1/3 of the votes in the last two local elections, and in the 
regional elections for the flemish parliament in 2004 it collected 24.2% of the votes mak-
ing it the second biggest party in flanders. the party is deeply rooted in the separatist 
regionalist movement for an independent flanders, which is one important explanation 
for its continuous successes (coffé, 2005).
table 1.1 voting percentages (national and european parliament elections) of 
all far-right parties combined
Election year 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1994 1995 1998 1999 2002 2003 2004
Netherlands 0,5 0,9 2,4 0,6 0,5 17,0 5,7 2,5
Germany 0,6 7,1 4,0 4,1 3,3 2,1 0,6 2,8
Flanders 
(Belgium)  1,9 4,1  6,8 7,8 7,8  9,9  11,6 14,3
Sources: CBS, www.elections.de. The German voting percentages are ‘Zweitstimme’ in Bundestag or European Parlia-
ment elections. Belgian figures are percentages of the total number of Belgian votes (not just the Flemish votes).
in a sense, the netherlands and flanders are extreme cases because (1) whereas the 
vlaams blok has grown into an irrefutable power factor, in the netherlands the far-right 
has remained, or become, a shadowy marginal phenomenon; (2) the system and ideology 
of party hierarchy in flanders contrasts sharply with the poorly-organised party structure 
in the netherlands; (3) the social, historical and cultural context of the vlaams blok as 
part of the flemish nationalist tradition (see, among others, spruyt, 1995; van den Brink, 
1999; Achten, 2000) is in sharp contrast to the groups in the netherlands that have re-
mained isolated. however, the sudden appearance and success of the lPf suggest a sizable 
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right-wing potential. the german case has yet another, completely different, character. 
the fluctuations in far-right voting behaviour in germany put that country electorally 
into a middle position. however, due to the electoral system, the german far-right never 
succeeded in entering the german parliament, and germany is the only country (in the 
three considered in this study) with a considerable extra-parliamentary far-right (Kühnel, 
1998). in short, the notable differences between the three contexts with regard to far-right 
voting behaviour justify the suspicion that media attention to the far-right in the nether-
lands, germany and flanders will differ considerably. these differences will enable us to 
reach a better understanding of the variation in media attention within these countries, as 
well as media attention to the far-right in general.
1.4 media attention to the far-right 
A vast body of literature has been dedicated to the development and empirical testing of 
various explanations of the differences and changes in the popularity of the far-right in 
the last two decades. Authors focus on a broad range of aspects, from party dynamics 
to culture and political opportunities. in recent years, explanations on the level of indi-
vidual voting preferences have been systematically tested in comparative and longitudinal 
designs (cf. lubbers 2001). characteristics that may influence far-right voting behaviour 
are on the individual as well as the contextual level. the most important individual 
characteristics are: level of education, employment, income level, gender, age and church 
membership. contextual characteristics that have been investigated are: unemployment 
levels, change in unemployment levels, number of immigrants and the combination of the 
last two. these explanations have been tested in multi-variate models by lubbers and col-
leagues (lubbers, scheepers & Billiet, 2000; lubbers, 2001; lubbers & scheepers, 2001). 
By now, a generally acknowledged idea, based on these empirical tests, of the influence 
of these factors individually as well as in combination, exists. “the trends in extreme 
right wing voting are above all explained by anti-immigration attitudes and the changes 
therein, which are influenced by the actual increase in the number of ethnic immigrants 
present (lubbers, 2001: 179).” however, this does not mean the variation in far-right vot-
ing is now completely mapped out. there are still aspects that have not been given much 
attention as yet. 
scarcely any attention has been paid to the role of the media in this matter, despite the 
fact that the media are considered to be an important factor in the communication be-
tween politicians and voters, especially at election times (Brants & Van Praag, 2000; 
2005; Kleinnijenhuis et al, 2003). in the field of election studies some even speak of a 
mediacracy (Brants, 2002). Many within as well as outside academia consider media 
coverage of the far-right a delicate matter because of its assumed agenda-setting effects 
(i.e. Van donselaar et al., 1998). therefore the suggestion that the media have a role in 
the decision-making process whether to vote for the far-right or not is legitimate. lubbers 
(2001) tested this hypothesis of media influence for germany and the netherlands. the 
results reveal a connection between the amount of newspaper coverage of the far-right 
and far-right voting behaviour; however, the characteristics of this relationship remain un-
clear (see below). hence the goal of this study is to explore the contents of the newspaper 
24
coverage of the far-right and its relation to the variations in far-right voting over time and 
between nations.
the blind spot of the relationship between voting for the far-right and media coverage is 
not only addressed by lubbers et al., but also (although from different perspectives) by 
de swert (2002), Walgrave & de swert (2004) and Van donselaar et al. (1998). the lat-
ter, however, limit their focus to journalists’ strategies to deal with the far-right or media 
coverage of far-right ideological issues. As far as i know, no one besides lubbers and – to 
some extent - Walgrave & de swert and recently Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart (2007), 
have looked into the relationship between the volume of newspaper coverage on the far-
right and voting behaviour/preferences.
1.4.1 findings on the relationship between media attention and 
 far-right voting 
for two countries, germany and the netherlands, the relationship between newspaper 
coverage of the far-right and far-right voting has been investigated by lubbers. he came 
to somewhat surprising conclusions (2001: 239). in accordance with his findings on con-
textual factors, he concentrated his research on the role of the media on two issues, asy-
lum seekers and the far-right parties themselves. the number of articles on asylum seekers 
as well as the number of articles on far-right parties were related to election polls during 
the nineties. he then found that there is no significant relationship between the number of 
articles on asylum seekers and far-right voting in neither of the two countries. Also in the 
netherlands there was no relationship between attention for far-right parties and far-right 
voting. in germany however, he did find a positive relationship between the frequency of 
articles on the far-right and far-right voting (2001: 174). the reasons for this difference 
are as yet unclear. 
A closer look at the outcomes of lubbers’ study reveals – although not statistically sig-
nificant – opposite effects on both variables in the two countries. An increase of articles 
on the far-right in the netherlands relates to a decrease of far-right votes. While the fre-
quency of articles on asylum seekers in the netherlands relates to an increase in far-right 
votes, it has a negative effect in germany (2001: 237). Both the strength and the effect 
of the relationship vary between the two countries. the increasing amount of articles in 
dutch newspapers at the moment of decreasing support for the parties cd and cP’86 in 
1994 found by lubbers (2001: 200) may be thus explained by a negative content of the 
news coverage. that would be a reversed effect of lubbers’ hypothesis: “the higher the 
media attention to extreme right-wing parties, the larger the likelihood of voting for an 
extreme right-wing party (2001: 166)”, but would at the same time support the hypoth-
esis that newspaper coverage does influence far-right voting behaviour negatively or posi-
tively, depending on the contents of the coverage. the contents of newspaper coverage of 
the far-right therefore needs to be investigated.
1.4.2 the importance of media contents
lubbers chose not to go into the contents of newspaper coverage and measured only the 
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amount of media attention by the number of articles in the newspapers. he did so, not 
only for practical reasons, such as limited time, but states that he finds his arguments to 
do so in media theories as well. however, the assumption of this study is that the content 
of newspaper coverage on the far-right is relevant. this expectation is built upon various 
hints from media and social movement theories and finds support in lubbers’ results as 
well as in some of his remarks thereon. this study will further elaborate on these argu-
ments below.
using the results of Vergeer’s (2000) study on the relationship between media and at-
titudes towards immigrants, lubbers argues that the content of the newspaper coverage is 
not important. According to this study, the newspaper read has little influence on people’s 
opinion on ethnic relations and people usually choose a newspaper that matches their 
existing opinions (Vergeer, 2000). referring to stappers, reijnders & Möller (1990), he 
adds that mechanisms of selective perception and selective retention support this assump-
tion; “research has shown that people with racist attitudes interpret anti-racist texts 
which contrast their opinion in such a manner that their pre-existing attitudes remain 
valid to them (lubbers, 2001: 166).” the outcome of Vergeer’s study is confirmed in 
studies on the relation between media and election campaigns. Van der Brug & Van der 
eijk (2005: 264) state that changes in party preferences among voters do not relate to 
media use, but there are significant “across the board” effects. this does not mean that 
content does not matter, but only that there was (in the 2002/2003 elections in the neth-
erlands) little difference in the content of the coverage of various newspapers. Walgrave 
& de swert (2004: 495-496) found effects of flemish news media’s attention on voting 
behaviour for certain far-right ideological issues. these authors thus have empirical argu-
ments against neglecting the content of newspaper coverage.
there are also remarks to be made on lubbers’ interpretation of the mechanisms of 
selective perception and selective retention. even if this mechanism is at work, it is still 
insufficient reason to ignore the content of newspaper coverage of the far-right. for read-
ers’ opinions on political issues, in this case racist attitudes, and the evaluation of politi-
cal parties, the confirmation, denial or (possible) legitimation of these opinions by third 
parties has proved important (Koopmans & olzak, 2004). research on party choice has 
made clear that, after having formed an opinion on issues, people use accessible informa-
tion to evaluate which party with similar views suits them best. A two-step model is at 
work here. People first compare their views with those of competing political parties. the 
parties with points of view closest to their own are then evaluated on whether they are 
a ‘normal democratic party’ or not, and on their strategic value (Van der Brug, fennema 
& tilly, 2005: 564). in research on far-right violence it has become clear that the amount 
of support of mainstream politicians and public opinion of this violence depends on the 
visibility, resonance and legitimation in the media (Koopmans & olzak, 2004). important 
third parties providing this feedback are politicians, journalists and experts whose mes-
sage is accessible almost exclusively through the media. so between finding agreement 
between individual opinion and party ideology and voting, voters evaluate other aspects 
of their voting decision, based on media-provided information.
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these arguments match findings within the communication science framework. second 
order agenda setting theory emphasises the relevance of the way (far-right) actors receive 
attention in the media is meaningful for the evaluation of these actors by the readers and 
their voting behaviour (Weaver, Mccombs & shaw, 2004: 262). others make a similar 
argument, stating that a cumulative particular way of reporting on a subject has an in-
creasing effect on voters’ ideas on the subject (scheufele, 1999; cappella & Jamieson, 
1997). in this way, media make an important contribution to the public opinion of the 
far-right, although this influence is seldom direct (McQuail, 2005: 516). due to the fact 
that journalists report on movements in a routine way, using a limited set of ‘frames’ 
(gitlin, 1980: 266), a repetition of a limited range of images of a political movement oc-
curs in newspaper coverage, or, as Van Zoonen states: “once you have a media image it is 
quite hard to get rid of it” (1992: 457). this image is built by emphasising certain aspects 
of a movement or focussing attention on repeated events around a movement (gitlin, 
1980: 27; Van donselaar, 1998: 47). this does not mean the public image of a move-
ment is static. if significant changes in the social or political context occur – a ‘political 
crisis’ in gitlin’s terms - this may lead to changes in journalistic routines and a changed 
public image of the movement (gitlin, 1980: 273). these arguments confirm our idea 
that the portrayal of a movement, in this case the far-right, is of great significance both 
as an expression of political discourse and as an information source for voting decisions. 
this means that we have to investigate how media pay attention to the far-right as a 
prerequisite to be able to explore adequately the relationship between media coverage of 
the far-right and far-right support. the central problem of this study is to investigate how 
media pay attention to the far-right and how it varies between cultural-political contexts, 
newspapers and over time.  
1.4.3 media attention: a conceptual elaboration
By investigating how media pay attention to the far-right we can determine if there is a 
‘sensus communis’ way of reporting on it. in literature we found hints as to what aspects 
of media attention need to be examined if we want to get a grip on the contents of media 
coverage of the far-right. to be able to review variation in the content of the coverage 
of the far-right we distinguish four relevant aspects of media attention. the first two are 
quantitative measures (attention volume and formal attention), which cover the same 
aspects of media attention as much agenda setting research (Weaver, Mccombs & shaw, 
2004: 257; Kosicki, 1993; Walgrave & van Aelst, 2006). the other two are more ‘quali-
tative’ measures of media attention and thus give us insight in the image of the far-right 
constructed in newspaper coverage (substantial attention and support attention). these 
last two aspects of media attention have been developed to analyse the ‘how’ question 
of media attention for the far-right in a structural way. the assumption behind it is that 
emphasis on certain aspects of the far-right and repetition of this emphasis make a certain 
image of the far-right more salient (gitlin, 1980, entman, 1991). for this improvement of 
the study of media attention for the far-right, we apply knowledge from studies on related 
subjects, such as that on media images of social movements by gitlin (1980), social move-
ments’ discursive opportunities (Koopmans & olzak, 2004), framing (entman, 1991, 
1993) and the process to come to a far-right vote (Van der Brug, fennema & tilly, 2005).
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volume attention
Most studies on the media and the far-right simply counted the number of articles on the 
far-right (or migration issues) within a given period and related those numbers to voting 
or polling data through various statistical procedures (lubbers, 2001; Walgrave & de 
swert, 2004; Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007). this volume of attention is a relevant 
first measure to judge how much, or how little, attention media pay to the far-right. 
Media are often said to ignore the far-right completely. if this thesis of editorial ‘minimal 
attention policy’ (Van donselaar et al., 1998: 46) is correct, we would find a very small 
attention volume.
formal attention
the second aspect of media attention to the far-right is actually a further investigation of 
the first. Beyond volume, other quantitative measures are used to see how much attention 
the far-right received. the visibility of the far-right as an actor or topic in the articles is 
taken into account, as well as the level of prominence the far-right has in the articles. for-
mal attention provides a cue to the newsworthiness of the far-right. high levels of formal 
attention measures may increase the relevance of media information when voters judge 
far-right parties at the ballot box (see Koopmans & olzak, 2004: 203). 
substantial attention
this third aspect of media attention is the first that gives the ‘how do media pay attention 
to the far-right’ question real substance. far-right voting increases when voters evaluate 
these parties as ‘normal’ democratic parties instead of, for example, ‘too extreme’, ‘un-
democratic’, or ‘unreliable’ (Van der Brug, tilly and fennema, 2005). this suggests we 
should focus on the portrayal, or media image of the far-right itself in the coverage. this 
third aspect is called substantial attention. We consider four dimensions of substantial 
attention. firstly, we ask if the far-right is represented passively or actively as a source. 
for similar indicators see scholten & ruigrok (2006) and ter Wal (2004). A low level 
of active representation suggests a greater distance between journalist (and reader) and 
the subject. in cases of passive representation the latter is ‘not involved’ but only ‘talked 
about’. in other words: are far-right actors portrayed as objects or subjects in the coverage?
A second dimension consists of the roles in which far-right actors receive news coverage. 
this can be in ‘normal’ or positive roles, roles that can be expected for political parties 
, for example, as a participant in parliamentary debates and party conferences; or more 
negative ones, such as in legal conflict (e.g. when a far-right politician is charged with rac-
ism), or in forms of extra-parliamentary activity. the way in which newspapers present 
how far-right actors operate is one of the most important aspects of its media image (Van 
Zoonen, 1992: 463-468). 
the third dimension of substantial attention is the presence of stigmatising associations 
with the nazis and (their) anti-semitism, or associations with extremist (violent) groups 
(such as neo-nazis, or skinheads) or violence. the presence of such associations attribute 
a negative media image to the far-right and increase the distance from a ‘normal demo-
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cratic party’ image (Van der Brug, fennema & tilly, 2005). therefore, we assume that 
such associations may function as disqualifiers in the electoral competition. it is a fact that 
they are used as such, for example in the case of Pim fortuyn in the dutch election cam-
paign of 2001 (Van donselaar & rodrigues, 2002: 62). A high level of stigmatising asso-
ciations in the coverage strengthens an extremist, or violent media image of the far-right.
the fourth and last dimension of substantial attention is the presence of far-right ideo-
logical standpoints. Whereas the first three dimensions are more directly related to the 
far-right’s sociogenesis, this last dimension represents the ideology. the ideological stand-
points attributed to far-right actors in the coverage add to their media image. Both the 
range of standpoints and the intensity of their appearance in the media may be important. 
for example, when a party is only related to one standpoint, it may acquire the image of 
a one-issue party. 
these four dimensions form an image that may, or may not meet the standards of a 
‘normal democratic party’ (Van der Brug, fennema & tilly, 2005: 546). Portrayal of the 
far-right in ‘normal democratic’ roles would increase the appeal of a far-right party. in the 
same way, portrayal in, by general standards, unacceptable circumstances would decrease 
the appeal of the far-right. 
support attention
not only the image, in a restricted sense, matters in this respect. other stakeholders, or 
‘claim makers’ (Koopmans & statham, 1999) relate to far-right formations and their 
standpoints as well. Journalists can decide to include these attitudes in their coverage of 
the far-right. Most studies on the public image of movements and parties have ignored 
this support as a part of the media image. therefore the fourth aspect of media attention 
in our study is support attention that considers the way the far-right or their standpoints 
are evaluated by non-far-right stakeholders, such as other politicians, civil organisations 
and government, and thus measures legitimation and distance from other political par-
ties. We distinguish two dimensions of support attention. first we look at the attention 
to attitudes of non-far-right actors towards the far-right. Koopmans & olzak distinguish 
resonance and legitimacy as “mechanisms of positive and negative feedback (2004: 
223)”. Where resonance is a ripple effect, assuming that in a reaction of a third party, the 
original message is at least partially repeated. legitimacy refers to whether the message 
is approved (legitimated by a stakeholder) or disapproved (de-legitimated) (Koopmans 
& olzak, 2004: 204-5). our assumption is that reported favourable attitudes of non-far-
right actors (legitimation) add to the image of a ‘normal democratic party’, while unfa-
vourable attitudes (de-legitimisation) would add to an unacceptable image. the second 
dimension of support attention is the attention to debates among stakeholders on how to 
deal with the far-right. the idea is that the more frequently such debates are reported, the 
greater the contribution to an undemocratic and unacceptable party image, because the 
debates are centred around the question whether or not the far-right can be treated as any 
other political party. often such debate is focussed on the necessity and possibility of pro-
hibition of a far-right organisation or party, or non-cooperation agreements among other 
parties, such as have been made in Belgium (deschouwer, 2001).
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figure 1.2 four aspects of media attention for the far-right
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attention aspects dimensions
I Volume attention Number of articles
II Formal attention Visibility in newspaper
Prominence in articles
III Substantial attention Representation of far-right actors
Situated roles far-right actors feature in
Stigmatising associations
Far-right standpoints
IV Support attention Non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the 
far-right
Debate on how to deal with the far-right
1.5 variations in media attention to the far-right: questions
We now have four aspects of media attention for the far-right to structure our central 
question (rQ1) how do media pay attention to the far-right? in order to find out how 
these characteristics of media attention to the far-right are relevant for the study of the 
relationship between media attention and far-right voting we need to investigate the varia-
tion in the media attention to the far-right. in this section we specify the primary question 
into three research questions of variation in media attention to the far-right, longitudinal 
variation, variation between different kinds of newspapers and variation between differ-
ent national contexts. if there is something like a ‘sensus communis’ of reporting on the 
far-right, how far-reaching is this across time and culture and different types of newspa-
pers?
1.5.1 longitudinal changes
in recent history of the far-right and its popularity among voters there are numerous ups-
and-downs that should be mentioned, as well as some serious events, such as the wave 
of far-right violence in germany, the sudden rise and assassination of Pim fortuyn in the 
netherlands and the successful lawsuit against the Belgian far-right party vlaams blok 
(VB, flemish Block). for the purpose of this study it is relevant to investigate to what ex-
tent these electoral fluctuations and events have been preceded or followed by changes in 
media attention. especially interesting is the question whether there are specific patterns 
in this longitudinal variation, such as that found by Van gorp in the Belgian press’s at-
tention to asylum seekers around christmas, when all newspapers suddenly shifted to the 
same frame, regardless of their previous dominant framing (Van gorp, 2005). other than 
lubbers’ argument that increased volume attention will cause increased popularity of the 
far-right, there are no indications that specific patterns occur. therefore an open research 
question is formulated (rQ2): Are there any changes in the media attention to the far-
right between 1986 and 2004? 
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1.5.2 differences and similarities between newspapers
research on political news showed different, sometimes contradictory results of compara-
tive analyses between types of newspapers. some studies show few differences between 
newspapers, while others stress that significant differences exist (scholten & ruigrok, 
2006; Van der Brug & Van der eijk, 2005). in order to create a valid basis for this study 
and to be able to investigate possible differences between types of newspapers, three 
different daily national newspapers in each country were selected, two so-called quality 
newspapers and one popular newspaper. the popular newspaper is considered to be right 
of the political middle (ohlemacher, 1996; de Bens, 2001; Ward, 2005). of the quality 
newspapers, one is left-leaning and one right-leaning. With this newspaper selection we 
can compare quality and popular newspapers, as well as left-leaning and right-leaning 
newspapers (see chapter two for further details on the newspaper selection). research 
question 3 therefore is: Are there any differences in the attention to the far-right in differ-
ent types of newspapers?
media attention to the far-right in quality and popular newspapers
A general difference between quality and popular newspapers revealed in various studies 
is that quality newspapers pay more attention to politics and political parties (scholten & 
ruigrok, 2006: 10, 24; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2007: 98). it would be logical to expect that 
this also applies to specific political parties, in this case far-right political parties. there-
fore we expect the following:
H1 Quality newspapers pay more volume attention and more formal attention to the 
far-right than popular newspapers.
Previous research suggested two differences in substantial attention between quality and 
popular newspapers. the first difference is that the popular press tends to limit its focus 
to sensational aspects of the far-right, such as internal power struggles, shocking quotes 
from party leaders, violence and legal conflicts (ohlemacher, 1996: 156, 158; Plasser & 
ulram, 2003: 27-29); steward, Mazzoleni & horsfield, 2003: 225). Quality papers, in 
contrast, are relatively more interested in the background of far-right politics and why 
people support these parties and activists (steward, Mazzolenie & horsfield, 2003: 225). 
the second difference is the higher level of attention for crime and immigration issues in 
popular newspapers that leads to a focus on only two far-right standpoints, xenophobic/
exclusionist and law and order standpoints (ohlemacher, 1996: 156; steward, Mazzoleni 
& horsfield, 2003: 225, Walgrave & de swert, 2004: 489). these two differences suggest 
that, overall, quality newspapers pay more attention to a more diverse range of substan-
tial attention issues. 
H2 Quality newspapers pay more attention to (a more diverse range of) substantial 
attention aspects than popular newspapers. 
following the same line of argument we expect popular newspapers to limit their focus to 
de-legitimatising attitudes of non-far-right actors. their focus on the far-right itself is on 
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the extreme aspects, because of the deviant character that is unlikely to be approved by 
the political establishment. Quality papers, however, are expected to pay more attention 
to support attention in general, as well as to the individual kinds of support attention.
H3 Quality newspapers pay more attention to (a more diverse range of) support at-
tention aspects than popular newspapers.
  
media attention to the far-right in left and right leaning newspapers
in all three national contexts the media systems developed within the borders of what 
hallin and Mancini call the democratic-corporatist model, which, among other features, 
included political parallelism in the press (2004: 178). this means newspapers were often 
affiliated to political parties. this parallelism has declined over recent decades, at least in 
the formal sense. former partisan papers, or their successors, can still be characterised 
along left-right lines (hallin & Mancini, 2004: 180). in countries like germany and 
Belgium the high level of professionalism of journalists does not automatically mean ‘neu-
tral’ journalism. they tend to stress particular values as important in their publications. 
they concluded on the basis of various studies that a certain degree of ‘politicisation’ of 
newspapers is still likely to be present, although others, like schönbach stürzenbecher & 
schneider (1998) state that there “has been a convergence in journalism in the Western 
democratic countries.” if the persistence thesis on ‘political parallelism’, or rather ‘polari-
sation between left and right newspapers thesis’ is correct, we can expect to find differ-
ences in the coverage of the far-right between left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers. 
left-leaning newspapers would then have more reason to use actively the strategies as 
described by Van donselaar et al. (1998) to create a certain image of the far-right, than 
right-wing oriented newspapers would do. this, then would lead to three new hypotheses:
H4 left-oriented newspapers pay more volume attention and more formal attention 
than right-wing oriented newspapers.
H5 left-oriented newspapers pay more attention to substantial attention aspects than 
right-wing oriented newspapers.
H6 left-oriented newspapers pay more attention to support attention aspects than 
right-oriented newspapers.
1.5.3 contextual variation
Besides the historical dimension of comparison and that between newspaper types, this 
study also investigates media attention for the far-right cross-culturally. three national con-
texts have been included, the netherlands, germany and flanders (see for a detailed argu-
ment chapter 2). despite a range of similar circumstances the far-right has had very different 
levels of electoral success in these contexts. in this study it is therefore interesting to compare 
the media’s contents and thus the media’s roles herein. has the far-right in the netherlands 
indeed been ignored, while receiving attention in flanders? did the german press continue 
to present a negative media image of the far-right, while the dutch media abandoned it after 
the demise of the last generation of far-right parties at the turn of the millennium? does the 
cultural-political context matter for the media attention to the far-right?  
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do dutch newspaper report differently on similar far-right actors than do german or 
flemish newspapers? in other words, is the political-cultural context relevant for the way 
newspapers report on the far-right? in chapter six i will compare the media attention in 
these three political and cultural contexts as a final step to improve our understanding of 
significance of the media attention to the far-right. the fourth and last research question 
therefore is: What differences are there in the media attention to the far-right between 
dutch, german and flemish newspapers?
1.6 objective of the study
the model of the four aspects of media attention to the far-right enables us to investigate 
the media image of the far-right in a systematic way. this study provides an answer to 
the principle question ‘how did dutch, german and flemish newspapers pay attention 
to the far-right between 1986 and 2004’. Moreover, by uncovering trends and patterns 
in the media attention to the far-right we can draw up an empirically based theory that 
shows how and why the portrayal of this exceptional party family in the newspapers of 
the northwest of europe is a changing image. With that, this study also delivers materials 
for future research that are more capable of interpreting the relationship between media 
attention to the far-right and far-right political success within its political-cultural context.
1.7 outline of the book
in the next chapter we will elaborate on the design of the study, the measurement of the 
four aspects of media attention to the far-right and the methods and techniques used in 
the analysis. the heart of the book consists of three case studies. We applied the model 
of media attention to the far-right on newspaper coverage of the far-right in newspapers 
from three countries. for each of these national contexts, the netherlands, germany and 
flanders (the dutch speaking region of Belgium) we conducted a case study. in the last 
chapter, we compare the outcomes of these national studies in a cross-national analysis 
and use the outcomes of the study to theorise on the mechanisms we found in the media 
attention to the far-right.
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2. design and methodology
chAPter tWo
design And Methodology 7
the main purpose of this chapter is to explain how the questions that have been brought for-
ward in section 1.5 have been researched. the empirical phase of this study can be divided in 
three parts. for each of these three parts the design and methodology will be discussed sepa-
rately. the main part of the study concentrates exclusively on the contents of the newspaper 
coverage, only in the last chapter the outcome of these analyses is confronted with the sec-
ondary data. in what follows the methodology of the systematic-quantitative content analy-
sis, that is the core of the research, is discussed in section 2.2. in section 2.3 we then discuss 
the additional content analysis method (framing) that has been used to triangulate, as well as 
to complete, the outcomes of the systematic-quantitative content analysis with analyses of a 
closer and different reading of the newspaper coverage of the far-right. in section 2.4 the pro-
cedure and analytical construct in which the newspaper coverage data has been related to the 
voting data will be explained.
2.1 systematic-quantitative content analysis
from the research questions logically follows that the empirical research for this study con-
cerns the contents of newspaper coverage of the far-right. Because of the descriptive charac-
ter of the research questions concerning this content, the comparative research design and 
the amount of material, the choice for a systematic-quantitative content analysis is a logical 
method. it enables the researcher to perform a precise and effective analysis of a large corpus. 
this method is a frequently used and positively evaluated research tradition for the analysis 
of contents of texts, and especially mass media (Wester & van selm, 2006: 124). “Quantita-
tive content analysis is the systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communica-
tion, which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules, and the 
analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods, in order to describe 
the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication 
to its context, both of production and consumption (riffe, lacy & fico, 1998: 20).” this is 
precisely the form of content analysis that features in this study (as opposed to various other, 
often more qualitative, forms, see Wester & Pleijter, 2005; neuendorf, 2002).
newspaper articles are ‘natural’ data in the sense that they are analysed exactly as they occur 
in society (in contrast to survey data that are indirectly, or artificially acquired). newspaper 
articles, in contrast to transcribed interviews or answers to survey questions, are part of 
social reality (Wester 1996: 199-200). texts, such as newspaper articles on the far-right are 
“products with a meaning structure that refers to the social context in which the texts have 
been produced (Wester, 2006:  18)8.” 
7 Parts of this chapter (section 2.3) were previously published in Communications, as Schafraad, 
 P., Wester, F. & Scheepers, P. (2006). Using ‘new’ data sources for ‘old’ newspaper research: 
 developing guidelines for data collection. Communications 31 , 455-467.
8 My translation.
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the content analysis as is executed in this study is a direct analysis of social reality. its purpose 
is to describe systematically the characteristics of the content of newspaper coverage of the far-
right with the aid of a carefully developed, constructed and tested instrument. therefore con-
stant items are used, that – to be accurate – have been operationalised in specific ways for the 
diverse temporal and local relevant contexts.
 
2.1.1 the content analysis instrument
the first step in the operationalisation of the theoretical framework developed in 1.4.3 is to 
work out indicators of the three aspects of media content relevant for this study. from these 
indicators the next step in the operationalisation is the listing of the recording units pertain-
ing to these indicators and from there on the phrasing/wording of these recording units into 
questions and instructions that together form the instrument. this systematically carried out 
process, which should guard the construct validity of the instrument (Merten, 1995: 317), is 
described in this section. the codebook can be found in appendix 2.2.
from theoretical concepts to coding items
in the theoretical framework, three relevant aspect of the contents of newspaper coverage 
of the far-right are identified and conceptualised (1.4.3). here the way in which these have 
been translated into indicators and then into the concrete items in the codebook is elabo-
rated. A schematic overview of the operationalisation is presented in figure 2.1.
 
volume attention
in order to calculate the volume attention we simply recorded the title and date of publica-
tion of the newspaper (items 1-3)
 
formal attention
the first indicator of formal attention is the size of the article. As the form in which the 
articles was available varied greatly (copies of original articles, prints of microfilm, photo-
graphs of original articles and text-only offprints of lexis nexis and Mediargus archives), 
we needed a measurement that fitted all of these formats. Part of the lexis nexis and Me-
diargus offprints provided exact word counts. therefore we took the exact or estimated 
amount of words as the operationalisation of size of the article (item 7 estimated, and item 
7a exact amount). We categorised the estimated amount of words as follows: short articles 
(< 150 words), medium length articles (151 – 400 words), long articles (401 – 800 words) 
and extra long articles (>800 words).
A second indicator of formal attention was the position of the article in the newspaper. 
front page articles form the ‘main headlines of the day’. hence we distinguished between 
front page articles and those appearing elsewhere. Page numbers were not always provided, 
especially those of telegraaf and het laatste nieuws offprints from lexis nexis and Me-
diargus. A third indicator of formal attention focused on the prominence of the far-right 
within an article as well as whether the far-right featured in the headline of the article. 
A second indicator in this area is the prominence within the article, therefore we recorded 
whether the far-right featured as a main issue or as a character in the news story. 
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substantial attention
substantial attention indicators form the largest part of the codebook. here the most sig-
nificant differences between the version used for the dutch newspapers and the final ver-
sion are to be found. All points where the dutch version differed are indicated. As we have 
seen in chapter 1, substantial attention consists of four dimensions, of which representa-
tion is the first. 
for the representation of far-right actors we coded two characteristics. item 11 is the ac-
tual representation indicator. it checks whether a far-right actor is only mentioned and 
described in the passive voice, or if the far-right actor is described in the active voice, in 
other words if it was quoted or paraphrased. the name of the far-right actor (party name, 
name of organisation, or other description of the actor) is to be found in item 12. in the 
codebook we distinguished between paraphrases and quotes in active representation. this 
distinction might be problematic in terms of validity. research has shown that journalists’ 
presentation of their sources is not always 100% accurate, but and can deviate for stylistic 
reasons (rennen, 2000: 298-299). citations might not always be citations, for example. 
therefore we limited the categories of representation in the analysis into passive and active. 
despite the stylistic decisions of journalists, this remains a relevant and valid distinction .
A second substantial dimension is the situated role. coders could code six different roles 
in which the far-right actor was portrayed (items 13-18). the first situated role is ‘role in 
elections’. All electoral situations, such as campaigns, polls, outcomes and negotiations for 
a new government were coded as ‘role in elections’. the second is ‘role in political actual-
ity’. this refers to all situations in which the far-right played a role in a debate about a 
policy issue, actuality, or parliamentary debate. this role refers to the prime task of MPs 
and other politicians. the third role is ‘role in legal conflict’. All situations in which far-
right actors engaged in law enforcement, court cases, convictions, etc. were coded as ‘role 
in legal conflict’. next, we distinguished three different ‘extra-parliamentary activity roles’ 
(for the dutch case only a general extra-parliamentary role). All social movement activity, 
rallies, violent confrontations with opponents and far-right violence (against minorities, or 
general) were coded in this role. last, we distinguished two kinds of situations within the 
far-right, or within far-right formations:, in normal situations and in negative situations. 
this distinction was made because we know from the literature that the far-right has a 
long history of internal conflict, which has been coded as ‘roles in negative situations’.
stigmatising associations are the third dimension of substantial attention. it was recorded 
via one item in the codebook. it simply asked if the far-right actor was associated with any 
reference to nazis, racist violence, or any symbol of nazism (item 32). 
the last dimension of substantial attention measures the attention to far-right standpoints. 
We recorded all references and mention of the far-right standpoints as they have been iden-
tified in section 1.2. that means we recorded attention to anti-progressive standpoints, 
anti-democratic standpoints, anti-establishment/populist standpoints, nationalist stand-
points, xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints, law and order standpoints and standpoints 
in favour of traditional values.
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support attention
the two dimensions of support attention, as described in section 1.4.3, were recorded as 
follows. first we recorded if there were any non-far-right actors (nfrA) with an explicit 
favourable attitude towards the far-right, for example when a spokesman utters support, or 
agreement with a far-right standpoint (item 19). in item 20 we identified the non-far-right 
actor. We then recorded any nfrA with unfavourable attitudes (item 21) and their identi-
ties (item 22). the last indicator of support attention was designed to record any debate 
among nfrAs about strategies towards the far-right. At times such debates were intensive 
in all of the three national contexts, especially in flanders and germany, each in its own 
specific form. Attention to such debate was recorded as a binary variable (item 23).
figure 2.1 schematic overview of the operationalisation of the four 
 aspects of media attention for the far-right
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Attention Aspect indicAtors                cAtegories (other thAn yes/no)
I. Volume attention Absolute number of articles
Average number of articles per day
II. Formal attention Size of the article Short (<= 150 words)
Medium (151 – 400 words)
Long (401 – 800 words)
Extra long (> 800 words)
Front page appearance
Headline appearance of the far-right
Prominence of far-right actors in the article
III. Substantial 
attention
Representation Active representation
Passive representation
Situated roles In elections
In political actuality
In legal conflict
In extra-parliamentary violence
In extra-parliamentary confrontations
In extra-parliamentary peaceful situations
In normal internal situations
In negative internal situations
Stigmatising associations
Far-right standpoints Anti-democratic
Anti-progressive
Populist/anti-establishment
Nationalist
Xenophobic/exclusionist
Law & Order
Traditional Value protection
IV. Support 
attention
Attitudes of non-far-right 
actors towards the far-
right
Exclusively favourable
Exclusively unfavourable
Both favourable and unfavourable
Attention to debates on how to deal with the far-right
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2.1.2  coding instructions
A last aspect of the operationalisation that is discussed here are the coding instructions. 
these are crucial for both the validity and reliability of the recording and coding work 
because they instruct the coder very precisely how to ‘read’ or interpret the raw data in 
relation of the research questions. the coding instructions define the coder’s room for in-
terpretation and thus make the contents analysis systematic (Wester en selm, 2006: 133). 
the general instructions included two important issues. first the order of recording 
steps, and second the instruction to ‘stay as close as possible to the text’ of both the 
document and the codebook. no individual interpretation or background information 
may be used to code the newspaper coverage of the far-right, compelling the coders to 
act in accordance with the directions given in the individual instructions that come with 
every item. each item in the codebook includes definitions of the central concepts used in 
it (for example ‘ethnic group’, ‘conservative political party’, or ‘short article’). to further 
explain the items, descriptions and examples of how the items may appear in newspapers 
are given, so the coder can recognise them more easily (for example the topic of illegal 
aliens may appear as ‘sans papiers’). to further systemise the content analysis all items 
are measured with carefully constructed pre-defined categories so the coding consists 
exclusively of numeric values (riffe, lacy & fico 1998: 25), and items are measured on 
nominal and ordinal scales. 
2.1.3 instrument development
A reliable and valid content analysis instrument without flaws is not something that comes 
about overnight. from the first outlines to the final version a period of almost a year went 
by and the design process passed through three phases, initial design, testing and retesting 
and the finalisation of the instrument. the original design was laid out on the basis of the 
theoretical framework and the explorative study of a significant amount of newspaper cov-
erage of the far-right from all three national contexts and various points in time (between 
1986-2004) and the feedback of some experts on parts of the instrument, or, on occasion, 
even individual items. A feasible version was then taken for the second phase of testing 
and retesting (using the examples of Wester en selm, 2006: 134; gerbner, 1972: 167-168). 
this testing phase was largely carried out in the context of a course on media analysis for 
communication science students at the department of communication of the Ku leuven. 
in a series of group and individual sessions 25 coders were trained in using the codebook. 
every session ended with a extensive evaluation of the coding work, with special attention 
to the phrasing of the items, their measurement and the coding instructions. especially in 
the early stages this resulted in major revisions of the instrument. in later stages the adap-
tations were more in the nature of fine-tuning. the test and retest phase was rounded off 
with a major coding session in which the coders coded 550 articles from flemish newspa-
pers. this session was evaluated both in writing by the coders and by a (construct) reliabi-
ity test that revealed seven problematic items (scott’s π < .67), that were then all revised, 
or taken out of the instrument. the concept instrument – as a product of the test and retest 
phase, a very different instrument than its preliminary form – was then fine-tuned by five 
different coders, using data from various timeslots, newspapers and national contexts. 
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the coders that assisted the development of the instrument were not involved in the ac-
tual coding, as the consensus developed by them during the development process cannot 
be replicated by new coders (Krippendorff 2004a: 131). however, the final stage of the 
development took place during the training of the coders for the actual data gathering, as 
the instructions were adapted to reach further consensus among the coders. An evaluation 
of the codebook after the recording of the dutch data led to a last alteration of the code-
book used in the german and flemish studies. this last version differed in structure from 
the dutch one and some items were deleted. one item was divided in three new ones. the 
operationalisation above and the codebook in Appendix 2.2 are the latest and final version.
2.2 sample construction
the corpus on which the research was carried out had to be constructed along clear and 
strict standards. in some instances that meant that a statistical procedure was performed to 
obtain a sound sample (Krippendorff 2004a: 122). for the aim of this study this method of 
sampling is not very suitable, because the research period is quite long, while the theoreti-
cally relevant newspaper articles are expected to be concentrated in certain short periods 
within the total research period. therefore a theoretically and empirically informed sam-
pling method (also known as a purposive sample, cf Wester 1995b) is more effective and 
contributes to the construct and external validity of the study (riffe, lacy & fico, 1998: 
144). in this section the process of narrowing down the sample is described.
2.2.1 national contexts
the research is limited to three national contexts that are the largest level of comparison. 
these three national contexts are flanders (the dutch speaking region of Belgium), ger-
many and the netherlands. these three countries have not been picked randomly, but each 
represents a significantly distinctive political background and history of far-right activity. 
the netherlands and flanders are extreme cases on various grounds. 
Whereas the Vlaams Blok, the only far-right party in this electoral region9, has grown into 
a irrefutable power factor in the period under scrutiny, the dutch far-right has remained a 
shadowy marginal phenomenon, at least until May 2002. A second contrast between these 
two contexts is that the party system in flanders contrasts sharply with that in the nether-
lands (coffé 2005, ten napel 1999). While the netherlands has a rather loosely organised 
party system, in Belgium parties are first organised along the lines of language, and then on 
both sides of the language border along religious and socio-economic divides, and is a case 
of ‘extreme multi-partyism’ (de Winter & dumont 1999: 184). the fact that vlaams blok 
is part of a significant flemish nationalist tradition (that is much broader and widely shared 
among the flemish population than the rather radical nationalism of the party itself) sets 
the flemish social, cultural and historical context apart from the dutch, where the far-right 
does not have roots in any kind of broader ideological and cultural tradition. 
9  The Belgian political system is organised along language borders as a federal state. Both the 
French speaking and Dutch speaking part of the country have their own political parties that take part in the 
federal parliament and government. The region around the capital Brussels is the third region in this federal 
system. Here both the Walloon and Flemish parties are represented (see De Winter & Dumont 1999).	
41
2. design and methodology
in voting percentages, germany takes a middle position for the greatest part of the research 
period. the german party system differs from the dutch and Belgian systems, firstly be-
cause of its electoral threshold that has so far kept far-right parties out of the Bundestag (na-
tional parliament). While its party system in general is quite similar to the dutch, organised 
along similar religious and socio-economic lines, the reunification of former West- and east-
germany caused a change in the party system for two reasons. first, the former communist 
party Pds was included and second, the traditional West-german parties (including the 
far-right) gained a new electoral potential, but also faced new socio-political problems (see 
Jefery, 1999: 113). in respect of cultural, social and historical contexts germany, of course, 
stands out. firstly because of its emotionally charged history of national-socialism and the 
devastating consequences of it – in fact the sole reason for all political, social and scientific 
worries about the contemporary far-right in general. this historical background has far 
reaching consequences for german politics, as well as political, cultural and social life (see 
for example Koopmans, 2001; ignazi, 2006: 62). secondly because of the reunification that 
occurred during the research period, a germany came into being with two economic, politi-
cal and social backgrounds, with all the accompanying problems to be anticipated, chal-
lenging political parties, including the far-right. these three neighbouring countries were 
selected because their different contexts meant that considerable differences in the newspa-
per coverage could be expected and therefore fruitful comparisons possible.
2.2.2 newspaper selection
the choice of newspaper titles from these countries was not very easy. national newspapers 
are relatively easy to access, something that is much more difficult with regional newspa-
pers. the latter were eventually excluded because it was impossible to select regional news-
papers that were representative for all regional newspapers in the country. the newspapers 
themselves were not the problem, but the strong contextual regional differences would 
cause too powerful interfering factors for the cross-national analysis. for flanders, and 
probably the netherlands, it would have been possible to select a newspaper from reason-
ably comparable regions. in both these countries the greatest support for the far-right is 
concentrated in large harbour cities (Antwerp, rotterdam). in germany this is not the case, 
and far-right support is concentrated in a number of very different regions (for example 
Bavaria and saxony) (see lubbers, 2001: 84). Because of these sampling problems it was 
decided to focus on national newspapers. in each country it was possible to select a large 
popular newspaper, as well as two so called ‘quality’ newspapers, each representing a differ-
ent major political position in the political spectrum. All newspapers have a significant read-
ership among the population. the three flemish titles are de morgen (progressive/socialist, 
or left-leaning), de standaard (conservative, or right-leaning) and het laatste nieuws 
(popular and right-leaning). these represent the different factions of the flemish newspaper 
scene (Ward 2004: 26) for germany bild (popular and right-leaning), die süddeutsche 
zeitung (progressive, or left-leaning) and frankfurter allgemeine zeitung (conserva-
tive, or right-leaning) were selected.(Ward, 2004: 68). the dutch selection consists of de 
volkskrant (progressive/liberal, or left-leaning), nrc handelsblad (conservative/liberal, 
or right-leaning) and de telegraaf (popular and right-leaning) (Ward 2005: 126). see for 
circulation details appendix 2.1.
42
2.2.3 research period
the research period reaches from 1986 to 2004. the year 1986 was chosen as a starting 
point because that year roughly marks a point in the history of the far-right in all three 
countries when the far-right was in a similar position of low voting percentages and starting 
to grow (again) (Mudde 1998: 49, 132, 189). in this period, many far-right parties reshaped 
their programmes following the example of the french front nationale with its ‘nouvelle 
droite’, meaning a shift away from fascism as a cultural source and towards anti-immigrant 
politics, which often caused more radical and more explicit xenophobic and exclusionist 
standpoints (ignazi, 2006: 22). the period extends to 2004 because that is the election year 
closest to the start of this study and it includes the interesting new developments on the 
far-right of the political spectrum that occurred in all three countries during the first years 
of the decennium. in 2004 the vlaams blok reached a historic twenty-five percent of the 
flemish votes in the regional elections, and the period of 2001-2003 featured the rapid rise 
and (relative) fall of new right populist parties in both the netherlands and germany.
2.2.4 news concentration in election periods
Because the relationship between newspaper coverage of the far-right and voting behaviour 
is the central issue of this study the selection of newspaper articles was concentrated around 
elections. the selected periods consist of two months preceding national parliamentary and 
european parliamentary elections and the month directly after the elections. in this way it 
was possible to cover the entire campaign period, as well as the reactions to and effects of 
the electoral results. this total period was expected to contain the most intensive cover-
age of the far-right, and is the most likely to include changes in the newspaper coverage of 
the far-right because changes in the political situation, or relevant events are most likely to 
occur around elections10. drawing the samples from complete intense periods also avoids 
the danger of the bias of fragmentation that is the risk of a-select drawn samples (Wester & 
van selm, 2006: 128). According to Kops a selective sample based on theoretical and empir-
ical knowledge, such as the corpus in this study is often more efficient (Kops, 1977: 166). in 
this study the coverage of each newspaper in each research period forms one case (smallest 
unit of comparison). in total the study includes 81 different cases (see fig 2.2).
the actual corpus (selection of newspaper articles) consists of all articles in these cases. A 
selection instrument that was developed on the basis of the theoretical and historical under-
standing of the far-right, as it is worked out in section 1.2 and 1.3, has been used to gather 
all relevant newspaper articles. the selection instrument consists of a list of keywords that 
is an operationalisation of that sociogenesis, and in practice consists of a series of names 
of far-right political parties, organisations and politicians and a list of thematic keywords 
representing synonyms for far-right parties and symbolic references. the keyword list is 
adjusted for each time period as well as for each national context. this means that major 
changes in actors representing the far-right and forms in which the ideological issues are 
10  I am aware of the fact that on several occasions outside of the electoral periods important ‘news mo-
ments’ have occurred, such as the intensively covered attacks on migrant homes in Germany during the early 
nineties. Our corpus is not intended to cover all moments of change; it is not set out as historically complete, but 
yes to identify relevant factors.
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expressed have been taken in account. Also context specific issues asked for country spe-
cific operationalisation of the sociogenesis at points. After the original construction of the 
keyword list it was tested and adjusted according to a sampling protocol developed for this 
purpose, described in detail elsewhere (schafraad, Wester & scheepers, 2006: 465). see for 
the protocol Appendix 2.4.
Figure 2.2 Overview of election years in this study
year Flanders germany the netherlands
1986 National
1987 National National
1989 European European National
European*
1990 National
1991 National
1994 European National 
European*
National
European*
1995 National
1999 National
European**
European European
1998 National National
2002 National National
2003 National National
2004 European European European
* In these years the selection periods of both elections partly overlap. 
** In this year the National and European elections were held on the same day and therefore the selection periods overlap 
 completely
2.2.5 data sources
the newspaper articles were drawn from two kinds of data sources. As far as possible they 
were drawn from the electronic data sources lexis-nexis Academic and Mediargus. the ar-
ticles unavailable from these sources (all bild articles and the eighties to mid-nineties cases 
of the other newspapers) were taken from paper and microfiches editions of the newspapers 
from libraries. the above sampling protocol included measures to deal with the specific 
characteristics of these electronic data sources (ibid). the total corpus consists of 5,292 arti-
cles on the far-right. 
the data collection from different sources demanded a carefully set-up organisation. in ad-
dition, the usefulness of the electronic datasets had never been tested. so in order to be able 
to construct a valid corpus (internal validity) the aforementioned data collection protocol 
was developed. in a pre-test the characteristics of the data sources (and the quality of the 
data that can be obtained from them) were examined critically. Although the electronic data 
sources turned out to be not unproblematic and caused loss or obfuscation of formal infor-
mation on the articles (see schafraad, Wester & scheepers, 2006: 460), the two data sources 
lexis nexis Acamdemic and Mediargus were found useful for data collection in this study, 
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especially since they proved to produce a 100% coverage of relevant articles published. 
Based on the results of this pre-test a protocol for the data collection from the various re-
sources was drawn up and used for the data collection for this study (ibid, 466; Appendix 
2.4). With the application of such a protocol very accurate and replicable data collection is 
made possible.
After the data collection we found great differences in the amount of articles per election 
year, ranging from 19 (dutch, 1999) to 802 in the following dutch election year 2002. 
therefore we decided to draw a random sample from all election years that produced more 
than 200 articles per country. the limit of 200 was chosen in order to keep the chance of 
fragmentation of news stories to a minimum. We applied Morris’ formula for random sam-
ples of small populations11 to decide the minimum size of the sample and then drew a sam-
ple 10% larger than this minimum size.
2.3 recording
With an instrument and a corpus in hand the recording process could commence. the ac-
tual coding however requires its own preparation, which mainly consists of two things, the 
selection of coders and their training. this section reports on this preparation as well as on 
the coding process and organisation.
there are practical as well as methodological reasons to use multiple coders in the recording 
process. the practical reason is simple; it enables the researcher to code more articles within 
a limited amount of time than if he had to do it alone, just as survey researchers use inter-
viewers. the important methodological reason here is that for each of the three national 
contexts coders from these specific national and cultural contexts were used to code the arti-
cles of the respective newspapers; dutch coders dealt with the dutch, and coders of german 
origin coded the german newspaper articles. for the flemish newspapers we used the same 
coders who received extra training in order to learn about the political and cultural context 
of these newspaper articles. Political knowledge is an important factor for reliable coding of 
political news (Peter & lauf, 2002). in this way a cultural bias has been excluded from the 
recording process. native coders are more familiar with the newspapers, the specific con-
texts and peculiarities of the far-right in their own country, than even a well-informed and 
experienced researcher from outside. using native coders limits the risk of misinterpretation 
(tennekes, 1999: 61, 153). for content analysis research the importance of the familiarity 
of the coders with the data is also emphasised by content analysis methodologists (Wester 
1995a: 145; Peter & lauf, 2002). coders were selected from participants of a number of 
MA level courses in content analysis at the radboud university nijmegen. Various aspects 
of this study have been integrated in these courses, as a general topic with which to work, to 
test the instrument, or to train students in coder skills. students who successfully completed 
these courses were selected to become coders for this study and received a coder training.
11  http://uregina.ca/~morrisev/Sociology/Sampling%20from%20small%20populations.htm. We added 
10% to the calculated minimum size to secure a sufficient sample size in case of missing values and other fall 
out of data.
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2.3.1 coder training
the official coder training thus started after the courses, when most coders were no new-com-
ers to the topic, instrument and material of the study. unlike some other authors, i separate 
the role of coders and their training in the development and testing of the instrument and their 
role in the coding process here (Krippendorff, 2004a: 129-130; Wester, 2006: 11-12). the goal 
of the coders’ involvement in both phases of the study is different. in the previous phase the 
purpose of their involvement, or ‘coder training’ is to increase the face validity and reliability 
of the instrument. the coder training before the actual recording is to increase the inter-coder 
reliability. small groups of coders (3-5 at the time) then received a training that consisted of 
4-5 meetings and was divided in three parts; first a short but to-the-point introduction of the 
research topic and instrument, then the main training, consisting of several sessions of collec-
tive coding, in which the main goal was to develop and practise a collective interpretation and 
use of the instrument. coders were to develop a common reference frame and in the training 
sessions their interpretation flexibility was limited in a structured manner (Wester, 2006: 12). 
coders and researcher were to come to agreement on the utilisation of the instrument while 
applying the instrument to material that the coders were later to code ‘for real’. instances 
where coders suggested different codes were discussed, taking the instructions in the codebook 
as a definitive guide. A constant emphasis of this principle (together with very carefully formu-
lated instruction) has been one of the most important elements of the coder training because 
coders initially tend to jump to conclusions in the coding process, drawing from their (coding) 
experience, hence the importance of emphasising the guiding function of the instructions. cod-
ers must learn to distance themselves from their frame of reference (Wester & van selm, 2006: 
134). some concepts in the codebook needed specific attention because their meaning was not 
always clear to the coders. three sessions of training were usually sufficient to familiarise the 
coders with all the ins-and-outs of the codebook and the basic rule of strictly following the in-
structions in the codebook. A last part of the coder instruction was then, to inform the coders 
on the organisational aspects of the recording process, the data input programme indata12. 
2.3.2 coding organisation
the coding of all data was carried out in phases. for each national context there was a sepa-
rate group of native coders (see above). After the codebook was finalised the coding started 
with the dutch newspapers. each coder, in principle, had an exclusive set of material to code 
independently and was instructed to code individually. on average coders could code 5-10 
articles an hour. in order to have an as direct possible relation between the raw material and 
the final dataset, the coders typed their codings directly into the computer using the data input 
programme indata. this programme has been specifically developed for that purpose (Aerts, 
2000). indata enables clear data input, without the need of the often used extra step of cod-
ing sheets that might cause extra errors (Wester, 2006: 13). Beneficial points of using indata 
(Aerts, 2000) are that it does not allow input errors. it only allows the input of predefined 
values and is provided with routing schemes. coders reported back after having coded about a 
hundred articles and discussed problematic cases with the author. for each of the national con-
texts one or two coder instruction updates were given during the process of coding.
12  InData (Aerts, 1986, 2002) see: http://www.ru.nl/socialewetenschappen/rtog/naslagwerk/onderde-
len/indata/ (retrieved January 10th, 2009).
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2.3.3 reliability measurement
the reliability of the content analysis is an issue especially at two stages in the research 
process. first with the construction of the research instrument and later during the record-
ing process (Wester & van selm, 2006: 137). for both situations it is possible to apply a 
statistical test of reliability (of instrument and coders), of which the results and following 
measures have been described above. here the applied methods will be explained and the 
found levels of reliability are reported.
content analysis handbooks all discuss the importance and various techniques of inter 
coder reliability tests (see riffe, lacy & fico, 1998; Krippendorff, 2004a; neuendorf, 
2002; Wester & van selm, 2006). however, serious reliability tests are lacking in many 
content analysis reports (lombard, snyder-duch & Bracken, 2002: 599). Besides the 
scant attention to this serious methodological issue, it is also a complicated issue because 
there are many techniques about which there is little agreement among researchers on 
their value. in the assessment of reliability tests by lombard, snyder-duch & Bracken a 
division is made between tests that are too liberal, such as percentage agreement tests and 
the ‘holsti test’ and stricter measures, which, however, they evaluate as ‘too conservative’. 
it is therefore recommended that researchers choose carefully techniques that are appro-
priate to their situation and can best use multiple techniques (lombard, snyder-duch & 
Bracken, 2002: 600). With multiple techniques at hand the researcher can deal with the 
disadvantages of each technique, if he develops clear decision rules.
issues in testing reliability 
Both neuendorf (2002: 149-151) and lombard, snyder-duch and Bracken (2002) discuss 
these advantages and disadvantages. ‘liberal’ techniques such as percent agreement are 
accurate, but ignore chance bias, while the ‘conservative’ techniques such as scott’s π and 
Krippendorfff’s alpha are sometimes too strict. especially in cases of unequal distributions 
and small samples these techniques may produce extremely low values, while the percent 
agreement is high (lombard, snyder-duch & Bracken, 2004: 436; see nuyten, 2007: 47 
for a similar conclusion). in order to deal with both disadvantages we applied both types 
of techniques to calculate the level of inter coder reliability and developed a decision mak-
ing standard to interpret the calculated levels of agreement.
As a first measure of reliability we used holsti’s method to measure agreement between 
the norm coder and the other coders (neuendorf, 2002: 149). A range of techniques was 
available to calculate reliability controlling for the impact of chance agreement. cohen’s 
Kappa is often recommended and is the only technique that is included in the standard 
menu of sPss. however, Krippendorff states that it is actually a correlation measure and 
not a reliability measure, because it is based on the chi-square formula (Krippendorff, 
2004b: 419). chi-square tests themselves are considered inappropriate by others as well 
(lombard, snyder-duch & Bracken 2002: 602). A technique that is appropriate in this 
study, because tests involve only two coders and the measurement level is nominal or 
ordinal, is scott’s π (scott, 1954;,Krippendorff, 2004a: 245; Wester & van selm, 2006: 
139). it is relatively easy to use and it calculates chance for every case. scott’s π is used 
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as the ‘conservative’ technique in this study. in Appendix 2.3 we provide the sPss matrix 
that was used to calculate the levels of reliability.
developing decision rules
Both techniques produce levels between .00 and 1.00. As there is no uniform standard 
to decide which are appropriate levels, a full and clear report is the best one can do ac-
cording to neuendorf (2002: 144; lombard, snyder-duch & Bracken, 2002: 593). in our 
opinion that includes decision rules with convincing arguments. Both authors state that 
a coefficient of .90 or higher is always unproblematic, coefficients of .80 are reasonable. 
Below that there is great diffusion. We take that for liberal techniques a coefficient of. 
80 is required and follow Krippendorff in that a coefficient of .67 or higher is acceptable 
and .80 is preferred for conservative techniques (Krippendorfff, 2004a: 241-2). As stated 
above it may happen that only one of the requirements is met for a certain variable when 
we calculate both. in that case the liberal measure should at least be .80 to reconsider the 
sufficiency of the reliability.  
the following problematic situations may underlie insufficient scores on the reliability 
measures:
• too much disagreement between coders (both coefficients are below the limit);
• unequal distribution in the cross table;
• unequal distribution in the cross table combined with a small sample (both last prob-
lems manifest large (>.30) differences between the holsti and π coefficient).
in the first situation this may be reason to not use the variable in the analysis. in the other 
two situations the context may be taken into consideration. this situation occurs mostly 
for variables that are seldom found in the coded material (in this study for example ‘anti-
democratic standpoints’). due to its absence in the vast majority of the materials coders 
may ignore its presence when it does occur. the recorded level of attention for ‘undemo-
cratic standpoints’ is then always an under-representation of the real level of attention. 
therefore we do not instantly remove these variables from the analysis but treat them 
with care. differences in levels of attention must be of substantial size before interpreted 
as significant, but global trends can be interpreted without problems. in figure 2.3 the 
exact decision rules are presented.
figure 2.3 decision rules reliability coefficients
holsti π decision
>.90 >.90 Very high
>.90 >.80 High
>.80 >.67 Sufficient
<.80 <.67 Insufficient
<.80 >.67 Sufficient
>.90 <.67 Sufficient/Reconsider
>.80 <.67 Reconsider
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reliability sample and method used
Below, we report the outcomes of reliability tests of the data used in the analysis. for 
each of the three case studies we drew a reliability sample of all material coded of about 
ten percent of the full sample. the samples were randomised for coder, election year and 
newspaper title and then compared to the norm coder. in the table below we report the 
interpretations based on the measurements and decision rules that have been explained 
above. in Appendix 2.3 we report all exact reliability values of the two techniques.
table 2.1 inter-coder reliability of media attention for the far-right
Variable Dutch German Flemish
general and formal attention   
Newspaper title high very high very high
Week day very high very high very high
Size high very high insufficient
Front page appearance high sufficient very high
Headline appearance very high very high very high
Prominence sufficient sufficient sufficient
substantial attention variables
Representation insufficient sufficient sufficient
Role in elections sufficient* very high sufficient
Role in political actuality sufficient* sufficient sufficient
Role in legal conflict sufficient very high very high
Role in extra-parliamentary situations sufficient sufficient sufficient
Role in internal situations sufficient sufficient* sufficient*
Positive and negative roles sufficient sufficient sufficient
Stigmatising associations sufficient sufficient very high
Standpoints general sufficient* sufficient high
Anti-progressive standpoints sufficient* sufficient* high
Anti-democratic standpoints sufficient* sufficient* sufficient*
Populist/anti-establishment standpoints sufficient* sufficient* sufficient*
Nationalist standpoints sufficient* sufficient* sufficient
Xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints sufficient very high high
Law & order standpoints high sufficient very high
Traditionalist standpoints very high sufficient very high
support attention   
NERA favourable attitudes sufficient* sufficient* sufficient
NERA unfavourable attitudes insufficient sufficient* sufficient
Debate about dealing with the far-right sufficient* sufficient* high
*) after reconsideration
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evaluation
in table 2.1 we can see that besides the variables that needed reconsideration due to un-
equal distribution, for almost all variables we found sufficient or even high or very high 
reliability coefficients. the reliability in the dutch case is relatively more problematic. 
this was reason to adjust the codebook (see section 2.2.3). this resulted in very satisfac-
tory levels of reliability for the german and flemish data. 
three variables where found to have an insufficient level of reliability; representation in 
the dutch case, nfrA unfavourable attitudes in the dutch case and size in the flemish 
case. representation in the dutch case is a serious issue for interpretation. We did not re-
move it, in order to have some idea of a trend, but do not draw any conclusions, based on 
it. for the unfavourable attitudes the problem lies in the distinction between nfrAs that 
were made in the version of the codebook that was applied in the dutch case study. of 
the original variables some had very high coefficients, some low. trends for both groups 
of nfrAs were similar, therefore we decided not to exclude unfavourable attitudes, but 
again to be extremely modest in their interpretation. for size in the flemish case we 
found that here coders had difficulties judging whether an article was just below or above 
400 words (size M or l). no conclusions were drawn based on that difference. differ-
ences in size were analysed looking at the distribution over s, M (and l) or Xl. in this 
way the low reliability on behalf of one category did not influence the conclusions.
for all variables with a holsti coefficient of >.90 and a π <.67 we found this was due to 
the third identified problem, that of an unequal distribution combined with a small sam-
ple and therefore interpreted them as sufficient after reconsideration of the cross table 
and characteristics of the variable itself. for those variables that had to be reconsidered 
(holsti >.80, π <.67) we came to the same conclusion for most of these variables except 
for nfrA favourable attitudes in the dutch case, where the low coefficients had the exact 
same cause as for the variable nfrA unfavourable attitudes, therefore they were treated 
in a similar way.
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3. the dutch press: progressive nuance of a rigid media image
chAPter 3
the dutch Press: ProgressiVe nuAnce of A rigid MediA 
iMAge 13
3.1 introduction
in this first case study we will provide answers to research questions from section 1.5.1 and 
1.5.2 regarding the media attention to the far-right and the variation in this media atten-
tion between election years and between newspapers. in this analysis, we use the model of 
four aspects of media attention as was presented in section 1.4.3.
the far-right in the dutch context
As in each of the three case studies, the dutch context has a number of peculiarities. the 
first is that the dutch far-right movement has seen many splinter parties and non-party or-
ganisations that have come and gone over the years. there is and was a lack of continuity, 
although some of the main personalities on the more extreme side of the political family 
have a long track record (i.e. Van donselaar & rodrigues, 2008: 59). Most of the dutch 
far-right parties never succeeded in being elected to any representative body. Among those 
that have, the most important parties are centrum partij (cP, 1980-1986), centrum-
democraten (cd, 1986-2002), centrum partij’86 (cP’86, 1986-1998), nederlandse 
volksunie (nVu, 1971-), nederlands blok (nB, 1993-?), lijst pim fortuyn (lPf, 
2002-2007), conservatieven.nl (2002-2003?) en nieuw rechts (nr, 2003-2007). 
in 1982 the cP obtained the first far-right seat in dutch parliament since the demise of 
the boerenpartij in the early seventies. the MP, hans Janmaat, was to be the face of 
the far-right in the netherlands until the turn of the century. in 1986 the party split and 
did not succeed in keeping its seat in parliament. one of the issues of contention, besides 
struggles over leadership, was the new ideological course some of the leaders wanted to 
take, following the successful example of the front nationale in france, with its ‘nou-
velle droite’ (ignazi, 2006). the period between 1986 and 1989, without parliamentary 
representation, is known as the first period of electoral marginality (scheepers, eisinga & 
lammers, 1993: 364). in 1989, Janmaat returned to parliament with his cd. the far-right 
embarked a new period of electoral growth, which lasted until shortly before the next elec-
tions in 1994. in the local elections, two months before the nationals, the far-right (cd, 
cP’86 and nB) obtained no less than 88 seats in local councils. in the national election 
cd managed to obtain three seats in dutch parliament. Meanwhile, the far-right received 
a great deal of opposition from anti-racism organisations, as well as undercover journalists 
who revealed a series of scandals concerning cd personnel and representatives (rennen, 
1994; lucardi, 1998; Witte, 1998; Mudde, 2000). in the following period of electoral 
13 An earlier version of this chapter is accepted for publications as P. Schafraad, P. Sheepers & F. 
Wester (in press). Coverage of the far-right in three Dutch newspapers 1986-2004. Characteristics and trends. 
In F. Virchow (ed.), Media	and	the	far-right	in	contemporary	Europe	–	theoretical	considerations	and	case	
studies. A different version has been accepted for publication in Migrantenstudies, as P. Schafraad, F. Wester 
& P. Scheepers. Controversiële buitenstaanders. Een longitudinale studie naar berichtgeving over verrecht-
sing in Nederlandse dagbladen. Migrantenstudies	25	(3).
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failure and marginal stability (1994-2001) little happened, although cP’86 was dissolved 
by court order after a conviction for racism. none of the parties returned to parliament in 
1998. A new period of electoral growth started when a new player entered the field, Pim 
fortuyn and his lPf. fortuyn’s sociogenesis was completely different and lacked any bonds 
with traditional far-right organisations or personalities. nevertheless, his ideology was 
much the same (including exclusionism, nationalism, law and order and anti-establishment 
and populist standpoints) (Pels, 2003; Van donslaar & rodrigues, 2003). the aspect of 
sociogenesis that lPf did have in common with its predecessors was its electorate of lower 
educated, secular men (Van der Brug, 2003: 96). fortuyn obtained no less than 27 seats in 
parliament, a unique event in dutch parliamentary history. even more so, because fortuyn 
was murdered only 9 days before the election. despite the fact that his lPf became part of 
the coalition government, its popularity decreased rapidly in the following years, not only 
because of the lack of a charismatic leader, but also because of a series of scandals and 
quarrels within the party. At the european Parliamentary elections of 2004, lPf obtained 
2.5% of the votes, not enough to send a MP to Brussels. other far-right parties (nnp, con-
servatieven.nl, nr) have hardly played a significant role since the foundation of lPf.
drawing from a variety of previous research as well as from broadly expressed statements 
of (often far-right) politicians and public opinion makers we can draw up two preliminary 
hypotheses concerning the content. the first preliminary hypothesis is that the media pur-
posely ignored the far-right (Van donselaar, 1998; fennema & Van der Brug, 2006: 68, 
and for example nrc handelsblad, May 9th 1998). this means that we should expect 
very little coverage of the far-right, especially far-right parliamentary conduct, and what 
there is limited in scope. the second is that the media gave the far-right an exaggeratedly 
negative image, making ungrounded suggestions. something that fortuyn, as well as some 
researchers, referred to as ‘demonising’ (de Kort and d’haenens, 2005: 140, ignazi, 2006: 
167; de volkskrant, March 23rd 2002). According to this preliminary hypothesis we 
should find that the majority of coverage of the far-right is very negative, even exaggerat-
edly negative. if these hypotheses hold, our first research question therefore simply is: how 
did dutch newspapers cover the far-right?
longitudinal variation
As the electoral history of the dutch far-right is full of ups-and-downs and contains mul-
tiple key events, some variation in media attention can be expected. therefore the second 
question we answer in this chapter is whether there were any changes in the media atten-
tion to the dutch far-right between 1986 and 2004? our main interest in the longitudinal 
variation therefore, is whether this variation developed in a particular direction. 
quality and popular newspapers
drawing from the work of steward, Mazzoleni & horsfield (2003) we postulated three 
hypotheses about quality and popular newspapers in chapter 1. here we will test these 
hypotheses for the dutch case, looking at differences between the popular de telegraaf 
and quality papers de volkskrant and nrc handelsblad. tailored to the dutch case 
the three hypotheses are:
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H 1 de volkskrant and nrc handelsblad pay more volume and formal attention to 
the far-right than de telegraaf.
H 2 de volkskrant and nrc handelsblad pay more attention to (a more diverse 
range of) substantial attention aspects than de telegraaf.
H 3 de volkskrant and nrc handelsblad pay more attention to support attention 
aspects than de telegraaf.
left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers
Although the period of polarisation in dutch society is over, newspapers still carry traces 
of political orientation. As we have seen in chapter 1, hallin and Mancini (2003) state 
that this continued politicisation is still reflected in the contents of the newspapers. in order 
to test this thesis, we developed three hypotheses that distinguish media attention of left-
leaning newspapers from that of right-leaning newspapers. these have been tailored to the 
dutch case as follows:
H 4 de volkskrant paid more attention to volume and formal attention than 
 nrc handelsblad and de telegraaf.
H 5 de volkskrant paid more substantial attention to the far-right than 
nrc handelsblad and de telegraaf.
H 6 de volkskrant paid more support attention to the far-right than 
 nrc handelsblad and de telegraaf.
sample
concerning the data collection, it turned out that in the dutch newspapers the amount of 
coverage around the so called ‘second order elections’ (reif & schmitt, 1980) was so small 
that these periods cannot be treated as separate data collection periods, except for the 
european Parliament elections of 2004. therefore the eP election year of 1999 has been 
excluded from the analysis and the material collected around the eP elections of 1989 and 
1994 has been added to the cases of the national parliamentary elections of the same year 
(the data collection periods already partially overlapped, see also table 3.1). generally only 
statistically significant differences between election years, or between newspapers are re-
ported in this chapter.14 
3.2 results
3.2.1 volume attention
Volume attention was measured as the average number of articles per day and was calcu-
lated as follows. for each election year we calculated the number of news days based on 
14  To test the significance of differences between categories a Chi-square test has been used with an al-
pha level of p	< 0,05. For 2x2 tables and in situations where the expected cell count was lower than 5 in more than 
20% of the cells, Fisher’s Exact Test was calculated (using the Monte Carlo option in SPSS), which corrects for too 
small expected cell counts (Siegel and Castellan 1988: 103,123). To test the significance of differences between 
specific groups (for example two election years, or two newspapers, as referred to in the text above the table) we 
also used a Mann-Whitney test. Only significantly tested differences are reported in the text. In tables with both 
significant and insignificant differences, variables with significant variation are marked with an asterisk(*).
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13 week periods, except for 1989 and 1994 (18 and 19 weeks). in cases where we used 
random samples for further analyses, the actual number of news articles in the population 
had to be estimated, based on the proportions in the sample. the actual number of news 
articles was then divided by the number of days. A t-test was used to test the significance 
of the mean differences between election years and between newspapers at .05 level. 
overall, the dutch newspapers printed one article per day that at least mentions the far-
right in one way or another. throughout the research period the volume attention fluc-
tuated quite considerably. in some of the electorally more successful years it was above 
average, but in other ‘success’ years it decreased greatly, compared to the previous year, 
as in 1989. in 1999 there was so little media attention to the far-right, that we had to ex-
clude that year from further analysis.
table  3.1 Average number of articles per day*
election year newspaper VK nrc tel total
1986 N 60 37 21 118
x per day 0,79 0,47 0,27 0,51
1989** N 32 30 15 77
 x per day 0,28 0,26 0,13 0,23
1994** N 102 131 45 278
x per day 0,92 1,18 0,42 0,84
1998 N 34 44 17 95
 x per day 0,44 0,58 0,22 0,42
1999*** N 7 10 2 19
x per day 0,09 0,13 0,03 0,08
2002 N 387 299 116 802
 x per day 5,09 3,93 1,53 3,52
2003 N 171 157 180 508
x per day 2,25 2,07 2,37 2,23
2004 N 21 86 30 137
 x per day 0,28 1,13 0,4 0,6
Total N 814 794 426 2034
Average x per day 1,27 1,22 0,67 1,05
*) The differences between years and between newspapers have been tested, p	< 0,05. The differences discussed in the 
text are all significant. 
**) TK + EP is 18 (105 news days in 1989) or 19 (111 news days in 1994) weeks instead of 13. 
***) In further analysis the election year 1999 is excluded because of its sample being too small. 
there are significant differences between newspapers, especially between de volksk-
rant and nrc handelsblad on one side, and the popular paper de telegraaf on the 
other, which is not surprising since the latter has less news content in general (scholten & 
ruigrok 2006: 8). its average number of articles on the far-right is only half of the aver-
age number in de volkskrant and nrc handelsblad.
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3.2.2 formal attention
Visibility is the central idea behind the formal aspect of attention to the far-right. formal 
attention was measured as the size of articles, front page appearance, headline appear-
ance and prominence of the far-right in articles.
size of articles
the second variable measuring formal attention is the size of the article. Well over 50% 
of the newspaper coverage on the far-right are longer articles (400 or more words), while 
14% are short reports (less than 150 words) (table 3.2). this means the far-right is sub-
ject not only to ‘short news’ type of sections in newspapers. in the eighties the percentage 
of long articles was less than 40%, but from 1998 on it rose rapidly to sometimes more 
than 60% (61% in 1998 and 63% in 2004). the trend of the share of short reports has a 
reversed tapering, going down from 23% in 1986 to a mere 6% in 2004.  
table 3.2 size of articles (in percentages)
election year 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2004 total
n 111 77 223 96 348 338 122 1315
S (< 150 words) 23 17 18 13 12 14 6 14
M (150-400 words) 40 47 39 26 29 33 31 34
L (> 400 words) 37 36 43 61 59 53 63 52
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
As Appendix 3.1 shows, de volkskrant and nrc handelsblad both printed signifi-
cantly more long articles on the far-right than de telegraaf (56% and 58% vs 37%). 
de telegraaf printed mostly medium length articles on the far-right, at 45% that was 
often 15% more than both other newspapers. it also printed slightly more short articles 
on the far-right (tel 18%, vs VK 13% and nrc 12%).
 
position of the article in the newspaper
the next aspect of formal attention is the position of the article in the newspaper, meas-
ured as the percentage of the coverage of the far-right published on the front page (see 
fig. 3.1). only 11% of the coverage of the far-right can be found on the front page of 
newspapers, a figure that was fairly stable over the years. in the nineties it was slightly 
less (8% in 1994, 9% in 1998, while in 1989 it was at its highest with 17%). this did not 
differ between newspapers15.
prominence of the far-right in the coverage
the fourth aspect of formal attention that has been measured is the prominence of the 
far-right in the coverage. figure 3.2 below shows that until 1994, in over two-thirds of 
the coverage that includes far-right actors, the far-right had a prominent role. When the 
far-right was in the papers, it was usually a central figure in the news story. from the 
next election year on, the percentage dropped significantly.  
15  In the electronic source from which we obtained coverage from recent years there is no information 
on page numbers of Telegraaf articles. Therefore Telegraaf coverage could not be included in this analysis.
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this can be interpreted as a sign that the far-right has subordinate roles in articles about 
other issues as well. until 1994 the far-right only appeared in the papers if they had a 
prominent role in news stories, while thereafter they appeared in the papers in minor 
situations as well.
figure 3.1 front page and headline appearance and prominence  (in percentages)
in de volkskrant and de telegraaf more than half of the articles featured the far-right 
in a prominent way, while for nrc handelsblad the figure is 43% (see Appendix 3.2).
far-right in the headlines
the last aspect of formal attention is the percentage of the coverage mentioning the far-
right in the headlines, which means it immediately draws the attention of the reader to 
the political colour of a central actor in the coverage. this variable works chiefly as an 
additional variable to the previous one. figure 3.1 shows, as expected, almost the same 
trend as table 3, although the percentage of coverage with the far-right in the headlines 
was higher than that of far-right prominence in 1986 and 1989. until the mid-nineties 
over two-third of the coverage featured the far-right in the headlines; after this the share 
dropped to 17% in 2004.
in de volkskrant articles on the far-right had the far-right in their headlines more 
often (54%) than both other newspapers (Tel 44%, nrc 40%).
3.2.3 substantial attention
next the substantial attention in the coverage was considered. With substantial attention the 
focus lies on far-right actors and far-right ideologies. substantial attention has been opera-
tionalised via four dimensions. first the representation of the far-right actor(s), second the 
role in which the far-right actor(s) feature, third explicit far-right stigmatising (Van donse-
laar, 1998: 52) and fourth the presence of far-right ideological standpoints in the coverage.
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representation of far-right actors
far-right representation is the first aspect of substantial attention that has been measured. 
for every election year, the level of representation was divided into three categories, passive 
representation (far-right actor only named or mentioned in the article), active representation 
(far-right actor paraphrased or cited in the article) and no representation. fig 3.2 shows the 
distribution of representation over these categories in all election years. in almost half of the 
corpus (46%) far-right actors were passively represented. in 53% far-right actors were actively 
represented, which implies that the far-right served (for readers) as a visible journalist resource. 
in one percent of the articles the far-right was only addressed in general, without naming 
one or more far-right actors. the division between passive and active representation steadily 
changed throughout the research period. the share of active representation rose from 27% to 
71%. only in 1994, 2003 and 2004 was there more active than passive representation in the 
coverage. Between newspapers there were no differences in representation (appendix 3.3).
figure 3.2 representation of far-right actors (in percentages)
election news and situated roles of the far-right
the data were collected in an extended period around election day. therefore an overview 
is given of the percentage of coverage wherein the far-right had a role in the elections (pos-
sibly besides other roles) in table 3.3, before we describe the attention to situated roles in 
which the far-right featured. As we expected, a relatively large share of the coverage deals 
with the elections, or is in fact election news. 57% of all coverage is about the far-right in 
elections. the percentage varies over the years between 30% in 2004 and 82% in 1989. 
table 3.3 percentage of coverage with far-right in roles in elections
election year 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2004 total
n 110 77 223 96 348 338 122 1314
In elections 47 82 52 74 66 54 30 57
Not in elections 53 18 48 26 34 46 70 43
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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generally, roles in elections gained relatively most attention in de volkskrant  (61%) and 
least in nrc handelsblad (53%). Attention to these roles in de telegraaf is 57% (see 
Appendix 3.4.)
other roles of the far-right, as featured in the newspaper coverage, have been analysed as 
well. When we look at table 3.4 it is interesting to note that the coverage dealt as much with 
far-right-actors in legal conflict (15%) and extra-parliamentary roles (13%) as in ‘normal’ 
(parliamentary) roles in political actuality (18%). only 4% of the coverage contained the 
far-right in normal internal roles (meaning party conferences, leadership elections, or other 
party events), while negative internal roles (internal dispute, quarrel, party splits) are present 
in 10% of the coverage.
in years when there was far-right representation in parliament (especially 1994, 2003-2004), 
the share of articles on the far-right in political actuality, as expected, was greater. in 1994 
when centrumdemocraten obtained three seats in parliament (and 77 local council seats) 
there was an increase to 13%, and in 2003 and 2004 when lPf actively participated in 
parliamentary routine it was even higher (27% and even 55% respectively). in fact, the high 
percentage for ‘a role in political actuality’ in 2004 combined with the low percentage of 
coverage about the far-right electoral roles in that year may indicate tendency of ‘normalisa-
tion’ of the far-right (Van der Brug, fennema & tilly 2005: 546).
table 3.4 shows that until the late nineties the far-right featured relatively frequently in 
legal conflicts (18% in 1998, 35% in 1986). in the 2000s that figure dropped below 10%. 
A similar pattern can be found for the far-right in extra-parliamentary roles (rallies, peti-
tions, but also racist violence). it was at its peak in 1986, with 41%, concerning a great deal 
of confrontation in the form of anti-fascist rallies against the newly chosen centrum partij 
council members in various cities.
Attention to far-right actors in normal internal situations was continuously about 5% of the 
coverage, with a dip to almost nothing in 1998 (1%) and 2002 (3%). newspapers paid much 
more attention to negative internal situations, peaking at 21% of the coverage in 1994. here 
too, there was a divide between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with an exception 
for 2003 (those early elections were held after the coalition break-up due to internal conflicts 
in lPf). the decrease of the attention to internal conflicts started in 1998, the first election 
year after the peak year of 1994 (dropped from 21% to 7%).
table 3.4 percentage of coverage wherein far-right features in roles
election year 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2004 total
n 111 77 223 96 348 338 122 1315
In political actuality 2 4 13 9 10 27 55 18
ln legal conflict 35 31 30 18 5 7 9 15
In extra-parliamentary activity 41 19 16 10 13 4 9 13
In normal internal situations 6 5 4 1 3 5 2 4
In negative internal situations 14 12 21 7 6 9 2 10
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some of the roles of the far-right variables are handled differently by each of the three 
newspapers in one or more years (see appendix 3.4). in the three newspapers roles in extra-
parliamentary activity and in internal affairs did not feature differently in any significant 
way. concerning roles in political actuality there is a difference between de volkskrant 
on one side and nrc handelsblad and de telegraaf on the other side. VK paid much 
less attention to the far-right in roles in political actuality than the other two papers (VK 
9%, nrc 23% and Tel 20%). the other intriguing difference is between VK and nrc on 
one side and Tel on the other side and concerns the far-right in legal conflict. Both quality 
papers (VK 17%, nrc 16%) paid more attention to these roles than the popular newspa-
per (11%) 
the trends described above become clearer on a somewhat aggregated level. therefore we 
recoded the specific roles into two groups, one that we assume portrays the far-right posi-
tively as legitimate ‘normal democratic’ parties (role in political actuality and positive inter-
nal) and one that emphasises their negative, illegitimate side (in legal conflict and negative 
internal)16. this dichotomy makes visible the level to which the far-right is (de-)legitimised 
through the roles in which far-right actors feature (see Van der Brug, fennema & tilly 
2005). in figure 3.3, it is shown that the share of negative roles was high in the 80s and 
90s, especially in 1994, and then decreased sharply, while the share of articles with the far-
right in positive roles increased sharply after 1998 marking a break, or turn-around after 
the demise of the dominant far-right parties of the eighties and nineties. 
 
figure 3.3 the far-right in positive and negative roles
16  The other roles, in elections and in extra-parliamentary roles, are excluded from this dichotomy 
because they either do not have a clear status, or can clearly have both positive and negative connotations 
(depending on the situation). On top of that it is not clear if extra-parliamentary politics are part of what Van der 
Brug et al mean with ‘normal democratic parties’.
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stigmatising the far-right
stigmatising associations with the nazis or extremist or violent groups are the third 
aspect of substantial attention in this study. the presence of such associations point the 
reader in a negative direction when considering the far-right.
these associations are present in about one-fifth of the coverage (table 12). throughout 
the research period, the percentage grew from 31% in 1989 to about half of the cover-
age in 1989 (55%) and 1994 (47%) and then decreased to 38% in the relatively quiet 
year 1998. in absolute numbers 1994 was the peak, while 2003 and 2004 featured much 
fewer articles with stigmatising associations than the yearly average of 34-40 articles. 
With the entry of the populist right the percentage dropped very considerably. the policy 
might be similar, but the image clearly changed. All three dailies contained similar per-
centages of such associations, there were no between-newspaper differences found (see 
Appendix 3.5).
figure 3.4 percentage of coverage including stigmatising associations
far-right ideological standpoints
An important final aspect of substantial attention is the presence of genuine far-right ideo-
logical standpoints. seven of them were formulated in chapter 1, based on the scientific 
consensus on central far-right ideological standpoints (Mudde, 1998; ignazi, 2006). the 
presence of each of these seven was checked in the coverage, but a first indicator of the at-
tention to far-right ideology is the total share of the coverage which contains any of these 
standpoints, and how much of the coverage does not contain any far-right standpoint at 
all. these figures are presented in appendix 3.6. About 33% of all coverage included one or 
more of the far-right ideological standpoints, in most years roughly varying between 20 and 
30%. the exceptions were 1989 (36%) and especially 1994 (54%). in these years, the atten-
tion to far-right ideologies was above average. for the rest of the research period there was 
not much difference between the years, or it could be that the relatively low percentage in 
1986 might have suggested less attention to far-right standpoints in the preceding period.
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looking at the attention to specific ideological standpoints reveals a more subtle varia-
tion in the news coverage. not all seven central aspects of far-right ideology received the 
same amount of attention. in table 3.5 the variation between ideological standpoints 
over the years is presented. Anti-progressive, anti-democratic and traditionalist stand-
points hardly featured in the coverage at all. the four other ideological standpoints can 
be ranked as follows: the most prominent featured ideological standpoints were those 
containing xenophobic or exclusionist sentiments; 27% of the coverage of the far-right 
contained such standpoints: 9% of the coverage contained harsh law and order stand-
points: almost equally prevalent were anti-establishment (or populist) standpoints (5%) 
and nationalistic standpoints (4%). the most controversial standpoints also received 
most attention in the newspaper coverage.
Anti-democratic standpoints featured in a small portion of the coverage in the 80s and 
90s, as well as in 2004. the anti-establishment and populist far-right standpoints only 
gained attention from 1998 onwards. nationalist standpoints were found in the coverage 
throughout the research period, but mainly in 1989-1998 (7-10%). As one would expect, 
by far the most prominent standpoints were the xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints. 
the peak in the attention to these was also in the period 1989-1998 (>30%), but atten-
tion to these standpoints remained on a high level throughout the entire 18 year research 
period. harsh law and order standpoints gained more and more attention from 1994 
on (4%), and became almost as prominent as xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints in 
2003 (16%) and 2004 (13%).
As we can see in table 3.5, in 1998, the attention to far-right standpoints was most 
wide-spread across the seven standpoints. other years with a significant attention to a 
relatively wide spectrum of far-right ideological standpoints are 1994, 2002 and 2004. 
the year of least diversity of far-right ideological standpoints is 1986. 
table 3.5 percentage of coverage containing far-right ideological standpoints
election year 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2004 total
n 110 77 223 96 348 338 122 1314
Anti-progressive 0 0 3 4 3 1 0 2
Anti-democratic 3 4 1 3 0 1 3 2
Anti-establishment/populist* 1 4 0 7 8 4 11 5
Nationalist* 0 10 7 8 3 1 4 4
Xenophobic or Exclusionist* 24 36 51 30 22 17 16 27
Law & Order* 2 0 4 9 9 16 13 9
Traditionalist 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 1
*) differences significant at p < 0,05 
 
there are very few differences between the three newspapers concerning the attention 
paid to these seven far-right ideological standpoints. there are only two exceptions. the 
only exception to the neglect of anti-progressive standpoints was de volkskrant. de 
telegraaf paid twice as much attention to law and order standpoints (16%) than de 
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volkskrant (8%) and nrc handelsblad (6%). the difference between extra attention 
to xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints in de volkskrant (30%), as shown in Ap-
pendix 3.7, is only significant compared to de telegraaf (23%)
3.2.4 support attention to the far-right
the fourth aspect of media attention to the far-right is that of support attention. it refers 
to the degree that the far-right and their standpoints are (de-)legitimated by non-far-right 
actors. this dimension of newspaper contents is measured in two ways. first we look at 
the relative attention to favourable and unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right or 
their ideological standpoints. A second indicator is the attention to public debate and 
among non-far-right actors about the way one should deal with the far-right. 
non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the far-right
the first measure, as said, is the extent to which far-right actors are confronted with 
favourable or unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors (nfrA). in half of the cov-
erage these attitudes were not present at all (51%, see table 3.6). the remaining half 
contained mainly exclusively negative attitudes towards the far-right, or far-right stand-
points (34%). 
When we look at the developments throughout the research period, three periods can be 
distinguished, as one can see in the table. the first period from 1986 to 1994 was char-
acterised by a dominant and (almost) exclusive presence of nfrA with unfavourable 
attitudes towards the far-right (35-65%). the coverage contained almost no favourable 
nfrA attitudes in that period. Although this situation was at its most extreme in 1986, 
and there was some opening for alternative voices in 1994, the dominance of unfavour-
able attitudes and the marginality of favourable attitudes towards the far-right remained 
throughout the whole period.
in the second period (1998-2003) the share of the coverage that contained favourable 
nfrA attitudes started to break out of its marginal position. exclusive unfavourable at-
titudes towards the far-right were still the most frequent and remained a majority (still 
28% as compared to 12% for exclusively favourable attitudes in 2003). however, the 
share of articles that include favourable attitudes towards the far-right increased in this 
period from 10% to 17% (‘exclusively favourable’ and ‘both favourable and unfavoura-
ble’ combined). they were no longer an exception. the share of coverage with exclusively 
unfavourable attitudes in 2002 and 2003 was greater than in 1998, with a peak of 36% 
in 2002, meaning fortuyn had a great deal of negative response in the press.
the third period contains only one election year in this study. in 2004 the share of exclu-
sively unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right almost halved compared to 2003 (from 
28% to 15%), while the share of the coverage including exclusively favourable attitudes 
towards the far-right almost doubled from 12 to 21%. the share of articles with both fa-
vourable and unfavourable attitudes increased even more sharply and peaked with 19% in 
that year. this shift means a turn-around of the situation in the previous 17 years.
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table 3.6 percentage of coverage with non-far-right actors’ attitudes*
election year 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2004 total
n 111 77 223 96 348 338 122 1315
No NFRA attitudes 32 44 58 67 47 55 45 51
Exclusive favourable attitudes 3 1 3 7 13 12 21 10
Exclusive unfavourable attitudes 65 45 35 23 36 28 15 34
Both fav. and unfav. attitudes 1 9 4 3 4 5 19 6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Between newspapers there are modes, but also significant differences. de volkskrant 
paid least attention to favourable attitudes (7%) and most to unfavourable attitudes 
(38%). de telegraaf paid most attention to favourable attitudes (15%). nrc contained 
most articles with both favourable and unfavourable attitudes in them (8%), twice as 
much as the other two newspapers (VK 4%, Tel 3%, see Appendix 3.8).
dealing with the far-right as a topic in the coverage
in general, the far-right is not considered as a ‘normal democratic party’. Moreover 
among politicians and political debaters, civic organisations as well as activists there is a 
debate going on about how to fight the far-right in the most effective way. such debates, 
whatever the strategy under discussion (from criminalisation, to a so called ‘cordon 
sanitaire’ or even draconian measures, or the opposite - inclusion in the ‘normal political 
community’), indicate that the far-right receives separate treatment, even if the outcome 
of such a debate is to include them in the normal political community, because neither 
socialist, liberal nor confessional parties are subject to such debates (Van donselaar and 
rodrigues, 2006; Jacobs & swyngedouw, 2002). therefore coverage that pays attention 
to such debates is also an indicator that the far-right receives a ‘different treatment’, or 
that there is controversy about them among non-far-right actors. overall a mere 7% of 
the coverage paid attention to debates on how to deal with the far-right. in the dutch 
newspapers this issue received decreasing attention (figure 3.5). Whereas it was a rela-
tively relevant issue in 1986 (27%), after the mid-nineties it ceased to be so. it was not 
totally absent, but with an attention figure of about 5% after 1994, it cannot be said to 
be a ‘hot issue’ in the news coverage. there were no significant between-newspaper dif-
ferences (Appendix 3.9).
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figure 3.5 percentage of coverage containing debates on dealing with the far-right
3.3 conclusions and discussion
in this section we will provide answers to the three research questions. While doing that, 
we will also discuss the value of the preliminary hypotheses that we engaged and used to 
sharpen our focal point. following this, we will first give some general conclusions about 
media attention to the far-right in dutch newspapers (rQ1), then look at longitudinal 
variation (rQ2) and close with the expected differences between types of newspapers 
(rQ3).
general conclusions 
the fact that we found between a few dozens to hundreds of news articles on the far-right 
in each election year means that the far-right was not neglected in the coverage. even more 
significantly, in most of this coverage the far-right is often a prominent actor in headline or 
body text. in practically all of these articles there were one or more far-right actors, who are 
actively represented in fifty percent of the total coverage. the following aspects of substan-
tial attention deepen this analysis more thoroughly. one of the first intriguing findings is 
that far-right actors featured as much in roles in legal conflict as in political actuality, which 
is the normal every-day role of a political party. furthermore, stigmatising associations have 
been used in a quarter of all coverage. together this is not exactly an image of what Van der 
Brug, fennema & tilly call a ‘normal party’ (2005: 564). of all ideological standpoints, 
as described in the literature, only half of them received more than incidental coverage 
and only xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints receive a relatively high level of attention. 
When finally, we look at the fourth aspect of media attention, support attention, half of the 
coverage contained some attitude towards the far-right. the vast majority of these attitudes 
is unfavourable. together with very specific aspects of substantial attention, this creates a 
media image of a controversial outsider. this rather negative media image is not automati-
cally the result of overemphasising certain aspects of the far-right, or even what some have 
called ‘demonising the far-right’. in order to make such statements, we would first need an 
account of far-right activity and compare that to what was reported in the news. 
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still, it is clear that we have found that media focused their attention on certain recognis-
able aspects of the far-right. this focus results in a media image that sets the far-right apart 
from ‘normal parties’ by emphasising its controversial characteristics, hence this media 
image can be described as that of ‘the controversial outsider’. in the following section we 
take a closer look at the development of that media image. 
longitudinal variation
first of all, the volume attention fluctuated greatly. there were two periods of increased 
attention, 1994 and the “long election year 2002-2003 (Brants & Van Praag, 2005)”, 
both peaks were simultaneous with a rise in electoral popularity. in 1994, most atten-
tion went to hans Janmaat and his cd, with the numerous incidents in and around the 
party. in 2002, fortuyn continuously drew media attention. Media attention was at an 
all-time high, and continued to be so, also due to the disastrous participation of the lPf 
in the coalition government, which fell before the end of the year and led to new elections 
in January, 2003 (see Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003). With an exception of the election year 
2002, formal attention decreased steadily throughout the research period. 
in terms of substantial and support attention, we see a double edged pattern. on one 
side there are tendencies that suggest increasingly more open and diverse media atten-
tion to the far-right. there was increasing attention to the far-right in roles in politi-
cal actuality (and decreasing attention to roles in legal conflict). A greater diversity of 
far-right standpoints received attention in more than 5% of the coverage after 1998. 
not only xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints, but also law and order standpoints 
and anti-establishment or populist standpoints came more to the fore. last but not 
least, next to the serious attention to unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right, more 
and more attention was given to favourable attitudes to the far-right from 1998 on. 
on the other side of the coin, attention to controversial roles and stigmatising associa-
tions may have decreased in the second half of the research period, but did not become 
exceptional. together with the unfavourable attitudes of nfrA, they remained impor-
tant aspects of the media attention to the far-right.
All together, this means that media attention to the far-right did change significantly since 
1986. in 1986 it was relatively limited and almost exclusively focused on negative aspects 
of the far-right. during the nineties there was increasing diversity in media attention, some-
thing that continued in the new century. however, the media image of the controversial 
outsider continued to be used, at least until 2003. the arrival of fortuyn did not cause an 
immediate change of media attention to the far-right, other than in volume. some aspects 
that were in a process of change already, changed faster. however, fortuyn also was the 
focal point for strong counter-reactions, which is reflected in the coverage, as the aspects of 
media attention that contribute to the controversial outsider image received increased atten-
tion as well. it was not until 2004, that these aspects suddenly received much less attention, 
while the diversity tendency continued. therefore, it seems that the media image of the far-
right in 2004 can no longer be characterised just as that of the controversial outsider.
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quality and popular newspapers
in the introduction of this chapter, we distinguished de volkskrant and nrc han-
delsblad as quality newspapers and de telegraaf as a popular newspaper. Based on 
previous research, we formulated three hypotheses about the differences in media atten-
tion to the far-right in the quality papers and the popular paper in our dutch case study. 
here we consider our findings on newspaper differences to see if these hypotheses hold.
hypothesis 1 stated that VK and nrc were expected to pay both more volume and 
formal attention to the far-right, than tel. indeed, dutch quality newspapers paid sig-
nificantly more volume attention to the far-right, than the popular tel did. concerning 
formal attention, we did not find a clear distinction between quality and popular papers. 
As we explained in section 3.2, due to missing data we cannot interpret the findings on 
front page appearance here. of the other two variables, headline appearance and promi-
nence, one does support the hypothesis (headline appearance) and one does not (promi-
nence). in conclusion, hypothesis 1 was supported on 2 out of three variables. in terms of 
volume attention it is confirmed, in terms of formal attention, it found mixed support.
hypothesis 2 stated that VK and nrc were expected to pay more attention to (a wider 
range) of substantial attention aspects than tel. in the analysis we focused this hypoth-
esis on the range of roles (h2a), the range of far-right standpoints (2b). in terms of atten-
tion to roles in which the far-right featured, we found one significant difference relevant 
in terms of hypothesis 2. VK and nrc did indeed pay more attention to the far-right in 
legal conflict, than Tel did. All other differences were insignificant. together with this 
one significant difference they do not refute hypothesis 2a, but they do not form convinc-
ing support for it either. in terms of attention to far-right standpoints, we did find some 
differences, but these seem to express the individual characteristics of the newspapers 
first. here too, the differences found are no direct refutation of hypothesis 2b, but form 
no support for it either. 
the third hypothesis concerned support attention. As, contrary to the german and flem-
ish cases, the indicator of attention to debate on how to deal with the far-right is not di-
rectly related to one particular issue, we did not expect to find particular differences on 
that indicator. therefore, we looked only at the attention to favourable and unfavourable 
attitudes of nfrA towards the far-right. We counted slightly more reported attitudes 
in the quality newspapers. unfavourable attitudes featured slightly more in VK and fa-
vourable attitudes in tel. this means that the hypothesis formulated was too general. 
specific attitudes turned out to feature in particular newspapers. hypothesis 3 has to be 
refuted for the dutch case.
left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers
the second dimension of comparing newspapers was along the lines of political leaning. 
As we expected, more attention was given to critical aspects of the far-right in the ideolog-
ically most distant newspaper, de volkskrant, based on the ideas of hallin & Mancini 
(2003). Again we formulated three general hypotheses to test this general expectation. 
69
3. the dutch press: progressive nuance of a rigid media image
in order to test these hypotheses in a valid way, differences found between the two qual-
ity newspapers are taken as more crucial, to be able to make statements about political 
differences, because we need to distinguish quality – popular differences from left-lean-
ing – right-leaning differences.
hypothesis 4 expected more volume and formal attention in the left-leaning VK than in 
the right-leaning two newspapers. differences turned out to be relatively small. concern-
ing volume attention, hypothesis 4 found some support, but the difference between VK 
and nrc is too small for convincing support. in terms of formal attention there is sup-
port, again on one indicator, which again is not enough. hypothesis 4 therefore, found 
only weak support in the dutch case.
the fifth hypothesis that expected more substantial attention in VK can be split into 
three parts. the first concerns roles of the far-right. here there were few differences, 
but one very particular one, namely that VK paid least attention to the far-right in its 
‘natural habitat’ as a political party, in political actuality. this finding refutes h5a, but 
is a relevant difference between left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers. h5b concerns 
stigmatising associations. these were expected more in the left-leaning VK, which also 
occurred in the corpus, but the differences were very small. last, h5c expected more 
attention to far-right standpoints in the left-leaning VK. here we did find a clear dif-
ference on some standpoints that indeed distinguish VK from nrc and Tel. it was the 
only newspaper that reported anti-progressive standpoints. it paid slightly more attention 
to xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints than nrc, and significantly more than Tel. 
however, attention to law & order standpoints featured most in Tel. Apparently there 
is a significant difference between the left-leaning VK and the right-leaning two, but not 
in the simple opposition of more or less attention to standpoints, but for specific stand-
points, where the left-leaning newspaper seems to emphasis the traditional or ‘typical’ 
far-right standpoints, and the right-leaning newspapers emphasis the more conservative 
or populist standpoints.
the final hypothesis, h6, expected more attention to nfrA attitudes in the left-leaning 
newspaper than in the right-leaning ones. here we found a similar difference as in h5c. 
the left-leaning VK paid most attention to unfavourable attitudes, while the right-lean-
ing nrc paid least attention to unfavourable attitudes and the right-leaning Tel paid 
twice as much attention to favourable attitudes than the other two. this again, does not 
exactly support h6, but does suggest a significant difference in emphasis between left- 
and right-leaning newspapers.
discussion
in this chapter we have shown that with the possible exception of 1986, newspapers did 
not practice a minimal attention policy. Whether it is a conscious policy or not, through-
out most of the research period the coverage is narrowly focussed on negative aspects. 
Janmaat’s accusation that he and his party have been ignored by the media is unjust, but 
the media attention was relatively negative for most of the research period (in general, 
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journalists did not have to ‘dig deep’ to find newsworthy negative facts around especially 
cd and cP’86). in general the media attention can best be described as producing a 
image of controversial outsiders; this image was one dimensional in 1986 and became 
more nuanced during the nineties and first years of the new century. differences between 
newspapers were relatively small. individually they did not produce very different media 
images. in emphasises there were some differences, both between quality and popular 
newspapers as well as between left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers. As this case 
study was carried out on no more than three titles, we need to see if these differences, 
and their slight degree are representative for the various types of newspapers, or rather 
are individual differences, in the following chapters.
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4. german press: ‘dealing with the devil of the past’ 
chAPter 4
the gerMAn Press: deAling With 
the ‘deVil of the PAst’17 
4.1 introduction
in this chapter we will investigate the coverage of the far-right in german newspapers. in 
doing so we will provide answers to the research questions discussed in section 1.5.1 and 
1.5.2 regarding longitudinal variation concerning the contents of coverage of the far-right 
in the german newspapers, frankfurter allgemeine zeitung, süddeutsche zei-
tung and bild and the differences between these three newspapers. for this purpose we 
apply the same model of media attention as we did in the previous chapter and that was 
explained in section 1.4.3.  
the far-right in the german context
the burden of the past is omnipresent in the recent history of the german far-right. After 
WWii, germany did not have a consistent party representing the far-right (unlike the 
other former fascist state italy, see ignazi, 2006). in 1964 however, the national demok-
ratische partei deutschlands (nPd, national democratic Party of germany) was 
founded and had some small electoral successes in the second half of the sixties, after 
which its support declined. in 1971 gerhard frey, owner and publisher of a number of far-
right newspapers founded the deutsche volksunion (dVu, german People’s union), a 
far-right organisation that was initially not meant to be a political party and drew most of 
its members from the readers of frey’s publications. 
twelve years later, in 1983, a few anti-communist members of the southern conserva-
tive party csu split from their party in protest to its relation with the ddr and started 
their own party, the republikaner (reP, republicans), modelled on reagan’s new right 
(ignazi, 2006: 32). When in 1985, franz schonhüber became the party leader, the repub-
likaner radicalised, for which the ‘nouvelle droite’ of the french front national once 
again was the inspiration (ignazi, 2006). in competition with this new party the dVu and 
nPd collaborated in the elections of 1987 and in the landeswhal (state elections) of 1987 
the dVu gained the first far-right seat in a state parliament, in Bremen, in twenty years 
(Mudde 1998: 96, ignazi 2006: 69). 
since the mid-eighties these three legal far-right parties have been active in germany, and 
of these the reP is most active (and successful) in the two southern states, and has also 
developed into the most populist of them all. the nPd is the most radical party adhering 
to the german national-socialist tradition. After the german unification the nPd con-
centrated mostly on the eastern states, and is the weakest of all three (ignazi, 2006: 71). 
By then its collaboration with the dVu was transformed into a hostile relationship, due to 
17 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Publizistik as Schafraad, P., Scheepers, P. & 
Wester, F. (2008). Dealing with the ‘devil of the past’. Attention to the far-right in the German press (1987-
2004). Publizistik	53,		362-385.
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deckert’s take-over of the party leadership of the nPd (Mudde, 1998: 95). the dVu re-
mained a ‘one man’ project and failed to build a party structure, despite its relatively large 
membership, and often did not even take part in elections. “the dVu is first and foremost 
the instrument of a wealthy german businessman who one day decided to add a political 
party to his strange blend of nationalist business (Mudde, 1998:119).”
the german far-right parties never achieved great successes and their popularity is often 
located in particular parts of the country, as we can see from lubbers’ and scheepers’ 
study. the highest peaks were in 1989 and in the years 1992-3 (2001: 435), especially the 
european Parliament elections of 1989. the most far-right states were Bavaria and Baden-
Würtenburg in the south. in the last elections the nPd was fairly successful in the eastern 
state saxony with 9.2% of the votes18. these regional differences are also noticed by 
Kitchelt (1997: 220), who explains the lack of success of german far-right political parties 
by pointing out that they cleave too much to their tradition and refuse to incorporate two 
important features of the post-industrial far-right, namely the advocacy of the free market 
and a strong populist anti-statist appeal (ibid: 238)19. the latter is something the former 
judge ‘richter gnadenlos’ roland schill did. he participated successfully in the hamburg 
city council elections of september 2001, with a programme similar to that of the dutch Pim 
fortuyn, with an emphasis on immigration and security (faas, 2001). however, while his 
dutch counterpart continued his victory – even after his murder – in the national elections, 
schill failed to do so in the Bundestag elections of 2002. We may add that an effective obstacle 
against far-right electoral success is the five percent threshold in the german electoral system.
the german far-right seems to take place outside of parliaments more than the far-right 
in its two small neighbouring countries. in 1992-1993, a series of brutal attacks on asylum 
seekers and other immigrant families, resulting in several deaths, took place. the reactions 
of both state and public were not very strong (Koopmans, 2001), and since then the level of 
far-right violence has stayed rather high. especially in the eastern part of the country far-
right subcultures and violence became part of public life (ignazi, 2006: 82). the reactions 
to this violence from both the public as well as the state are not very homogenous. they 
range from direct or indirect approval to the dramatisation and enlargement of far-right in-
cidents of violence. A double standard seems to be apparent. According to Koopmans, anti-
semitism and straight-forward neo-nazism have a much stronger meaning in germany 
than anywhere else. racist violence against immigrants is often taken less seriously than 
elsewhere: public legitimation of racist violence is not unusual (Koopmans, 2001: 71-72). 
the reactions from the side of government as well as those in the public debate therefore 
greatly depend on who is the victim of the racist attack. While some of the racist violence is 
not taken very seriously, public opinion is quick to judge organisations, parties and groups 
that  (only) seem to sympathise with the dark parts of the german past as if they are in-
volved in this racist violence (Art, 2007).
18 http://www.election.de/
19 Not all authors agree with Kitchelt’s emphasis on the free market advocacy as a key element of 
the new far-right (see Cole 2005). Another explanation might be found in the numerous internal conflicts and 
lack of a stable party structure that are extensively described by various authors. Its continuing linkage to the 
national-socialist past is also considered a barrier to a breakthrough (Ignazi 2003: 82).
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longitudinal change
our research period runs from 1987 to 2004. We took 1987 as a starting point because 
it is the first election year after the mid-eighties reformation of the far-right (Mudde, 
1998). Varying electoral results (with 1989 as a peak of success for the far-right repub-
likaner) and several events (such as the 1994 wave of far-right violence) probably had 
a temporary influence on the way the newspapers covered the far-right. here, we are 
concerned firstly with the question whether more permanent changes have occurred dur-
ing the research period, as this seems to be the case in other contexts (Walgrave & de 
swert, 2004; chapter 3). there are no indications for particular patterns of change for 
expectations in particular directions. so we take this research question as an open ques-
tion: what changes occurred in the newspaper attention to the far-right between 1987 
and 2004?.
quality and popular newspapers
A problem in most studies on media coverage of the far-right in german speaking coun-
tries is that they are limited to one specific kind of newspaper, usually the popular press. 
hence an empirical comparison is often lacking. here, we will compare quality and pop-
ular newspapers empirically, based on the hypotheses formulated in chapter 1 (1.5.2).
H 1 the quality newspapers sdZ and fAZ pay more volume and formal attention to 
the far-right than popular newspaper bild.
H 2 sdZ and fAZ pay more attention to (a more diverse range of) substantial atten-
tion aspects than bild.
H 3 sdZ and fAZ pay more attention to (a more diverse range of) support attention 
aspects than bild.
left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers
german newspapers are not related to political parties, nor do they endorse particular 
parties in their electoral commentary, however they do have political leanings (semetko 
& schönbach, 2003). this enables us to ask similar questions about differences between 
left- and right-leaning newspapers in the german context, as we did in the other two 
case studies, and reformulate hypotheses 4-6 from chapter 1 (1.5.2) to apply them to the 
german contexts. We assumed that left- and right-leaning newspaper report differently 
on the far-right, due to their differences in ideological distance from the far-right. this 
means that the left-leaning sdZ would focus more on the far-right and especially its 
controversial characteristics in order to criticise them, or warn the public against them 
(donselaar, 1998). 
H 4 the left-leaning sdZ paid more volume and formal attention to the far-right
 than the right-leaning fAZ and bild.
H 5 sdZ paid more substantial attention to the far-right than fAZ and bild.
H 6 sdZ paid more support attention to the far-right than fAZ and bild.
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4.2 results
in this section the results of the content analysis of the german newspapers are pre-
sented. the way the german newspapers portraye the far-right is unfolded in four steps. 
first, we will look at the volume attention, then the formal attention, or visibility of the 
far-right in the news. substantial attention, or the way far-right actors and standpoints 
are covered is the third step. last, we will look at the coverage of non-far-right actors’ at-
titudes towards the far-right, which we have called support attention. for every indicator 
we will first present the general picture, then describe the longitudinal variation in the 
portrayal and conclude with possible differences between the three newspapers.
4.2.1 volume attention
Volume attention is the ‘volume’ of attention to the far-right and was measured as the 
average number of articles on the far-right per day.  
the first table includes the total amount of articles in each newspaper each year. it does 
not only show a first indicator of formal attention, but also shows the distribution of 
the researched material over the nine election years and the three newspapers. for each 
election year we calculated the number of news days based on 13 week periods. in the 
election years where we used random samples for the further analyses, the actual number 
of news articles in the population had to be estimated based on the proportions in the 
sample. the actual number of news articles was then divided by the number of days. A 
t-test was used to test the significance of the mean differences between election years and 
between newspapers at .05 level. 
A little more than half of the complete corpus is from sdZ, 40% is from fAZ and the 
remaining 7% is from bild (see table 4.1). during the periods of data collection, an aver-
age of about one article per day per newspaper covered the far-right. the lowest level of 
attention was found in 1987 (0.19 a/d), whereas the Bundestag elections of 1994 showed 
the highest level of attention with 2.11 articles per day. in 1989 (0.89 a/d), both election 
periods in 1994 (1.95 and 2.11 a/d) and 1998 (1.44 a/d) the average number of articles 
per day is relatively high, while in 1987 (0.19 a/d) , 1990 (0.29) and 2004 (0.51) it is 
relatively low. this does not coincide with second order, european Parliament, elections 
as one might expect. second order elections are expected to draw fewer voters to the 
ballot box and generate less media attention than first order elections, such as national 
parliamentary elections (see conclusion chapter 3 and, reif & schmitt, 1980; Wilke & 
reinemann 2007, p. 318).
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table 4.1 frequencies of articles per title in each election year per newspaper 
and average number of articles per day per year and per newspaper.
election year newspaper FAZ sdZ BiLd total
1987 N 8 32 2 42
x per day 0.10 0.43 0.03 0.19
1989 EP N 67 114 19 200
x per day 0.89 1.52 0.25 0.89
1990 N 13 48 4 65
x per day 0.17 0.64 0.05 0.29
1994 EP N 217 203 25 445
x per day 2.89 2.71 0.33 1.98
1994 N 187 274 14 475
x per day 2.49 3.65 0.19 2.11
1998 N 118 197 9 324
x per day 1.57 2.63 0.12 1.44
1999 EP N 59 85 1 145
x per day 0.79 1.13 0.01 0.64
2002 N 62 102 25 189
x per day 0.83 1.36 0.33 0.84
2004 EP N 62 45 6 113
x per day 0.83 0.60 0.08 0.50
Corpus N 793 1100 105 1998
 x per day 1.18 1.63 0.16 0.99
there are enormous differences between newspapers. Both broadsheet papers report 
regularly on the far-right, while it is barely mentioned in bild. this is not unexpected 
though, considering the characteristics of the newspapers. nevertheless, the size of the 
difference, and especially the sometimes almost complete absence of the far-right in 
bild, remains surprising. the distribution between newspapers followed the general av-
erage over the years. generally, sdZ contained the highest average number of articles on 
the far-right per day, closely followed by fAZ. bild contains sometimes ten times fewer 
articles than both broadsheet papers. some minor exceptions to the general distribution 
are the very low average of fAZ in 1990, its higher average than sdZ in 1994 (european 
Parliament) and its slightly higher average than sdZ in 2004.
4.2.2  formal attention
Visibility is the central idea behind the four formal aspects of media attention to the far-
right. We measured this visibility of the far-right in the newspapers by looking at the size 
of the articles, front page appearance, headline appearance and prominence of the far-
right in the body text of the articles.
size of the articles
the size of the article is the first measure of formal attention. the measurement for the 
german newspapers is divided in four categories, instead of three, dividing the category 
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of the longest articles (>400 words) into two new categories (401-800 words and >800 
words).  the last column of table 4.2 shows that short news as well as medium and long 
news articles each form about 30% of the coverage. 15% of the coverage consists of 
longer, often in depth, background articles (Xl). the table shows a shift from mainly 
short news (s, 60%) to medium and long news articles between 1987-1994. from 1994 
onwards the distribution over the four size categories remains roughly the same.
table 4.2 size of the articles (in percentages)
election year 1987 1989 1990 1994ep 1994Bt 1998 1999 2002 2004 total
n 42 200 65 303 302 262 145 189 113 1621
S (<150 words) 60 43 40 19 28 26 28 19 18 27
M (151-400) 12 28 25 27 31 38 30 30 41 31
L (401-800) 17 23 22 35 24 24 31 31 21 27
XL (> 800) 12 7 14 19 17 12 12 20 19 15
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Most of the bild coverage is very short (51% s, 30% M), while the other two newspaper 
published significantly more medium (fAZ 29%, sdZ 32%) and long (fAZ 26%, sdZ 
29%) articles (see Appendix 4.1). A good 23% of the fAZ coverage is over 800 words 
long, whereas 11% of sdZ coverage is of that size, and only 2% of the bild articles is 
that long. over time these differences remain quite constant, although the percentage of 
short articles in bild is even higher in some years (e.g. 88% in 1998). Between 1987 – 
1990 there are no significant differences between the newspapers.
front page
the following aspect of formal attention is the position of an article in the newspaper, 
measured as the percentage of the coverage of the far-right published on the front page. 
A mere 8% of the coverage of the far-right appeared on the front pages. in 1987 the 
figure is only 2%, while in the for the reP successful year 1989 a peak was reached of 
18% (see figure 4.1). in 1990 the front page value of the far-right dropped again to 5% 
and went up a little, to 8%, a level at which it more or less remained until 2004. if the 
far-right does appear in the columns of bild, it apparently is considered front page news 
more often (24 %), than in fAZ (11%) and sdZ (4%), see Appendix 4.2. these distribu-
tions remained roughly the same between 1994 and 1999. Before and after that period 
there are hardly any differences between the newspapers, which generally means that the 
percentages are at, or below, the general figure of 8%.
headline appearance and prominence
the third aspect of formal attention that we measured is the prominence of the far-right 
in the coverage. the fifth indicator is the percentage of the coverage that contains the far-
right in its headlines. in 66% of the coverage of the far-right it featured in a prominent 
role. the far-right featured in the headlines in 46% of the coverage. figure 4.1 below 
shows that the longitudinal trends for prominence and headline appearance follow a 
similar line, coming from a relatively high level in 1987, reaching a peak in 1989 (promi-
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nence 83%, headline appearance 76%) and then levelling out at 15% to 20% lower than 
the 1987 level (respectively 69% and 62% of the coverage). the only exception may be 
the percentage of the coverage with a prominent role for the far-right in 1998 that shows 
a second peak at 76%. in the 2000s it returns to the level of early and mid-nineties.
figure 4.1  percentage of far-right coverage on front page, with prominent 
 far-right actors and far-right in the headlines
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Between fAZ and sdZ there is little difference in the share of their coverage with the 
far-right in a prominent role (62% and 68%). in the bild coverage this is 80%, signifi-
cantly more. Between the election years, there are only significant differences in 1994 
and 2004 with similar proportions as the general picture, except that sdZ coverage sud-
denly peaks in 2004 with 78% prominence, coming close to the 83% prominence of the 
far-right in the bild coverage (Appendix 4.2).
for headline appearance, a similar difference between the three newspapers exists as for 
front page appearance. 73% of the bild coverage has far-right references or names in the 
headlines. however, 53% of sdZ coverage and 29% of fAZ coverage did so too. in most 
election years the proportions are similar. in 1987 and 1990 there are scarcely any dif-
ferences, and in 1989 sdZ has most headline appearance of the far-right with 86% of its 
coverage of the far-right (Appendix 4.2).
4.2.3 substantial attention
the substantial attention in the coverage was considered next. substantial attention re-
ferred to the portrayal of far-right actors and far-right ideologies. substantial attention 
has been operationalised into four main variables, first, the representation of the far-right 
actor(s), second, the role in which the far-right actor(s) feature, third, stigmatising asso-
ciations and fourth, the presence of far-right ideological standpoints in the coverage.
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representation
far-right representation is the first aspect of substantial attention that has been meas-
ured. for every election year, the level of representation was divided into two categories, 
passive representation (far-right actor only named or mentioned in the article), active 
representation (far-right actor paraphrased or cited in the article). figure 4.2 shows the 
distribution of representation over these categories in all election years. in 62% of the 
coverage there is only passive representation of far-right actors, which means their own 
opinion is not covered by these articles. 21% of the coverage contains active representa-
tion. An unexpectedly high percentage of the coverage on the far-right did not contain 
any representation of far-right actors (16%) (Appendix 4.3). in these articles the far-right 
only features as a general phenomenon without mentioning a far-right actor by name. 
As one can see in figure 4.2, the share of coverage without representation is especially 
large in 1998 (34%). Most of this coverage is about ‘far-right incidents’ (“rechtsextreme 
Vorfalle”) - as they are often called in the coverage - in the german army. A number of 
incidents showed that in many ranks of the army and at the military academy there were 
active far-right sympathies came to public attention that year. it is quite remarkable that 
precisely this issue was widely reported without mentioning names of either the far-right 
army personnel, or the organisations of which they were members. the passive represen-
tation of far-right actors over the years did not change much. in all years a majority of 
the coverage, about 60%, contained passive representation of far-right actors. the share 
of coverage with active representation varied much more. it was as high as 32% in 1989 
and as low as 14% in 2004. there is no clear pattern of increasing or decreasing active 
representation. A high level of active representation did not relate to a certain kind of 
election, electoral success, extensive coverage, or over representation of certain parties.
figure 4.2  representation of far-right actors (in percentages)
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Appendix 4.4 shows a significantly higher percentage of bild coverage with active repre-
sentation (35%, vs 18% fAZ and 23% sdZ). While passive representation was equally 
present in all three newspapers, the percentage of the coverage without any specific far-
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right actor is much higher in fAZ and sdZ (both 17%), as expected. in some election 
years such differences are even greater (e.g. 1994 eP, 2002).
election news and situated roles of the far-right
the data were collected in an extended period around election day. therefore an over-
view is given of the percentage of coverage in which the far-right has a role in the elec-
tions (possibly besides other roles), before we analyse the different roles in which the 
far-right featured in the coverage (table 4.3). A little more than a third of the coverage 
showed far-right actor(s) in a role in the elections (34%). in the late eighties the percent-
age was relatively high, peaking in 1990 with 63%. After 1990 it dropped to less than 
half of that, with an all-time low in 2004 (16%), with a temporary increase in 1999 
(45%). Again, the low percentages cannot be explained with the second order elections 
argument. no differences between newspapers were found here.
table 4.3 percentage of coverage with far-right in role in elections
election year 1987 1989 1990 1994ep 1994Bt 1998 1999 2002 2004 total
n 42 200 65 303 302 262 145 189 113 1621
Role in elections 43 61 63 36 29 17 45 21 16 34
No role in elections 57 39 37 64 71 83 55 79 84 66
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
in table 4.4 we present the relative amount of coverage in which the far-right featured in 
other roles than election related ones. A far-right actor can feature in more than one role. 
hence each row in the table should be read as if it was a single table. the far-right fea-
tured most in legal conflict (17%) and in extra-parliamentary violence (14%). 
table 4.4 the far-right in situated roles (in percentages)
election year 1987 1989 1990 1994ep 1994Bt 1998 1999 2002 2004 total
n 42 200 65 303 302 262 145 189 113 1621
In political actuality 2 3 3 6 3 3 6 16 4 5
In legal conflict 36 5 12 17 18 16 11 26 32 17
In extra-parliamentary 
violence 12 6 8 18 15 18 11 11 13 14
In extra-parliamentary 
confrontation 10 6 2 4 3 3 1 3 5 4
In extra-parliamentary 
peaceful situations 12 4 6 4 5 19 10 10 4 8
In normal internal 
situations 12 17 5 7 8 11 8 7 4 9
In negative internal 
situations 2 8 18 6 4 2 1 3 1 4
this means the far-right was portrayed relatively often in situations in which they were 
suspected of violation of the law (often in cases of racism) as well as in situations in 
which far-right actors used violence, for example, against immigrants or buildings that 
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host asylum seekers. in the 1994 eP election period, all newspapers paid a great deal of 
attention to the court case of the four local neo-nazis who were suspected (and finally 
sentenced in 1995) of the infamous assault with Molotov cocktails on an immigrants’ 
home in solingen resulting in five deaths. in many of these cases, the far-right actors fea-
tured in both roles because they were suspected of racist violence in court. Most notably, 
far-right actors only featured in roles in political actuality in 5% of the coverage. the 
main reason was their absence in the national parliament. in 8% of the coverage, the far-
right featured in peaceful extra-parliamentary activity and in 9% in normal internal situ-
ations such as party conferences. 
over time, there were a number of changes in the attention to the far-right in certain 
roles. the role in political actuality is fairly constant, except in the short period (2002) in 
which schill was member of the hamburg government and presented himself as a candi-
date for the Bundestag (16%). his controversial speech in the Bundestag on August 29th 
2002 was widely covered. the role in legal conflict was relatively high in 1987 (36%), 
then decreased to 5% in 1989. in 2002 (26%) and 2004 (32%) the percentage increased 
significantly again. Attention to the far-right as actors of extra-parliamentary violence is 
fairly stable. exceptions are 1989 (6%) and 1990 (8%). the long stretched peak during 
mid-nineties (18 – 15 – 18%) might have started with the infamous ‘solingen’ court case. 
in 2004 the attention to far-right violence increased slightly again (13%). coverage of the 
far-right in direct confrontation with their opponents (often anti-fascist activists) is rela-
tively high in 1987 (10%), but is fairly constantly below 5% from 1990 onwards. Peace-
ful extra-parliamentary activity of the far-right generally received a little more attention, 
although in the early nineties it was equally low. in 1998 it increased sharply to 19% of 
the coverage. extra-parliamentary activity of the far-right in general was covered most 
intensively in 1998 (40%), whereas attention to the far-right in electoral and political 
actuality (both parliamentary) roles was at an all-time low in that year (20%). Attention 
to the developments within far-right (party) organisations was at its peak in 1989 (17%). 
negative roles within far-right organisations peaked in 1990 (18%), while in that year 
there was relatively little attention to other roles. After that, the attention to the far-right 
in this role decreased to a low percentage of the coverage.
it is no surprise that bild paid relatively more attention to the far-right in aggressive 
roles, such as roles in extra-parliamentary violence (25% vs fAZ 12% and sdZ 14%). 
More surprising is that it also covered the far-right in political actuality (13%) more than 
fAZ (6%) and sdZ (4%). the unexpected high percentage of roles in political actuality 
turns out to be concentrated in 2002, which is probably due to the high interest of bild 
in the activities of roland schill. in two years, there were also significant differences con-
cerning the far-right in legal conflict. in 1994 eP bild paid extraordinary attention to 
the solingen court case (44% vs 7% fAZ, and 21% sdZ). in 1998 fAZ covered the legal 
case against the nPd more intensively (23%, vs sdZ 10% and bild 11%). see appendix 
4.5.
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the far-right in positive and negative roles
We recoded these roles into the dichotomy ‘positive roles’ and ‘negative roles’ (in terms 
of positive or negative portrayal aspects). electoral roles were left out of this re-categori-
sation because a positive or negative label cannot be clearly attributed to that role. A role 
in political actuality is attributed as a positive role. this role can be considered the main 
function of a political party, or movement (see also chapter 2). however, it is not very 
common that far-right parties who are represented in parliament are covered in this role 
(fennema & van der Brug 2006, schafraad, Wester and scheepers, 2009). for about half 
of the coverage no role was coded, or a positive or negative label could not be attributed. 
this figure is quite stable throughout the research period. figure 4.3 shows that the other 
half of the coverage featured the far-right less in positive roles (17%), than in negative 
roles (33%). there is no exception to this distribution throughout the research period, 
but the balance changed throughout the 18 years. in 1987, 45% of the coverage featured 
the far-right in negative roles, while only 12% featured them in positive roles. in 1989, 
when the republikaner did very well in the eP elections, the balance is almost equal - 
22% in negative roles, 18% in positive ones. from 1990 until 1998 the balance is again 
negative. in 1999, 10 years after the 1989 deuce, the share of the coverage featuring the 
far-right in positive roles (19%) is again not much smaller than the share featuring them 
in negative ones (23%). in 2002 and 2004 the negative balance increased again to a con-
siderable difference of 41% of the coverage featuring the far-right in negative roles and 
only 10% featuring them in positive roles.
figure 4.3  the far-right in positive or negative roles (in percentages)
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All newspaper coverage showed an equal percentage of far-right actors in positive roles 
at 17%. bild, however, paid significantly more attention to the far-right in negative roles 
than the other two newspapers with 45% vs 31% fAZ and 32% sdZ (see appendix 4.6).
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stigmatising the far-right
stigmatising associations with the nazis or extremism were the third aspect of substan-
tial attention in this study. We assumed that the presence of such associations points the 
reader in a negative direction when considering the far-right. it was expected that stig-
matisation disqualifies the far-right actor as a normal democratic political party, or full 
member of the democratic party system. in order to calculate stigmatising associations 
we excluded all cases involving far-right violent groups and organisations from the analy-
sis. A significant majority of the coverage contained stigmatisation of the far-right actor 
(52%). Without this correction, the calculated percentage would be 10% higher. the cor-
rected trend for stigmatising associations is presented in fig. 4.4).
figure 4.4 percentage of the coverage including stigmatisation of far-right
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Coverage including any far-right extra-parliamentary actor (such as neo-Nazis, or activist groups such as Wiking Jugend 
or Skinheads Sächsische Schweiz) was left out of the analysis. This graph might underestimate a little, but it excludes the 
chance of taking representation of extra-parliamentary actors for stigmatising associations.
over time, there is a small peak in 1989 (48%), and then again in the mid-nineties, 
reaching its top in 1998 (71%). A new increase of stigmatising associations seems to have 
started in 2004.
interestingly, bild coverage contained relatively few stigmatising associations, whereas 
51% of fAZ and 55% of sdZ coverage did; only 31% of bild coverage contained such 
associations (see Appendix 4.7).
far-right ideological standpoints
An important last aspect of substantial attention is the presence of genuine far-right 
ideological standpoints. seven standpoints were formulated in chapter 1, based on the 
scientific consensus on central far-right ideological standpoints (Kitschelt 1997, Mudde 
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1998, ignazi 2006). the presence of each of these standpoints was checked in the cover-
age. A first indicator of the attention to far-right ideology is the total share of the cover-
age which contained any of these standpoints, and how much of it did not. in 38% of the 
coverage one or more of the far-right standpoints was present (see appendix 4.8). this 
level remained throughout the research period, although there are three election years in 
which it dropped below 25%, before it returned to the average percentage in the follow-
ing year. these years with relatively little coverage including far-right standpoints are, 
1987 (24%), 1990 (22%), 1999 (25%). 
in table 4.5 the presence of the seven far-right standpoints is shown. not all far-right 
standpoints received the same amount of attention in the german press. some, such as 
anti-progressive standpoints (1%), law & order standpoints (1%) and standpoints em-
phasising traditional values (2%) hardly featured in the coverage. Most prominent were 
xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints (28%) and the related nationalist standpoints (11%). 
Anti-establishment or populist standpoints (4%) and anti-democratic standpoints (5%) 
did not receive much attention, but were generally present in each time frame. 
Between 1987 and 2004 we cannot detect an increase in the amount of far-right stand-
points that featured in the coverage. for some of the far-right standpoints the attention 
did vary over the years. Anti-establishment or populist standpoints came to the fore in 
1989 and in the election period of the 1994 Bundestag elections. Attention to nationalist 
standpoints never dropped to a very low level, except in 2002 (2%), while it peaked in 
1989 at 22%. Xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints are present continuously in about 
20-30% of the coverage, except in 1987 (12%) and peaking during the elections period 
of the european parliament in 1994 (36%). coverage of other far-right standpoints re-
mained low in the entire research period, except for three small peaks of coverage with 
anti-democratic standpoints in (again) 1989, 1994 (eP) and 2004 (all at 7%).
table 4.5 presence of far-right ideological standpoints  (in percentages)
election year 1987 1989 1990 1994ep 1994Bt 1998 1999 2002 2004 total
n 42 200 65 303 302 262 145 189 113 1621
Anti-progressive 0 2 3 1 1 0 1 2 1 1
Anti-democratic 2 7 0 7 2 5 4 4 7 5
Anti-establishment/
populist* 5 9 0 4 6 3 3 2 1 4
Nationalist* 14 22 6 10 13 10 10 2 8 11
Xenophobic or 
Exclusionist* 12 29 17 36 31 27 18 30 27 28
Law & order 0 3 0 0 1 0 1 3 1 1
Traditional Values 2 2 2 1 2 4 1 0 0 2
*) p < 0,05
86
Most far-right standpoints present featured equally in the three newspapers. there are 
some differences, though. first, bild coverage contained fewer articles that mention 
anti-democratic and anti-establishment/populist standpoints than fAZ and sdZ. bild 
contained almost none, whereas about 5% of the fAZ and sdZ coverage contained these 
standpoints. on the other hand, bild was the only newspaper that contained law & 
order standpoints in its coverage with 4% (see Appendix 4.9). Although all coverage con-
tained a great deal of xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints (between 26% and 35%), 
in bild coverage these were mentioned most with 35%.
4.2.3 support attention
the fourth aspect of media attention to the far-right is that of support attention. it refers 
to the degree to which the far-right and their standpoints are (de-)legitimated by non-far-
right actors. this dimension of newspaper contents is measured in two ways. first, we 
look at the relative amount of coverage that contains exclusively favourable or unfavour-
able attitudes towards the far-right or their ideological standpoints. A second indicator is 
the attention to the public debate about the way one should deal with the far-right. 
non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the far-right
the first measure is, as said, the extent to which far-right actors are confronted with pos-
itive or negative attitudes of non-far-right actors. exactly half of the coverage contained 
explicit non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the far-right, or far-right standpoints. 
Almost all of these attitudes are unfavourable to the far-right (46%) (see table 4.6). far-
right actors did not receive much approval in the coverage, hence their isolation seemed 
severe. 
table 4.6 shows that the share of favourable attitudes as well as the share of the cover-
age that contained both favourable and unfavourable attitudes were practically negligible 
in all election years. this does not mean nothing has changed. the percentage of the 
coverage containing exclusively unfavourable attitudes fluctuated quite considerably. it 
peaked three times in the research period. firstly in 1989 (+24% to 62%), then there 
was a longer period from the eP election in 1994 until 1998 (+20% to 50%) with a high 
percentage of the coverage containing exclusively unfavourable attitudes towards the far-
right, and lastly in 2004 it peaked again with 51% of the coverage (+11%). surprisingly 
there are no between newspaper differences (see Appendix 4.10).
table 4.6 non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the far-right (in percentages)
election year 1987 1989 1990 1994ep 1994Bt 1998 1999 2002 2004 total
n 42 200 65 303 302 262 145 189 113 1621
Excl. favourable 0 4 3 0 1 0 1 2 2 1
Excl. unfavourable 38 62 31 51 44 47 31 40 51 46
Both fav./unfav. 0 7 0 1 4 1 1 2 1 2
None 62 28 66 47 52 52 68 57 46 50
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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dealing with the far-right as a topic in the coverage
in general, the far-right is not considered to be a ‘normal democratic party’. Moreover, 
among politicians and political debaters, civic organisations as well as activists there is a 
debate going on about the most effective way to fight the far-right. such debates, what-
ever strategy is under discussion (from criminalisation, to a so called ‘cordon sanitaire’ or 
even draconian measures, or the opposite, inclusion in the ‘normal political community’), 
indicate that the far-right received a separate treatment, even if the outcome of such a 
debate is to include them in the normal political community, because neither socialist, 
liberal or confessional parties are subject to such debates (Jacobs & swyngedouw, 2002; 
Van donselaar and rodrigues, 2006). therefore, coverage that pays attention to such de-
bates is also an indicator that the far-right receives a ‘different treatment’, or that there is 
controversy about them among non-far-right actors. thirteen percent of the coverage con-
tained such debates, which means it is an issue among non-far-right actors that appeared 
in the newspapers from time to time. often, this coverage was bound to political or legal 
agendas, for example when the newspapers discussed the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of the attempt 
to ban the nPd in 2002. As shown in figure 4.5, there was relatively more coverage of 
such debates in the Republikaner success year 1989 (19%) and the eP election period of 
1994 (21%). except for 1990, the debate was always on the media agenda. here too, there 
were no significant differences found between newspapers (see Appendix 4.11). 
figure 4.5 percentage of coverage containing debate on  
how to deal with the far-right
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4.3 conclusions and discussion
following the logic of the four aspects of media attention, we unravelled the contents of 
german newspapers in order to see how the media covered the far-right between 1987 
and 2004. in this section we summarise these results and see what general picture they 
provide, which patterns of coverage can be indicated and to what extent there is a differ-
ence between the coverage of quality newspapers fAZ and sdZ and the popular tabloid 
bild as well as between the left-leaning sdZ and the right-leaning fAZ and bild.
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general conclusions
in general terms, volume and formal attention are not inconsiderable, compared to dutch 
newspapers. As the far-right did not have any representation in the Bundestag during the 
entire research period and a maximum of six seats in the european Parliament (1989-
1994), the far-right was far from ignored. in election years with major events involving 
the far-right, volume attention is significantly higher. this was the case, for example, in 
the electoral success year of 1989 and in the aftermath of the wave of far-right assaults 
in 1994 and 1998. generally, news about the far-right is not hidden in a corner of, say, 
page 17. forty percent of its coverage contained 400 or more words and on both visibility 
indicators the score was relatively high as well. the far-right was the main topic in two 
thirds of the coverage in which it featured and reached the headlines in almost half of the 
corpus.
substantial attention was measured with five sets of indicators. A remarkably high per-
centage of far-right coverage did not contain far-right actors at all. in some cases, we 
were able to identify certain news events that were almost entirely covered in this way, 
such as the ‘scandal’ of the so-called ‘extreme-right events’ in the german army. how-
ever, there was considerable coverage without far-right actors in most other years as well, 
without particular events to which to refer. Almost two thirds of the coverage only con-
tained passive representation (much higher than in our dutch study), while the share of 
references to far-right sources or quotes was much lower. this division remained almost 
stable throughout the research period. the far-right was portrayed in numerous other 
situations than just the expected electoral roles. especially roles in legal conflict and ex-
tra-parliamentary violence drew a great deal of media attention. the domination of these 
two roles in the coverage means that portrayal of the far-right is often in an unusually 
extreme setting for a political movement (whether a political party or extra-parliamen-
tary organisation). the presence of stigmatising associations in the coverage was simply 
very high. not surprisingly, the far-right standpoints which were found most frequently 
in the coverage were nationalist standpoints and xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints. 
More interestingly, very little coverage mentioning other standpoints was found, i.e. 
anti-democratic standpoints, anti-establishment and populist standpoints. the remain-
ing far-right standpoints were virtually absent from the coverage, even law and order 
standpoints in 2002, which means schill (‘richter gnadelos’) did not succeed in putting 
crime-fighting on the national political agenda.
the last aspect of media attention, support attention, showed a clear picture. hardly 
any favourable attitudes of non-far-right actors were found, while 46% of the coverage 
contained unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right. this figure did not change much 
during the 18 year research period. the far-right received scarcely any support or ac-
knowledgement from third parties within the pages of the press. 
concerning research question 1, this study shows a general picture of a limited focus 
on stereotype aspects of the far-right, roles in legal conflict and extra-parliamentary 
violence, nationalist and especially xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints, a numerous 
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stigmatising associations, only unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors and a low 
level of active representation. All together this suggests a german press that deals with 
the far-right as if it is a ‘devil from the past’. the far-right is covered with and from a 
distance. even though the far-right is not ignored in itself, the coverage is, as the Belgians 
would have it, to be described as a ‘cordon sanitaire in the press’. the far-right was not 
excluded from the media, but reported on in an exclusory fashion. the german culture 
of contrition (Art, 2007: 338) materialized in the ‘controversial outsider’ media image of 
the far-right.
longitudinal patterns
in answer to research question 2, we found no trends that gradually developed in a cer-
tain direction. instead, there seems to be little difference between the far-right coverage 
in 1987 and 2004. As we concluded above, during the entire research period the coverage 
of the far-right was almost exclusively focused on the unfavourable aspects of the far-
right. far-right actors in ‘unnatural’ roles for political actors (violent behaviour, accused 
in court) drew much more media attention than their ‘normal’ political performance did. 
this was not only so in 1987 and 2004, but throughout the entire research period and 
thus looks like a consistent ‘cordon sanitaire’ in the press. the absence of development 
towards a different media image, does not mean there was no fluctuation at all in the lev-
els of attention that different aspects received
Besides a growing volume, the most relevant variance in the coverage consists of two 
different patterns that both strengthen our conclusion. these patterns concern two com-
binations of indicators of substantial and support attention that develop simultaneously 
(see figure 7 and 8). the first pattern concerns stigmatising associations, nationalist 
standpoints, xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints and exclusive unfavourable nfrA atti-
tudes. the fact that precisely these four indicators peaked together means that nationalist 
and xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints in relation to far-right actors brings about stig-
matising associations and provokes explicit unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right 
from non-far-right actors. in other words, the far-right often made the news with their 
nationalist and xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints. non-far-right actors, using stigma-
tising associations, dissociate themselves from the far-right in these same articles. the 
majority of the newspaper coverage of the far-right reconfirmed the stigmatised image of 
the far-right, often including delegitimising attitudes of non-far-right actors. this hap-
pened especially around newsworthy events with ‘media event’ potential, as seems the 
case in, for example, 1989, 1994 (both eP and Bt elections) and 2002. 
the second pattern, which consisted of two related indicators, namely ‘roles in legal 
conflict’ and ‘roles in extra-parliamentary violence’, occurred quite clearly in the mid 
nineties (1994 eP, Bt and 1998) and on a smaller scale in 2002-2004 (note that it did 
not occur in 1989). in 1994, a significant amount of attention was given to the solingen 
court case, which had become a key-event (green, Mcfalls & smith, 2001: 496)20. 
20 We analysed which media events the coverage is about in each of the peak years, based on the  
 titles of the articles.  
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Most coverage with roles in legal conflict and extra-parliamentary violence in the first 
peak concerns single articles on smaller but similar events. Apparently, one exemplify-
ing event made a whole series of smaller events more newsworthy. in 2002 there was one 
media event that helps to explain the increase of the share of coverage with the far-right 
in a role in legal conflict, namely the attempt in court to prohibit the nPd. events that 
contain the exemplary aspects of the unacceptability of the far-right cause an overem-
phasis of media attention on similar events and issues in the newspapers.
figure 4.6   pattern 1: standpoints               figure 4.7.   pattern 2: extra-parliamentary
         and delegitimasation              violence and legal conflict
in more general terms this means that at times when there are events that provide the 
tools to emphasise, for example, the violent character of the far-right, or the immorality 
of their standpoints, these patterns peaked. in fact they serve as amplifiers of the already 
existing media image of the far-right. Apparently, certain events draw so much newspa-
per attention, that this puts these unfavourable aspects of the far-right under the mag-
nifying glass and so reconfirms the image of an undemocratic outsiders’ movement (see 
ohlemacher, 1996 and Brosius & esser, 1996 for a similar argument about the media 
hype around the early nineties wave of racist violence in germany).
 
differences and similarities between newspapers
the three newspapers in our german study have quite distinctive characteristics. one 
just has to look at their front pages to realise this. We have tried to see past these struc-
tural differences between the newspapers and look at the differences in attention to the 
far-right between the three dailies. the structural differences leave their mark especially 
in the volume attention. interesting therefore, is the extent to which there are differences 
beyond the volume attention aspects. We do so by testing our six hypotheses, as postu-
lated in the introductory section of this chapter
quality and popular newspapers
We expected (h1) the difference in the level of volume and formal attention between 
fAZ and sdZ on one side and bild on the other due to the general difference in focus 
on political news between quality and popular newspapers. in terms of volume attention, 
the hypothesis is confirmed. fAZ (794) and sdZ (1100) contained 8 to 10 times more 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
19
87
19
89
19
90
19
94
EP
19
94
BT
19
98
19
99
20
02
20
04
%
Stigmatisation excl unfavourable nationalism xenophobic
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
19
87
19
89
19
90
19
94
EP
19
94
BT
19
98
19
99
20
02
20
04
%
In legal conflict Extraparliamentary violence
91
4. german press: ‘dealing with the devil of the past’ 
articles than bild (105). however, in terms of formal attention the situation is the exact 
opposite. Whenever bild paid attention to the far-right, it was more visible with higher 
percentages of front page coverage, headline appearance and prominence of far-right ac-
tors in the coverage. h1 is confirmed, only for the first part.
hypothesis 2 expected sdZ and fAZ to pay more attention to (a wider range of) sub-
stantial attention aspects than bild. however, we did not find a univocal image concern-
ing substantial attention. relatively, bild paid more attention to the far-right in roles of 
political actuality and extra-parliamentary violence then sdZ and fAZ which is contrary 
to our expectations. on the other hand sdZ and fAZ did include many more stigmatis-
ing associations and a wider range of far-right standpoints than bild. hypothesis two 
thus received mixed support, which actually means it may be better specified for each as-
pect of substantial attention. bild turned out to pay attention to very specific substantial 
aspects of the far-right and ignore others. As we did not find any differences between the 
three newspapers concerning support attention, there is no support for hypothesis 3 in 
the german case.
left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers
in order to test our general expectation that due to the greater ideological distance, the 
left-leaning sdZ would have paid more attention to the far-right than right-leaning fAZ 
and bild, in order to delegitimise it, as well as to test hallin and Mancini’s statement 
of remaining politicisation of the press, we tested hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 as postulated in 
section 4.1.
We expected the sdZ to pay more volume and formal attention to the far-right. table 
4.1 showed, that indeed sdZ paid far more volume attention to the far-right than both 
other german newspapers. however, in terms of formal attention this is not the case. so 
hypothesis 4 is only supported concerning volume attention.
especially on aspects of substantial attention a difference would be expected. however, 
sdZ did not pay more attention to any situated role, or far-right standpoint than the 
other two newspapers. the difference between fAZ and sdZ on stigmatising associa-
tions is not significant. this means that hypothesis 5 has to be rejected all together for 
the german case.
As the german newspapers were found to be extremely univocal concerning support at-
tention, hypothesis 6, which expected more support attention in sdZ, has to be rejected 
as well.
in conclusion, this means that the theoretical expectation of significant differences be-
tween left- and right-leaning newspapers has not been confirmed in the german case. in 
part, this may be due to the general attitude of rejection towards the far-right in germany 
(Art, 2007), which was reflected in the newspapers (especially in support attention). 
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5. the flemish Press: an implicit attribution of an abominable image 
chAPter 5
the fleMish Press: An iMPlicit AttriBution 
of An ABoMinABle iMAge
5.1 introduction
in this chapter we discuss the results of the analysis of flemish newspaper coverage of the 
far-right. in doing so, we will provide answers to the research questions discussed in chapter 
1 regarding longitudinal variation in the coverage of the far-right in flemish newspapers, de 
morgen, de standaard and het laatste nieuws and the differences between these three 
newspapers. for this purpose we apply the same model of media attention as we did in previ-
ous chapters and as was explained in section 1.4.3. 
the far-right in the flemish context  
the relationship between the federal state and the regions is of paramount importance in Bel-
gian politics. ‘flemish-mindedness’ (or flemish nationalism) is an ideological position widely 
shared beyond the left-right spectrum in flanders. Many flemish parties are sympathetic to 
the idea of transferring jurisdiction from the federal to the regional level. in its most extreme 
form, this would mean separation of flanders and abolishment of the Belgian state: this is the 
position of vlaams blok (vb) on the matter. By way of comparison, the francophone front 
national does not have a similar regionalist standpoint, as it continues to support the Belgian 
state (coffé, 2005: 68; ignazi, 2006: 138).
the roots of the flemish far-right ideology lie in the flemish nationalist movement, which 
developed rapidly in the early 20 century as a countermovement against the “pronounced 
subordination of flanders” within the Belgium state (ignazi, 2006: 124). Many of the militant 
nationalists, united in the vlaams nationaal verbond (vnv, flemish national alliance), col-
laborated with the nazi government of occupation during wwii. after the war militant nation-
alists founded the vlaamse militanten orde (VMo, flemish Militant order), an activist 
organisation, outlawed in 1981. in reaction to the state reforms enshrined in the so-called 
‘egmont pact’ in 1979, flemish militants launched the far-right party vlaams blok (VB) that 
in the beginning was an elitist nationalist party. inspired by the success of the french front 
national, the VB radicalised; its anti-immigration standpoint became its main programme 
issue in 1987 (Van den Brink, 1999: 10; ignazi, 2006: 131). it took four years before the VB 
experienced its first real electoral success, shocking the Belgian media and political circles by 
getting 17.7% of the votes in the local elections in Antwerp, the biggest city of flanders. the 
party succeeded in activating a new, social-cultural dichotomy in the political landscape. from 
1991 onwards, the VB became an undeniably significant actor on the flemish political scene. 
up to the end of the research period in 2004, vlaams blok has been the only relevant far-
right party in flanders since it was founded in 1979. on top of that, it has close ties with 
the most significant extra-parliamentary far-right organisations, such as the nationalist 
student association (nsV) and voorpost (radical nationalist movement). this means 
that vlaams blok had a monopoly of the far-right of the political spectrum. 
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the party really started to grow as soon as it could activate a new – social-cultural – dichot-
omy in the political landscape, after the first successes of the green party Agalev (coffé, 
2005:116; ignazi, 2006: 34). from 1991 on, vlaams blok became a significant party in the 
flemish political landscape. it was one of the first european far-right parties that succeeded 
in growing and also consolidating its electoral successes (coffé, 2004; lubbers, scheepers & 
Billiet, 2000). While it had two seats in the national parliament in 1987, it rose to 11.6 per-
cent of the Belgian votes at the 2003 national parliamentary elections, and caused renewed 
consternation when it collected 24.2 percent of the votes in the regional flemish elections a 
year later (regional elections held on the same day as those for the european Parliament).
the other flemish parties reacted to VB’s consecutive successes in two ways. Party chairs 
agreed not to cooperate with VB at any political level (Jacobs & swyngedouw, 2002: 214). 
this agreement was reaffirmed twice, once, after VB published its second ‘70 issues plan’ 
in 1996 and again in 2000, just before the local elections (coffé, 2005b: 165-166). this 
agreement became known as ‘cordon sanitaire’ and has been increasingly contested, both 
because critics say it did not halt the party’s success and because it is an ‘undemocratic 
measure’. second, in a reaction to the far-right similar to that in other countries, other par-
ties also slowly but surely moved to the right. the flemish liberals, for instance, changed 
their position on the issue of voting rights for migrants with non-eu passports in municipal 
elections, but without hampering VB’s growth (Jacobs & swyngedouw, 2002: 216). 
  
longitudinal variation
As we have seen, media attention to the far-right in the netherlands has changed signifi-
cantly between 1986 and 2004. these changes occurred only partly simultaneously with 
electoral changes (schafraad, scheepers & Wester, in press). A longitudinal change in media 
attention to the far-right in flemish newspapers is not unlikely, but its direction, conse-
quently, might be quite unpredictable, despite the continuous electoral growth of vlaams 
blok between 1987-2004. in addition to our main research question about the character-
istics of the media attention, we will investigate what changes in the newspaper coverage of 
the far-right occurred between 1987 and 2004?
quality and popular newspapers
in chapter 1, we formulated three hypotheses concerning the differences in formal, substan-
tial and support attention between quality newspapers and popular newspapers based on re-
search on the particular role of popular newspapers (schafraad, scheepers & Wester, 2008; 
steward, Mazzoleni and horsfield, 2003; Plasser & ulram, 2003). in terms of the flemish 
context the hypotheses to be tested are:
h 1 de morgen and de standaard pay more volume- and formal attention to the  
 far-right than het laatste nieuws. 
h 2 de morgen and de standaard pay more attention to (a more diverse range of)  
 substantial attention aspects than het laatste nieuws.
h 3 de morgen and de standaard pay more attention to (a more diverse range of)  
 support attention aspects than het laatste nieuws
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left- and right-leaning newspapers
in Belgium, the media system has certain strong characteristics of the so called Polarised 
Pluralist model, which means its newspapers are relatively more partisan and ideologi-
cally polarised than in the other two contexts (hallin and Mancini, 2005: 70, 181). in 
a study by Van Kempen (2007: 310), the measure for press-party parallelism gives an 
average score, close to the dutch press, but higher than the Walloon and german press. 
Although dependency of political parties has decreased, the partisan roots of de mor-
gen (dM), de standaard (ds) and het laatste nieuws (hln) are still apparent (de 
bent, 2001). dM was the successor of the social-democratic party papers which went 
out of business in 1978. ds has a long centre-right (catholic) history, which is especially 
manifest in the national news. it has always displayed sympathy with flemish-nationalism 
(ibid, 261-262). hln is an explicitly liberal newspaper, but is mostly focused on regional 
news and human interest, not unlike the dutch de telegraaf. 
differences between left- and right-leaning, or progressive and conservative/liberal news-
papers are the second kind of variation between newspapers that will be investigated. 
this means differences in the aspects of the far-right, to which dM and ds/hln pay 
attention. following this line of reasoning it is not unlikely that dM put more emphasis 
on the controversial aspects of the far-right and thus paid more attention to the far-right 
in roles in legal conflict and extra-parliamentary violence, as well as to its xenophobic/
exclusionist standpoints and to unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors, and used 
more stigmatising associations than both right-leaning newspapers (ds and hln). Ac-
cording to media-system theory, dM is ideologically further removed from the far-right, 
than ds and hln are, and thus is readier to counter the far-right. 
h 4 de morgen paid more volume and formal attention to the far-right than 
 de standaard and het laatste nieuws.
h 5 de morgen paid more substantial attention to the far-right than 
 de standaard  and het laatste nieuws.
h 6 de morgen paid more attention to support attention aspects than 
 de standaard and het laatste nieuws.
5.2 results
in this section, we present the results of the content analysis of the flemish newspapers. 
the way flemish newspapers portrayed the far-right is unfolded in four steps. first we 
look at the volume attention. second, we consider formal attention, the visibility as-
pects at the level of the articles. substantial attention, or the way far-right actors and 
standpoints are covered is the third step. last, we will look at how non-far-right actors’ 
attitudes towards the far-right featured in the coverage - support attention. for every in-
dicator we will first present the general picture, then describe the longitudinal variation 
and conclude with possible differences between newspapers.
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5.2.1  volume attention
A first indicator of media attention to the far-right is logically the number of articles 
found in this period, in other words, the attention volume.
Table 5.1 volume of attention per year and newspaper  
  (frequencies and average number of articles per day)
newspaper  dM ds hLn total
1987 N 36 34 17 87
 x per day 0.48 0.45 0.23 0.39
1989 EP N 41 38 48 127
 x per day 0.55 0.51 0.64 0.56
1991 N 101 96 62 259
 x per day 1.35 1.28 0.83 1.15
1994 EP N 111 62 27 200
 x per day 1.48 0.83 0.36 0.89
1995 N 100 80 47 227
 x per day 1.33 1.07 0.63 1.01
1999 (EP) N 220 164 152 536
 x per day 2.93 2.19 2.03 2.38
2003 N 147 254 211 612
 x per day 1.96 3.39 2.81 2.72
2004 N 275 295 187 757
 x per day 3.67 3.93 2.49 3.36
Total N 1031 1023 751 2805
 x per day 1.72 1.71 1.25 1.56
in total we found 2,805 relevant articles in three newspapers, divided over eight election 
years (1.56 article per day per newspaper). in 1987 the volume of attention to the far-
right was still quite small. the volume rose in the following election years, especially in 
1991 and again in 1999. Both these years are exceptional election years and have become 
known as such in Belgium’s electoral history (see swyngedouw, 2003: 547). the parlia-
mentary elections of 1991 became known as ‘Black sunday’ (Zwarte Zondag) because 
the far-right party vlaams blok had its final breakthrough, reaching 10% of the flem-
ish votes. in 1991 the average number of articles a day more than doubled compared to 
1989 (from 0.56 to 1.15). in 1999, flemish citizens voted for the european parliament, 
national parliament and regional parliaments. these elections therefore became known 
as ‘the mother of all elections’ (Moeder aller verkiezingen). in 1999 the attention volume 
doubled again (from 1.01 to 2.38). Both key elections, however, did not only generate 
extra news in one year, but were the start of a trend of increasing volume in the follow-
ing election years.
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in the eighties there was little difference between the volume of attention between the 
three newspapers. this changed in the early nineties, when quality papers de morgen 
and de standaard intensified the volume of attention to the far-right (and especially 
vlaams blok). starting in 1999, het laatste nieuws also increased its volume of at-
tention. the differences between newspapers then became significantly smaller again. the 
total volume of attention of de morgen and de standaard is almost equal, while het 
laatste nieuws’ volume is about 25% smaller.
5.2.2 formal attention
Visibility is the central idea behind the formal aspects of media attention to the far-right. 
formal attention was measured by looking at the size of the articles, front page appear-
ance, headline appearance of the far-right and prominence of the far-right in the articles.
size of the articles
the largest part, 40%, of the coverage consists of medium length articles (150-400 
words). 28% of all articles contain up to 800 words. short articles (short news, < 150 
words) are 22% of the complete sample and long articles (> 800 words) make up 11%.
table 5.2 size of the articles (in percentages)
election year 1987 1989 1991 1994 1995 1999 2003 2004 total
n 82 79 260 200 226 473 474 562 2356
S <150* 27 35 18 15 16 25 24 21 22
M 151-400 28 28 36 33 28 44 43 45 40
L 401-800 29 28 33 44 40 25 22 22 28
XL >800 16 9 13 8 15 6 11 12 11
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
*) sizes in number of words
Between 1987 and 1995 the share of short articles decreased from 27% to 16%. Between 
1999 and 2004 it levelled out between 20-25%. the percentage of medium length arti-
cles increased throughout the whole period, until 1995 at the expense of short articles, 
after that at the expense of long articles. the share of this ‘long’ category rose until 
1994, and decreased sharply in 1999 (from 40% to 25%). the share of articles longer 
than 800 words fluctuated between 6 and 16%.
the most usual length of articles in de morgen and de standaard were medium and 
long (appendix 5.1). this is in great contrast with het laatste nieuws, where almost 
half of the coverage consisted of short articles, followed by medium length articles. less 
than 15% of the het laatste nieuws coverage was longer than 400 words. Before 1991 
these differences did not exist. in the eighties the length of the articles in de morgen and 
de standaard was divided similarly to het laatste nieuws, with mostly short or me-
dium length articles.
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front page
seven percent of the coverage was printed on the front pages of the newspapers. this 
figure remained quite constant, except for the years 1991 and 1994, when the percentage 
increased to 10 and 11 percent (see fig 1). no significant differences between newspaper 
were found (Appendix 5.1).
headline appearance and prominence
Almost 40% of the articles had a clear far-right reference in the headline, usually the 
name of a party or party leader. in 1991 and 1994 this was almost 60%, while it was 
lowest in 1999 (33%) and 2003 (24%) (see fig 5.1). there were no significant differences 
between newspapers.
figure 5.1 far-right on front page*, in headline or prominent in article
 *) From 1999 on, n is smaller due to the high percentage of electronic archived articles, for which page number, or section 
title information is not provided. Therefore the position in the newspaper remains unknown for these articles, mostly from
HLN.
A little over half of the coverage contained far-right actors in a prominent role in the 
article. in 1989 (71%) and 1994 (64%) this percentage was significantly higher, while it 
was lowest in 2003 (34%). Prominence and headline appearance evolved simultaneously 
through time (fig. 5.1). 
in some years prominence differed between newspapers. overall prominence is lowest in 
de standaard (46%, dm and hln both 55%). in 1999 (38%) and 2003 (22%) prominence 
was extremely low in de standaard, while it remained at the same level in de morgen 
and increased slightly in het laaste nieuws (to 62% in 1999). these differences suggest 
that de standaard included the far-right more in regular political news than de mor-
gen and het laatste nieuws, as in ds, the far-right featured not prominently relatively 
often, but as one of the many actors in other political news (Appendix 5.2).
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5.2.3 substantial attention
next, we considered substantial attention. it refers to the portrayal of far-right actors 
and far-right ideologies. substantial attention was measured using four main indicators. 
the first of this is the representation of far-right actors in the news, second, the role in 
which far-right actors featured, third, explicit far-right stigmatising and fourth, the pres-
ence of far-right ideological standpoints.
representation
far-right representation is the first aspect of substantial attention that has been meas-
ured. for every election year, the level of representation was divided in two categories: 
passive representation (far-right actors only named or mentioned in the article) and ac-
tive representation (far-right actors paraphrased or cited in the article). the first category 
means that the far-right has not been used as a source, and is only mentioned. in the case 
of active representation, the far-right has been used as a source, made explicit by way of 
paraphrasing or citation. in 55% of the coverage the far-right actor(s) was represented 
passively. in 42% there were paraphrases or quotes, and the far-right thus was repre-
sented actively. interestingly, almost all of the coverage contained one or more far-right 
actors; only 3% of the coverage did not contain any far-right actor. Most actively repre-
sented far-right actors were party officials of vlaams blok, not only its main figurehead 
Philip dewinter, but also other MP’s. 
in the eighties there was more active representation, while in the early nineties it de-
creased to a level under the average of 42%. in 1995 it is 51% again and from 1999 on it 
is exactly on the average level of 42%.
figure 5.2 representation of far-right actors (in percentages)
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overall, there were no between newspaper differences (Appendix 5.3). only in 2003 
there was a one-off difference between the three newspapers. While in de standaard, 
passive and active representation were on about the same levels as in the overall figure, 
de morgen contained significantly more passive representation (72% = +17) and het 
laaste nieuws, more active representation (58% = +16), compared to 1999.
election news and situated roles of the far-right
the data were collected over an extended period around election days (in Belgium always 
sundays). therefore an overview is given of the percentage of the coverage wherein the 
far-right has a role in the elections (possibly besides other roles), before we analyse the 
different roles in which the far-right featured in the coverage (table 4). Around 68% of 
the coverage showed far-right actor(s) in a role in the elections, which means less than a 
third of the coverage of the far-right did not have anything to do with elections (table 
5.3). this is twice as much as in the german newspapers.
table 5.3 percentage of coverage with far-right in election role
election year 1987 1989 1991 1994 1995 1999 2003 2004 total
n 82 79 260 200 226 473 474 562 2356
In elections 71 73 74 52 79 71 66 67 68
Non electoral situation 29 27 26 48 21 29 34 33 32
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
this figure was quite stable throughout the years. the only real exception was 1994, 
when the attention to the far-right in electoral situations dropped to half of that year’s 
coverage. in the year after, 1995, the figure was a little higher than the average (79%). 
this means that a significant majority of the news involving the far-right dealt with elec-
toral issues. remarkable is that in the years of multiple elections (for three or more levels 
of representation), there was no increase in attention to the far-right in electoral roles. 
‘super election years’ 1999 and 2004 are normal years in that respect. 
in table 5.4, we present the percentages of the coverage in which the far-right featured 
in other roles. A far-right actor can feature in more than one role. hence each row in the 
table should be read as if it was a single table. Besides the dominant focus on electoral 
roles (see above), the far-right featured most frequently in legal conflict roles (13%). in 
several election years, the far-right clashed with the authorities, chiefly about their party 
programme, but also on violent and criminal activities, for example of vlaams blok 
members. the coverage contained the far-right in political actuality (11%) almost as 
much. this involved parliamentary debates, or public reactions to social events outside 
the electoral context. the far-right was covered in all other roles in between with three to 
six percent of the coverage.
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table 5.4 the far-right in situated roles (in percentages)
election year 1987 1989 1991 1994 1995 1999 2003 2004 total
n 82 79 260 200 226 473 474 562 2356
In political actuality 16 13 4 9 5 10 23 7 11
In legal conflict 10 8 7 22 18 7 6 25 13
In extra-parliamentary violence 4 5 13 17 4 2 1 6 6
In extra-parliamentary 
confrontation 6 15 3 3 4 3 2 2 3
In extra-parliamentary peaceful 
situations 4 8 2 4 4 1 3 3 3
In normal internal situations 1 4 6 4 5 3 2 3 3
In negative internal situations 2 3 1 6 6 2 2 7 4
over time, there are some interesting developments in the attention to particular roles in 
which the far-right is portrayed. in 1987 and 1989, when the Belgian far-right was still 
a one or two person fraction in parliaments on both sides of the language border, the at-
tention to their role in political actuality was quite high (16% and 13%). from the mo-
ment of their electoral breakthrough in 1991, however, the percentage shrank far under 
10% and remained relatively low until a sudden peak in 2003 (23%). in 2004 it was 
back under the 10 percent level. the far-right featured in legal conflict in less than 10% 
of the coverage in most election years, except in 1994 – 1995 (22%) and in 2004 (25%). 
in 2004 this is probably due to the lawsuit against vlaams blok, which ended with a 
conviction for racist offences. the wave of far-right violence in germany (1991-1994) 
did not go unnoticed in the flemish press, which at least partly explains the peak of roles 
in extra-parliamentary violence in 1991 (13%) and 1994 (17%). Around the elections of 
1989, when the far-right seemed to become increasingly popular, newspapers paid a great 
deal of attention to the counter movement and thus the far-right in extra-parliamentary 
confrontation, i.e. rallies (15 %). the year 1989 is also the only election year in which 
there was a little above average attention to the far-right in peaceful extra-parliamentary 
roles. there was little variety in the attention to both internal roles.
the most interesting differences between newspapers are the following. het laatste 
nieuws (17%)21 covered the far-right three times as much in roles in political actuality 
than de morgen (6%) did, while de standaard had a middle position (12%). the only 
exception is in 1987 when de standaard featured the far-right in political actuality most 
(27%). de morgen, on the other hand, paid significantly more attention to the far-right 
in legal conflict (16% vs de standaard 12% and het laatste nieuws 11%) and extra-
parliamentary violence (8% vs de standaard 4% and het laatste nieuws 4%) than the 
other two papers, see appendix 5.2. de morgen also paid most attention to the far-right in 
internal roles, both positive and negative internal roles. de standaard did not differ much 
from de morgen, but het laatste nieuws paid significantly less attention to these roles. 
21  Possibly due to the inclusion of local editions in the Mediarchus archive, which are not always 
recognisable as such.
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over the years, differences between newspapers changed somewhat. in years of increased 
attention to the far-right in legal conflict, this is the case in all three papers (1994, 2004). 
in other years, it is consistently de morgen that paid significantly more attention to this 
role, especially in 1987 and 1995. from the 90s on, most attention to the far-right in 
extra-parliamentary violence was in de morgen and least in de standaard. especially 
in 1991 and 1994 this role peaked in de morgen. later on there is less difference in the 
attention to this role between the three newspapers. in 1989 de morgen also paid more 
attention to the other extra-parliamentary roles of the far-right (Appendix 5.4). 
the far-right in positive and negative roles 
As far as possible, the eight distinct roles were re-coded into the bipolar categories of 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ roles. electoral roles were left out of this re-categorisation, be-
cause a positive or negative label cannot be attributed to that role (see chapter 2). only 
28 percent of the flemish coverage could be re-coded this way. All other articles did not 
contain any role, or (and this is the majority) contained exclusively electoral roles and 
thus have not been included in the re-categorisation. A small majority then, contained the 
far-right exclusively in positive roles (16%), while only 12% portrayed the far-right in 
negative roles. throughout the years this dominance switched a number of times as one 
can see in figure 5.3. in the flemish press this is almost completely due to two roles, one 
positive (in political actuality) and one negative (in legal conflict). While positive roles are 
present more in 1987, the early- to mid-nineties show a higher level of negative roles and in 
1999 came a new period with a dominant presence of positive roles, with an extraordinary 
peak in 2003. in 2004 again a change occurred, but the imbalance was slight that year.
figure 5.3 the far-right in positive or negative roles (in percentages)
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there is a clear difference between de morgen and the other two newspapers (appendix 
5.5). de morgen covered the far-right significantly less in positive roles and more in nega-
tive roles. interestingly, this difference lies between the left-leaning de morgen and the 
right-leaning other two and not between quality and popular press (see Appendix 5.3).
stigmatising the far-right
the third aspect of substantial attention was the relative amount of the coverage that in-
cluded stigmatising associations with the nazis or (violent) extremism. We assumed that 
the presence of these stigmatising associations would disqualify far-right parties as ‘nor-
mal democratic’ parties, or full members of the democratic party system. A mere 27% of 
the coverage in flemish newspapers contained stigmatising associations, which is not very 
high considering the many controversies in recent vlaams blok history. flemish newspa-
pers do have an alternative way to express the ‘gap’ between the far-right, and specifically 
vlaams blok and the other parties, which has not been included in this measure because 
it is too specific. flemish newspapers often referred to ‘the democratic parties’ meaning all 
parties except the far-right vlaams blok. Without even mentioning the latter, it automati-
cally constitutes a black and white opposition between the ‘democratic parties’ and the 
‘undemocratic’ vlaams blok, as the following quote shows: “…the leaders of the demo-
cratic parties took notice of the [vlaams blok-Ps] decree. […].”22 the use of this implicit 
opposition has a similar disqualifying meaning as the stigmatising associations that we 
have included in our measurement. the levels in figure 5.4 can therefore be read as an 
underestimation of the presence of stigmatisation.
figure 5.4 percentage of the coverage including stigmatising associations
22 “…De leiders van de democratische partijen ‘namen akte’ van het arrest.” De Morgen, April 22nd 2004.  
The article discussed reaction to the decree that declared Vlaams Blok systematically urged discrimination.
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from 1987 to 1989 the level rose sharply, then dropped in 1991 and peaked with nearly 
every other article (50%) in 1994. After that year, the percentage of the coverage includ-
ing stigmatising associations dropped every year until it reached its lowest point in 2003 
with 17%. in 2004 it rose by 5%. in the mid nineties the term ‘extreme right’ was often 
used as a synonym for the names of far-right parties, which clearly shows in the graph. 
this latter qualification was especially used in de morgen. throughout the complete 
research period, de morgen contained significantly more stigmatising associations than 
both de standaard and het laatste nieuws (appendix 5.6). except in 1987 and 2004, 
het laatste nieuws contained the least stigmatising associations. this means we found 
a significant difference between left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers, and a smaller, 
but in some years significant, difference between quality and popular newspapers.
far-right ideological standpoints
the last aspect of substantial attention is the presence of genuine far-right ideological 
standpoints. seven standpoints were formulated based on the scientific consensus on 
central features of far-right ideology (Kitchelt, 1997; Mudde, 1998; ignazi, 2006). the 
presence of each of these standpoints was checked in the coverage. in 45% of the cover-
age, one or more of the seven far-right standpoints were mentioned (see appendix 5.4). 
in 1989, 1991 and 1994 it rose to about 60%, thereafter it decreased again. it was at its 
lowest point in 2003 with a mere 34%. this means that two-thirds of the news reports on 
the far-right did not contain any of the far-right standpoints that year. de morgen paid 
most attention to standpoints (55%), while de standard was close to the average with 
45% and only 33% of het laatste nieuws coverage contained far-right standpoints (Ap-
pendix 5.7).
in table 5.5 the presence of the seven far-right standpoints is shown. one standpoint 
stood out, xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints that were present in 30% of the 
coverage. nationalist standpoints were also frequently mentioned in relation to far-right 
actors (16%). As these two issues are also the most prominent issues of Belgium’s largest 
far-right party VB, this is not unexpected (see ignazi, 2006: 132). Anti-establishment (or 
populist) standpoints featured in 8% of the coverage. law and order standpoints, as well 
as standpoints protecting traditional values, featured in about 5% of the coverage. Anti-
democratic standpoints were present in 3% of the articles. Anti-progressive standpoints 
are the only standpoints of the list of seven which were virtually absent.
over time, a general trend is the growing diversity of standpoints that received. espe-
cially from 1991 on, the diversity is greater than in the eighties. trends for the individual 
standpoints differ quite considerably. Anti-progressive standpoints only featured in the 
coverage in 1994 and 1995. Before the 90s there was no attention to anti-establishment/ 
populist standpoints, but from 1991 the attention to these standpoints was fairly constant 
at around 8% with a small peak in 1995 (13%). nationalist standpoints were present 
quite prominently in the coverage between 1987 (32%) and 1995 (21%).
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table 5.5 presence of far-right ideological standpoints (in percentages)
election year 1987 1989 1991 1994 1995 1999 2003 2004 total
n 82 79 260 200 226 473 474 562 2356
Anti-progressive 0 0 0 3 3 1 0 0 1
Anti-democratic 1 6 1 6 4 2 3 3 3
Anti-establishment/populist 0 0 9 10 13 8 5 9 8
Nationalist 32 22 23 18 21 13 11 12 16
Xenophobic/Exclusionist 32 51 41 41 26 23 20 35 30
Law & Order 5 3 2 5 5 7 7 4 5
Traditional Values 10 11 3 5 4 5 3 2 4
After that, these standpoints became significantly less visible: from 1999 on less than 13% 
contained nationalist standpoints. the attention to xenophobic and exclusionist stand-
points was always by far the highest, although there was some variation over the years. in 
1991 there was a peak of no less than 51% and a decrease to 20% in 2003, directly fol-
lowed by a new increase to 35% in 2004. law and order standpoints only became some-
what more visible in 1999 and 2003 (both 7%). in all other years the attention to these 
standpoints remained at or below 5%. traditional values are present quite prominently in 
1987 (10%) and 1989 (11%), but then apparently became increasingly insignificant and 
featured in about 4% of the coverage in all of the following years. newspapers paid sig-
nificantly less attention to the third ideological ‘pillar’ of VB, conservative family values, 
than to the first two, their exclusionist and nationalist standpoints.
Anti-progressive, law and order and traditional value standpoints featured equally in 
the three newspapers (see Appendix 5.8). Anti-democratic standpoints and xenophobic/
exclusionist standpoint received most attention in de morgen and least in het laatste 
nieuws. de standaard paid most attention to anti-establishment/populist standpoints 
(10%) and nationalist standpoints (21%). here also, het laatste nieuws gave least at-
tention.
5.2.4 support attention
the fourth aspect of media attention, support attention, refers to the degree to which the 
far-right and their standpoints are (de-)legitimated by non-far-right actors. it is measured 
in two ways. first, we look at the relative amount of coverage that contained exclusively 
favourable or unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right or their ideological stand-
points. A second indicator is the attention to discussion in the public debate and among 
non-far-right actors about the way one should deal with the far-right. 
non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the far-right
A much as 46% of the coverage mentioned non-far-right actor’s attitudes towards the 
far-right. A large majority of these articles contained exclusively unfavourable attitudes 
(35%). only 4% contained exclusively favourable attitudes and 7% contained both fa-
vourable and unfavourable attitudes. throughout the years, the ratio did not change a 
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great deal, although the share of articles that do include favourable attitudes increased be-
tween 1987 and 2004 from 2 to 15%, especially after the breakthrough year 1991 (table 
5.6). But also the share with exclusively unfavourable attitudes increased from 22% in 
1987 to 40% in 2004. still the representation of non-far-right actors’ attitudes is less 
univocal(-ly unfavourable) in 2004 than it was in 1987. 
table 5.6 non-far-right actor’s attitudes towards the far-right  
  (in percentages)
election year 1987 1989 1991 1994 1995 1999 2003 2004 total
n 82 79 260 200 226 473 474 562 2356
None 76 56 65 55 48 52 60 46 54
Excl. favourable 2 1 2 4 4 4 6 4 4
Excl. unfavourable 22 38 30 36 41 37 29 40 35
Both fav. + unfav. 0 5 3 6 6 8 5 11 7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
there are no significant differences between de standaard and het laatste nieuws. de 
morgen (Appendix 5.9), however, paid more attention to non-far-right attitudes in gen-
eral (53% vs ds 43% and hln 40%). All of this extra attention went to unfavourable 
attitudes of non-far-right actors (see Appendix 5.6). in 1987 and 1989 this same distri-
bution was even clearer. in the following years the between newspaper differences were 
small. in 2004 De Morgen contained significantly more articles with both favourable 
and unfavourable attitudes (14%, vs ds 11% and hln 8%), along its ‘usual’ greater at-
tention to unfavourable attitudes.
dealing with the far-right as a topic in the coverage
this last indicator is especially interesting in the flemish press because of the ‘cordon 
sanitaire’. Besides the occasional discussion about legal measures against vlaams blok 
(which came into effect in 2004), the ‘cordon sanitaire’ is probably the most discussed 
way of dealing with the far-right, especially in the weeks after vlaams blok made new 
electoral progress (see damen, 2001). in 10% of the coverage, strategies towards the far-
right were a topic in the coverage. in 1987 it was completely absent as a topic. Between 
1989 and 1995, it was present in between 5 and 10% of the coverage. from then on, the 
dealing with the far-right became an increasingly important topic each year. the topic 
reached its attention peak in 2004 with 16% (see fig. 5.6).
there was no significant difference in the attention to debate on how to deal with the far-
right between de morgen (12%) and de standaad (10%), though het laatste nieuws 
did pay significantly less attention to this kind of debates (7%) (appendix 5.10). in 1991, 
in contrast to both other papers de standaard did not pay attention to dealing with the 
far-right as a topic in its coverage. in 1999 and 2004, hln paid significantly less atten-
tion to such debate than did de morgen and de standaard. in both these papers, atten-
tion to this debate increased from 1995 on. 
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figure 5.6 percentage of coverage containing debate on how  
  to deal with the far-right
5.3 conclusions and discussion
in this section we gather all relevant results and discuss their inter-relationship in the light 
of our research questions. Again, we follow the order of first the general outcomes, then 
longitudinal patterns and the hypotheses on longitudinal changes and finally the differences 
between newspapers and the hypotheses on differences between quality and popular news-
papers, as well as between leftist and rightist newspapers.
general conclusions
flanders has had a relatively large far-right party during the entire research period and 
scarcely any other independent far-right actors. the first of these two characteristics ex-
plains the large attention volume. together, they explain why there is relatively much atten-
tion to the far-right in roles in elections and in political actuality, and at the same time little 
attention to the far-right in extra-parliamentary roles (although there is no correlation be-
tween attention to these roles and far-right voting, see chapter 6). if we compare the main 
standpoints of vlaams blok with the far-right standpoint that received most attention, 
there is a great deal of similarity. As with other far-right parties, there is, of course, a great 
deal of attention to their xenophobia and exclusionism, but also the flemish-nationalist 
and anti-establishment standpoints, and even their ‘third leg’23 of protection of traditional 
values, received considerable attention in the flemish newspapers. A clear majority of the 
non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the far-right in the coverage was unfavourable, while 
at the same time the colonisation of far-right standpoints by other parties also showed in the 
fact that favourable attitudes were present in about ten percent of the coverage.
23  Political scientists pointed out that Vlaams Blok draws three different groups of voters. The tradi-
tional group of Flemish-nationalists, people that vote Vlaams Blok because of their exclusionist standpoints 
and conservatives that are attracted to their standpoints protecting traditional values, such as the family, 
anti-abortion standpoints and against gay marriage. Each of these  ‘wings’ in the parties has its own face: the 
Flemish-nationalists have Gerolf Annemans; the exclusionists have Phillip Dewinter and the traditionalists 
have Alexandra Colen (see Van den Brink, 1999).
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longitudinal patterns and changes
in 2004 we found ten times as many newspaper articles on the far-right as in 1987. especially 
in 1991 and 1999 there was an enormous increase (+100%) of volume attention. however, 
formal attention aspects did not increase significantly in 1991 and beyond. front page atten-
tion remained constant and headline appearance and prominence went up and down. 
surprisingly, before the electoral breakthrough of VB in 1991, the far-right was actively rep-
resented more often than after. We found a sudden decrease in 1991. next, the share of active 
representation remained more or less the same. Attention to the far-right in roles in elections 
did not rise significantly and roles in political actuality decreased, even though the party’s 
activity in various parliaments increased. Particular events, such as the wave of far-right vio-
lence in germany (1994) and the lawsuit against vlaams blok (2004) explain the fluctua-
tions in attention to most other roles of far-right actors.
Anti-establishment/populist standpoints started to gain attention from 1991 on. the ‘cordon 
sanitaire’ apparently gave significant input to the anti-establishment rhetoric of VB, which 
was recorded in the media. the attention to the original main standpoint of VB (radical flem-
ish-nationalism) decreased, while that to their new ‘core business’ of xenophobia and exclu-
sionism rose until 1994. in spite of what could be expected based on Walgrave & de swert’ 
study (2004), attention to law and order standpoints did not increase.
in 1994, all three categories of non-far-right actors’ attitudes received increasing attention. 
Attention to unfavourable attitudes increased most. An increase in the attention to debate on 
how to deal with the far-right increased in 1994, then fell back in 1995 and rose continuously 
until 2004. With the exception of 1995, the general trend here is that the debate grew with 
the electoral popularity of VB.
two mechanisms
the flemish case is exceptional in the sense that their electoral popularity grew continuously 
between 1987 and 2004 (for either parliament, as well as on the local and regional levels). 
therefore, it was a logical step to specify our longitudinal question in accordance with this 
fact: did media attention rise simultaneously with the electoral popularity of the far-right in 
flanders? on the level of the four aspects of media attention to the far-right we found two 
different patterns.
first we found that in general, neither formal attention nor substantial attention increased at 
all. there is no statistical relationship between any of these two aspects of media attention to 
the far-right and electoral results. second we found that both volume attention and support 
attention did increase between 1987 and 2004. As we have seen above, volume attention in-
creased sharply while the electoral popularity of Vlaams Blok grew. More interestingly, sup-
port attention increased as well, although not as much as volume attention. 
 
this means we have two mechanisms at work: the first mechanism is that although the 
popularity of the far-right increased, substantial attention did not. the increased presence 
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of vlaams blok in parliaments did not cause more attention to roles in political actuality, 
relatively more quotes of far-right politicians, or more attention to a more diverse range of 
far-right standpoints. this means the media image of the far-right did not change and kept its 
emphasis on the particular far-right characteristics of undemocratic party behaviour, exclu-
sionist standpoints, etc. 
instead, when the far-right electorate continued growing, newspapers turned to non-far-right 
actors, often politicians of other parties, to record their unfavourable attitudes towards the 
far-right and their debates on how to deal with the far-right (often in terms of the ‘cordon 
sanitaire’). Attention that indicates emphasis on the deviant and ‘undemocratic’ media image 
of the far-right increased greatly. this means the second mechanism is that volume and sup-
port attention did increase significantly simultaneously with the electoral growth of the far-
right. especially those support attention aspects that emphasis the unfavourable judgements 
of the far-right by other political parties remained dominant and doubled in size. Although 
substantial attention to the far-right in roles of violence and stigmatisation decreased, the 
undemocratic image of the far-right has been strengthened by the deligitimising attitudes of 
non-far-right actors.
in conclusion, we can state that the media image of the far-right did not change over the 
years, despite the fact that the far-right became increasingly more successful and received 
increasing media attention (volume). What did change, is that explicit emphasis on the unac-
ceptable aspects of the far-right (roles in extra-parliamentary violence, undemocratic stand-
points, extreme nationalism, and the use of stigmatising associations) decreased and a more 
subtle way of explicating the deviant characteristics of the far-right gained more attention 
- unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors towards the far-right. over time, one and the 
same media image was portrayed first in a relatively harsh way and later in a relatively subtle 
manner.
differences between quality and popular newspapers
looking at differences between quality and popular newspapers, it is remarkable that the 
popular newspaper hln did not pay so much less volume attention to the far-right than 
quality papers dM and ds. still, it is a significant difference, as is the difference in the size of 
the articles, which is generally bigger in quality papers. however, the newspapers did not dif-
fer on the other formal attention indicators, while a larger formal attention was expected for 
quality newspapers. there is mixed support for hypothesis 1. 
Attention to sensational roles (in legal conflict, in extra-parliamentary violence) is lower in 
hln, than in the other two newspapers, while concerning the other roles there are hardly 
any significant differences. hypothesis 2 expected a more diverse attention to situated roles in 
quality papers dM and ds. our results do not support this hypothesis here. concerning the 
expected focus on xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints in hln and the more diverse stand-
point attention in dM and ds we did find support for hypothesis 2.
the last hypothesis (h3) expected more support attention in the quality newspapers dM and 
ds than in hln. for non-far-right actors’ attitudes we did not find such a difference. for the 
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level of attention to debate on how to deal with the far-right we did find a significant differ-
ence between the quality newspapers and the popular hln, which does support hypothesis 
3. the quality newspapers’ support attention is thus more diverse than that of the popular 
hln. especially in the last couple of election years the attention to this debate rose signifi-
cantly in the quality papers, while it did not increase in hln. Apparently, this, in Belgium 
very serious, debate is more of an issue for quality newspapers, than for popular newspapers. 
Quality newspapers dM and ds differed significantly from the popular paper hln. the vol-
ume of their attention is larger and the variety of far-right standpoints that they paid attention 
to is bigger as well. however, we found only mixed support for our three hypotheses. unlike 
german and Austrian popular newspapers (Plasser & ulram, 2003; Art, 2007; schafraad, 
scheepers & Wester, 2008), hln was not totally focused on the far-right in sensational roles. 
such a singular focus on sensational aspects is apparently reserved for the most popular 
among the popular newspapers, the tabloids. hln does not fall into this category.
between left-leaning and right-leaning  newspapers
in order to test hallin & Mancini’s argument that despite the decrease of partisanism of the 
press in democratic-corporatist media systems, media are still politicised, we expected to 
find clear differences between left- and right-leaning newspapers. de morgen is the most 
left-leaning, or progressive newspaper in our study. therefore, hypothesis 4 expected it to pay 
most volume and formal attention to the far-right. As the differences with de standaard are 
marginal and those with het laatste nieuws significant, but not devastating, hypothesis 4 
finds only weak support in the data.
the fifth hypothesis expected de morgen to pay most attention to substantial attention. 
We found that de morgen paid most attention to the ‘controversial’ aspects of the far-right, 
such as roles in legal conflict and extra-parliamentary violence, as well as using the most stig-
matising associations. All of these indicators show strong support for this hypothesis.
de morgen generally paid more attention to non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the far-
right. there were especially more articles with exclusively unfavourable attitudes in de mor-
gen. favourable attitudes towards the far-right featured slightly more in de standaard and 
het laatste nieuws, although this last difference is not significant. All together this means 
we found quite strong support for hypothesis 6.
the literature about the general characteristics of the Belgian media system and newspapers 
generated our expectation of finding significant differences between the left-leaning de mor-
gen and the traditionally right-leaning de standaard and het laatste nieuws (de Bent, 
2001; hallin & Mancini, 2005; Van Kempen, 2007). of all our hypotheses we found the 
strongest support for just these hypotheses. there is a very clear difference between atten-
tion to the far-right in the left-leaning de morgen and the right-leaning de standaard and 
het laatste nieuws. our study of flemish newspapers does supports hallin & Mancini’s 
argument about the remaining political flavour of newspapers in contemporary democratic-
corporatist media systems.
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chAPter 6
suMMAry And discussion: theorising 
neWsPAPer Attention to the fAr-right
in the previous three chapters we answered our research questions within three distinct 
national contexts. in this last chapter we have four objectives left to fulfil, as we change 
our perspective from a national to a cross-national perspective. first we compare the out-
comes of the three case studies both on their general conclusions and longitudinal con-
clusions. this part serves to answer rQ 1 (how do media pay attention to the far-right?), 
rQ 2 (are there any changes in the media attention to the far-right between 1986-2004?) 
in a cross-cultural perspective and rQ 4 (what cross-national differences are there in 
the media attention to the far-right?). the second objective of this chapter then is to in-
vestigate how cross-national patterns in media attention relate to developments in the 
political contexts. is the way media pay attention to the far-right an autonomous process 
or does it reflect reality? A third objective is to place the comparison of different types of 
newspapers in a cross-national perspective as well, and answer the combined rQ3 and 
rQ4 (are there any differences in the attention to the far-right in different types of news-
papers?). We tested six hypotheses about these differences on national levels in previous 
chapters and now retest them on a cross-national level. As our last endeavour in this last 
chapter, we will take the model of media attention that we have developed for this study 
and review it critically. 
6.1  summary and cross-national analyses
6.1.1 media attention to the far-right in three countries: 
 the controversial outsider
in this section we summarise the findings on media attention to the far-right in each of 
the three national contexts, the netherlands, germany and flanders and point out their 
similarities and differences. in accordance with the previous chapters, we will first look 
at each of the four aspects of media attention to the far-right in general, followed by lon-
gitudinal developments. in this section we provide an answer to the first and last research 
questions; (rQ1) how do media pay attention to the far-right? (rQ4) What differences 
are there in the media attention to the far-right between dutch, german and flemish 
newspapers?
volume attention and formal attention
generally, newspapers published one article per day that at least mentioned the far-right; 
in flemish newspapers this was systematically more than in german and dutch newspa-
pers. A large majority of the coverage existed of medium or long articles. in all countries, 
an equal amount of articles was printed on the front page of the newspaper (9%). the 
far-right featured in the headlines of 44% of this coverage, while it was the prominent 
actor in 55%. german papers deviated from this description to a limited extent. 
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they contained relatively more short articles and the far-right featured prominently more 
often. this means that when the far-right featured in german newspapers, it was mostly 
as the central subject in the article.
substantial attention
representation
in more than half of all coverage, the far-right was only passively represented, in 39% 
it was actively represented and in the remaining part, no far-right actor was mentioned. 
that last category means the far-right remained an abstract entity ‘without a face’. in a 
majority of all coverage, the far-right was object rather than subject. in german papers, 
the absence of a far-right actor occurred most often (16%). Active representation was 
found most frequently in dutch newspapers (53%). german papers especially contained 
very little active representation (21%). this means the german far-right remained most 
abstract in the coverage, keeping the far-right most explicitly in that object position. the 
flemish papers held a middle position close to the general average.
situated roles
on average, the far-right featured in an electoral role in a little more than half of the 
coverage: in flanders (68%) this was considerably more and in germany significantly less 
(34%), which makes sense, because the flemish far-right has become a significant elec-
toral factor, while the german far-right, on occasion, was hardly capable of campaign-
ing. generally, attention to roles in political actuality was found in 11% of the coverage, 
the least in germany (5%), the most in the netherlands (18%). As flanders (Belgium) 
had most far-right MPs of all three countries, one would have expected the highest per-
centage of coverage with attention to the far-right in political actuality in flemish news-
papers. nevertheless, dutch newspapers paid much more attention to the far-right in this 
role than flemish ones. 
the far-right featured in roles in legal conflict in 15% of the coverage, almost equal in 
all countries (significantly more than in political actuality). A court of law is an unusual 
habitat for a political party, which seems reason enough to report on it on every sin-
gle occasion. the far-right featured in extra-parliamentary roles regularly (17%), most 
frequently in germany, which is not surprising since the german extra-parliamentary 
far-right is larger and more active than the dutch or flemish24. Both roles in normal 
and negative internal situations are present in 5% of the coverage, most negatively in 
the netherlands, which is not strange due to the enormous amount of incidents and ac-
tive strategies of some journalist to bring these things to the fore (rensen, 1994; Van 
donselaar et al., 1998). the high or low levels of attention to some specific roles can be 
explained by specific circumstances (i.e. electoral roles in flanders, or negative internal 
situations in the dutch newspapers). 
24 Data on membership of extra-parliamentary far-right organisations, and data on reported far-right 
violence incidents (Van Donslaar, 1998, 2006; Verfassungsschutz, 1994, 2002; Centrum voor Gelijke Kansen, 
2008).
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the variation between some other roles is rather curious, for example the particular low 
attention to roles in political actuality and high levels of attention to roles in extra-par-
liamentary violence. there seems to be an emphasis on outsider roles, controversial ones 
even, and little interest in more obvious roles for political parties, which emphasises the 
outsider image (in terms of roles) of the far-right even more. 
stigmatising associations
in 34% of the coverage we found stigmatising associations. this means the reader was 
frequently reminded that far-right parties are morally unacceptable entities: they func-
tioned as symbolic disqualifiers. in germany this occurred even more often, in 52% of 
the coverage of far-right parties. the frequent use of stigmatising associations aided the 
formation of a media image as a controversial outsider.
standpoints
in general, flemish newspapers paid more attention to far-right standpoints than dutch 
and german newspapers did. Most prominent far-right standpoints were xenophobic/ex-
clusionist standpoints. this most well-known standpoint of the far-right featured in 28% 
of all coverage and was equally newsworthy in all countries. nationalist standpoints 
featured in 10% of all newspaper articles, with significant variation between the three 
contexts, least in dutch papers (4%), 11% in german papers and most in flemish papers 
(16%). this last figure was not unexpected, due to the flemish nationalist (regionalist) 
tradition. law and order standpoints featured a little more frequently, most in dutch 
newspapers (9%). Populist/anti-establishment standpoint received a little more attention 
as well, 6% on average, 8% in flemish newspapers. All other far-right standpoints, such 
as anti-progressive, anti-democratic standpoints and standpoints in favour of traditional 
values, received very little attention. Although the emphasis on xenophobic/exclusionist 
standpoints is not surprising, it does emphasise the controversial nature of the far-right 
more than attention to most other far-right standpoints would.
support attention
non-far-right actors’ attitudes were present in nearly half of all coverage, equally in all 
countries. the kind of nfrA attitudes was not equally distributed across countries. in 
all three countries, unfavourable attitudes were the dominant ones in the coverage. in 
the german press these featured most often (48%). in dutch and flemish newspapers 
this percentage was 40 and 42%, still a significant minority. sixteen percent of the dutch 
coverage contained favourable attitudes towards the far-right, while only 3% of the ger-
man did. flemish newspapers have a middle position (11%). overall, the overwhelming 
amount of unfavourable attitudes again stressed the outsider image of the far-right. even 
in the dutch newspapers, the imbalance between unfavourable and favourable attitudes 
is still rather strong.in 10% of all coverage, debate among nfrA actors about the way 
to deal with the far-right was featured, a little less in the dutch press (7%) and most in 
the german press (13%). 
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summary
in general the media image of the far-right in the newspapers is not particularly positive. 
Across the board, the media attention to the far-right cultivated a media image that can 
best be labelled as that of a controversial outsider. this media image is expressed most 
clearly in the german newspapers and is most nuanced in the dutch press. the most 
important differences between the three contexts then, are the following. numerically, 
the flemish newspapers paid most attention to the far-right. two-thirds of the flem-
ish coverage contains the far-right in electoral roles, much more than dutch or german 
coverage, whereas the dutch paid relatively more attention to roles in political actuality 
and the german in extra-parliamentary roles. differences in attention to far-right stand-
points were relatively small. the xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints were by far the 
most prevalent. in german newspapers we found far more stigmatising associations than 
in dutch and flemish ones. in dutch newspapers we found most favourable non-far-right 
actors’ attitudes and in german newspapers most unfavourable attitudes. 
6.1.2 cross-national trends in media attention to the far-right 
Although in all three countries the image of a controversial outsider prevails, there are 
significant differences in the way this image is presented. the next step is to explore the 
media attention longitudinally (rQ2) and cross-nationally (rQ4). has the media image 
of the controversial outsider always been there? if it changed, how did it change? And 
did these processes differ between national contexts, or were they part of cross-national 
trends?
 
the first elections after 1985 were chosen as a starting point for this study because in all 
three countries this era is seen a ‘new start’ for the far-right in Western europe (Mudde, 
1998). often inspired by the ‘nouvelle droite’ of the french front national, parties 
such as vlaams blok, centrum democraten and republikaner changed their pro-
gramme – centralising exclusionist standpoints – and adapted their strategies to convince 
voters (ignazi, 2006: 23). these parties were not instantly successful at the next elec-
tions, but in some cases the first sign of progress was made, either on national or local 
electoral levels. it is intriguing that newspapers in all three countries reported in a very 
similar way in these first election years (1986 and 1987). there was limited (volume) at-
tention to the far-right, with little room for the far-right to present their own side of the 
story, a great deal of stigmatising (both substantial attention) and exclusively unfavour-
able attitudes of non-far-right actors (support attention). in the dutch press a large part 
of the attention was actually devoted to rallies of opponents of the far-right. in germany 
there was suddenly a media hype around the unexpected electoral success of the repub-
likaner at the eP elections in 1989. bild literally wondered if people had voted nazis 
into the european parliament. other newspapers expressed similar worries in more nu-
anced terminology. in all newspapers, the attention expressed a clear image of a contro-
versial outsider. All nine newspapers were even so similar as to suggest the existence of a 
collective minimal-negative attention policy in the newsrooms. 
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in the early nineties, we recognised two important socio-political developments. first, a 
sharp increase in the amount of asylum requests in West-european countries (nicolaas, 
sprangers & Korpel, 2007). second, probably in reaction to this demographic develop-
ment, the amount of far-right violence increased enormously, especially in germany 
(Verfassungsschutz, 1991, 1993, 1995). in this period, the far-right grew in two ways: 
it did well in various elections (peaking in 1994) and its extra-parliamentary side was 
(violently) active as never before. in this way it caused a modest media hype with itself as 
the subject (i.e. Brosius & eps, 1996). As the peak in popularity brought a lot of differ-
ent troubles, it gave media instant opportunities to re-emphasise the image it had already 
created in previous years. Besides the (relative) novelty of electoral successes, the wave 
of far-right violence and the wave of scandals around newly elected far-right MPs raised 
media attention. our analysis shows that all newspapers included in the study took up 
these opportunities and reported more than before on the far-right (volume attention). 
the focus of most of this coverage indeed is on these three topics, the electoral success, 
far-right violence and the malfunctioning of far-right politicians (substantial attention), 
thereby reinforcing the negative media image. so the media image did not change, al-
though media attention shifted to those controversial aspects that were most newsworthy 
in this relatively hectic first half of the decade.
After this turbulent period, the far-right became less active, as it seemed, but the discus-
sion of integration and immigration policies came to dominate public debate during the 
following years. Media attention to the far-right, in the three countries, started to show 
increasing variation, the media image became less rigid. While Vlaams Blok continued 
to grow, flemish newspapers slowly traded their stigmatising associations and focus on 
xenophobic/ exclusionist standpoints (substantial attention) for increased attention to 
unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors (support attention) throughout the follow-
ing ten years. in other words, instead of explicating (possible) dangers of the far-right 
(as they previously did), they emphasised the incompatibility of the far-right with the 
mainstream political constellation in Belgium by reporting on the unfavourable attitudes 
of non-far-right actors, who were described as ‘the democratic parties’, implying that 
‘the other’ is undemocratic. the media image of the controversial outsider was not ex-
changed for a new one, but became more subtle. in a period with little far-right activity 
and decreasing electoral results, dutch newspapers slowly became milder as well, but not 
in the same way. their coverage became more open (i.e. more active representation) and 
diverse (substantial and support attention), which is a greater step away from the original 
rigid media image than the flemish one. in germany, the far-right was less active than 
before (Mudde, 1998; ignazi, 2006, Verfassungsschutz; 1995, 1999). in a few instances 
(of particular events), extra attention was drawn to controversial substantial aspects. 
other than that, media attention in german newspapers did not change significantly. All 
together, in this period the first real changes in media attention occurred in dutch and 
flemish newspapers. More and different aspects of the far-right appeared in the news, 
nevertheless, the media image of the controversial outsider persisted (although less black 
and white).
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in 2001, a completely new phenomenon appeared in both dutch and german politics, in 
both cases first at a local, then at a national level and both being a one-man enterprise. 
in rotterdam and hamburg respectively, new populist politicians, fortuyn and schill, 
entered the political arena. they may be called far-right, but to many they were much 
more than just that (faas, 2001; Pels, 2003; Van Praag, 2003). in german (national) 
media all this political controversy remained quite low-profile, in contrast to the dutch 
situation. fortuyn received enormous amounts of attention in the dutch (and foreign) 
media. As his politics and approach to the media had all the ingredients for countless 
news stories he became a true media hype (see Pels, 2003; Van Praag, 2003; Koopmans 
& Muis, 2008). this was reflected in our data with a rapid increase of volume attention 
and stronger continuation of the opening and diversification of the newspaper content 
(substantial and support attention). Meanwhile the flemish far-right crossed the 10% 
line in national elections for the first time and debate on the ‘cordon sanitaire’ became 
increasingly apparent in the coverage. Besides the various media hypes around fortuyn 
and schill, the german media attention did not really change, while the rise of fortuyn 
caused an increase in the process towards more open and diverse media coverage in the 
dutch newspapers. By 2004, the dutch coverage even changed so much that it reached 
a balance in positive and negative news (especially support attention), long after the lPf 
hype was over. this indicates a change of media image.
6.1.3 conclusion
in summary, until 1994 media attention in all three countries remained fairly similar and 
focussed on the controversial aspects of the far-right. thereafter, differences between the 
three national contexts became increasingly apparent. from 1995 on three different proc-
esses can be distinguished. in germany the far-right underwent almost no change dur-
ing the research period, nor did the media attention: it continued its historically rooted 
(and culturally widespread) rejection. german newspapers persisted with a rather rigid 
image of the controversial outsider. As the flemish far-right kept growing electorally, the 
coverage showed gradual alteration, however, with limited acceptation. they traded the 
rigid controversial outsider image for a more implicit (version of the) controversial out-
sider image. in the netherlands a political crisis caused a gradual alteration to eventually 
become a significant change towards acceptation. this last phase in the dutch press is 
directly related to the rise and fall of the lPf, which may be a one-time exception. from 
1995 on the controversial outsider image became more diverse and open, until it changed 
so much in 2004 that we can no longer speak of a controversial outsider image.
Just like the netherlands and flanders, many surrounding countries, from france to Aus-
tria and the scandinavian countries (rydgren, 2005; ignazi, 2006), witnessed a rise of 
evolving far-right parties. As we have argued in chapter 4, there is a plausible explana-
tion for the consequent minimal-negative attention ‘policy’ of the german newspapers: 
the german culture of contrition, which caused a high degree of sensitivity to anything 
that could be associated with the nazis (Art, 2007). germany was also one of the very 
few countries in Western europe that has not seen a significant growth of far-right par-
ties in national elections (rydgren, 2005; ignazi, 2006). 
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therefore, it is not unlikely that the german case is somewhat of an exception in West-
ern europe concerning media attention to the far-right. With the recognition of the 
immigration issue in the political and public spheres and many far-right parties losing 
their sharp (sometimes already frayed) edges, the media image of the far-right in Western 
europe has not changed fully, but at least has become more subtle and diverse, leaving a 
growing amount of space for approval and support.
6.2 relationships between media attention and far-right voting
Above, we have seen that media attention to the far-right is relatively stable. neverthe-
less, it also depends on relevant events (sometimes cumulating in media hypes) as well 
as slow changes, within broader socio-political trends. in two of the three countries, for 
example, volume attention rose when immigration became a more prominent issue on 
public and political agendas. in this section we will look more precisely at the possible 
relationships between media attention to the far-right and far-right voting. in doing so, 
this study links up with previous research on the relationship between media and far-
right voting (lubbers & scheepers, 2001; Walgrave & de swert, 2004; Boomgaarden & 
Vliegenthart, 2007).  
6.2.1 analysing the relationship between media attention and 
 far-right voting
After looking at developments in media attention over time, we will now investigate 
whether media attention relates to actual developments of the far-right, and if so how. 
our main indicators for these actual developments are voting percentages and yearly fig-
ures of reported far-right violent incidents. our premise is that actual events or changes 
in electoral strength will be reflected in media attention. An increase of the amount of 
far-right violent incidents, for example, would relate to increased attention to the far-
right in roles in extra-parliamentary violence, or roles in legal conflict. Another example 
is that a decrease of the voting percentage would relate to a decrease of media attention 
to the far-right in roles in political actuality, as this role concerns parliamentary activity 
of the far-right, and if the number of MP’s decreases (after that election) there is thus less 
attention to be expected for their parliamentary activities. this means that we have two 
objectives. first, we set out to chart the absence or presence of such associations between 
media attention and voting percentages, or yearly figures of reported far-right violent 
incidents. second, we are interested in the nature of these associations, pertaining to the 
question if they are positive or negative associations. 
 
there are different measures of how the far-right developed over time. some useful 
measures may be membership figures of far-right organisations, registered amounts of 
and type of far-right activities, or of far-right parties, the monthly voting intention data, 
which lubbers and scheepers used in their study (2001). As we do not have an uninter-
rupted series of (monthly) media attention data, we cannot use that same poll data to 
establish monthly associations. instead, we use the voting percentages of the elections 
around which we collected the newspaper coverage of the far-right. 
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for germany we also have yearly figures of reported far-right violent incidents at our 
disposal as a second indicator. that means that for germany we have indicators for both 
the developments of far-right parties as well as the extra-parliamentary far-right. un-
fortunately, these data of far-right incidents are not available for all election years in the 
dutch and flemish cases.
our data have some limitations if we want to study the associations between media at-
tention and far-right voting. first, they are limited in the number of cases (8 election 
years25). second, from the longitudinal media attention analyses (in chapter 3-5) we must 
conclude that we cannot expect linear relationships for most of the media attention vari-
ables. due to these reasons, we cannot simply calculate statistical correlation measures, 
such as spearman’s r, as the absence of linear relationships would cause a high risk of un-
derestimation of the strength of the correlation (hinkle, Wiersma & Jurs, 1988: 114-5). 
yet we aimed to draw conclusions about the existence, or absence and the nature of asso-
ciations between media attention variables and the external data. therefore, we carried 
out an alternative procedure26. it does not produce exact association coefficients, but like 
a graphic analysis, it does produce the ‘decisive’ information. A summary of this analysis 
is presented in table 6.1. We were interested in whether there was a positive or negative 
association between the media attention indicator and voting percentages. in the table, a 
positive relationship is indicated with ‘+’, a negative relationship with ‘-’ and the absence 
of a relationship (or the independence of both variables) with ‘□’. for those relationships 
that we elaborate on, we also present the graphs.
25  For the Dutch case we only have 8 election years because the elections of 1999 produced too little 
data (see chapter 2). We had 9 for both Germany and Flanders, but out of these elections 2 occurred in the 
same year in the Netherlands and Germany (national and European elections, 1994), therefore we excluded 
the European elections of that year for this analysis in all three cases. This led to respectively, 7 elections for 
the Dutch case and 8 for both the German and Flemish cases.
26  In order to get a grip on the strengths and directions of the associations we carried out the following 
procedure. First we calculated Spearman’s r for all associations. Second we judged these on three criteria. 
First: possible linearity (yes/no), second: calculated significance level (yes/no) and third: existence or absence 
of association in either direction. In practice the first two occurred only simultaneously. The calculation produced 
a few very strong correlations, only for variables that visually showed a linear relationship. These were given 
‘++’ for positive associations (strong) and ‘- -’ for negative associations (strong). For all other possible associa-
tions we decided that coefficients of .25 or -.25 or less meant no association and coefficients of .26 or -.26 or 
higher showed some level of association. As a check we than produced graphs of all possible associations in 
order to carry out a graphical analysis and see if the calculated measure could also be visualised. Only if that 
was possible, associations were given ‘+’ for positive associations and’ –’ for negative associations. All other, 
non-associations, were given a ‘□’, meaning the absence of any association between the media attention vari-
able and voting or far-right violence.
123
6. summary and discussion: theorising newspaper attention to the far-right
table 6.1 
relationships between far-right voting percentages and attention indicators and 
between absolute numbers of far-right violence incidents and attention indicators 
(germany only).
nL germany Flanders
Voting % Voting % Far-right violence Voting %
i.   Volume attention
Average number of articles per day ++ □ ++ ++
ii.  Formal attention
Headline appearance □ - - -
Prominence - - - □
iii. substantial attention
Active representation □ - - -
Role in elections □ -- - □
Role in political actuality □ + + -
Role in legal conflict - -- - +
Role in extra-parliamentary violence - + ++ □
Role in extra-parliamentary peaceful situations n.a. □ - --
Role internal, ordinary □ - - □
Role internal, negative - - □ +
Stigmatising associations - + + -
Anti-establishment/populist standpoints + □ □ +
Nationalist standpoints - - - --
Xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints - + + -
Law & order standpoints + □ □ +
Traditional value standpoints □ - - --
iV. support attention
NFRA Favourable attitudes + □ - ++
NFRA Unfavourable attitudes □ □ □ +
Debate on dealing with the far-right - □ + ++
++ strong positive relation; + positive relation; □ no relation; - negative relation, - - strong negative relation (strong relations 
are mostly linear with a significant and high r). Far-right violence figures were numbers of reported cases per year (Verfas-
sungsschutz 1986-2004).
6.2.2 patterns in the relationship between media attention and 
 far-right voting
only a few attention aspects relate strongly to far-right voting, as indicated in table 6.1. 
however, there are some remarkable, often contrasting, relationships shown in the table. 
Below we describe the associations as they have been summarised in table 6.1 and report 
on the patterns that we found in the relationship between media attention to the far-
right, far-right-voting and far-right violence.  
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volume attention
the first thing that stands out in the table is that in two of the three national contexts 
there is a strong association between volume attention and far-right voting (figure 6.1). 
Both in the dutch and flemish cases there is a strong positive association between far-
right voting and volume attention. in germany such association is absent, but the asso-
ciation between far-right violence and volume attention is equally strong.
figure 6.1a-c  volume attention in relation to voting percentages per election year 
a. netherlands ++                    b. germany □        c. flanders ++
formal attention
As table 6.1 shows, formal attention aspects have an opposite relationship with far-right 
voting. Almost everywhere, there is a negative association between formal attention as-
pects and far-right voting as well as far-right violence. in two cases there is a complete 
absence of any kind of association between formal attention and far-right voting as well 
as far-right violence, headline appearance in the dutch case (figure 6.2a) and promi-
nence in the flemish one (figure 6.3c). 
figure 6.2a-c  headline appearance in relation to voting percentages per election year 
a. netherlands □           b. germany -        c. flanders -
figure 6.3a-c  prominence in relation to voting percentages per election year 
  
a. netherlands -           b. germany -        c. flanders □
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6. summary and discussion: theorising newspaper attention to the far-right
there could be two different explanations for the fact that the relation between formal 
attention and far-right voting is in contrast with that between volume attention and far-
right voting. first, it might mean that as the far-right becomes more popular, a larger 
portion of its media attention becomes integrated in normal political news, which might 
be a sign of normalisation of the far-right’s media image. A different explanation could 
be that when the far-right becomes more popular, the media downplay the far-right and 
thus under-emphasise it in the reporting. Which of these opposing explanations holds 
true may be answered after we turn to the associations between substantial and support 
attention aspects and far-right voting.
substantial attention
for active representation we found no positive associations: in the dutch case there is none at 
all: for both germany and flanders there are negative associations. electoral success does not 
relate to attention to the far-right in roles in elections in the dutch and flemish contexts. in the 
german context, roles in elections relate negatively to both far-right voting (strong) and far-
right violence. there was no association between roles in political actuality and far-right voting 
in the dutch case, but a positive association in the german case (figure 6.4). in germany at-
tention to the far-right in political roles also related positively to far-right violence. in flanders a 
negative association was found between roles in political actuality and far-right voting.
figure 6.4 a-c  role in political actuality in relation to voting 
  percentages per election year
a. netherlands □           b. germany+        c. flanders -
Attention to roles in legal conflict related negatively to far-right voting (and far-right violence) in 
the dutch and german cases. it has a positive association with far-right voting in the flemish 
case. Associations between attention to roles in extra-parliamentary violence and far-right vot-
ing are negative (dutch) or absent (flemish), but positive in the german case. Between roles in 
extra-parliamentary violence and far-right violence there is even a strong positive association. 
Associations between internal roles and far-right voting vary. Associations between roles in 
ordinary internal situations and far-right voting are absent in the dutch and flemish cases. 
in the german case they are negative (also for far-right violence). for roles in negative internal 
situations, the associations with far-right voting are negative in the dutch and german cases 
and positive in the flemish case. the relationship with far-right violence in germany is absent. 
While there is a negative association between stigmatising associations and far-right voting in 
the dutch and flemish cases, it is positive in the german case (figure 6.5). 
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Also the relation between stigmatising associations and far-right violence in germany is posi-
tive. this contrast between the german case and the dutch and flemish cases suggests that 
german newspapers react to far-right success in the opposite manner to that of the dutch and 
flemish newspapers. increasing ballot box success relates to tempering of the use of stigmatis-
ing associations in dutch and flemish newspapers, while it only encouraged stigmatising in 
german newspapers. this contrast, as the reader may have noticed, occurred for numerous 
other substantial attention aspects as well, namely roles in elections, in political actuality, extra-
parliamentary violence and ordinary internal roles for the german context contrasts with the 
other two national contexts.
figure 6.5 a-c  stigmatising in relationship to voting percentages per election year
a. netherlands -           b. germany +        c. flanders -
Attention to anti-establishment or populist standpoints related positively to far-right voting in 
both the dutch and flemish cases. there are no relations with far-right voting and far-right 
violence in the german case. in all three contexts, there is a negative association between at-
tention to nationalist standpoints and far-right voting. for nationalist standpoints and far-right 
violence in the german case, the association is negative as well. While there is a negative associ-
ation between xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints in the dutch and flemish cases, it is posi-
tive in the german case (figure 6.6). Also, attention to xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints 
related positively to far-right violence in germany. Attention to law and order standpoints then, 
related positively to far-right voting in the dutch and flemish context, no associations were 
found in the german case. in all three contexts, the association between attention to traditional 
value standpoints and far-right voting is negative, or absent (in the dutch case, see figure 6.7). 
traditional value standpoints did relate negatively to far-right violence as well.
figure 6.6 a-c  xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints in relationship to voting  
percentages per election year
  
a. netherlands -  b. germany +   c. flanders -
a. netherlands -           b. germany +        c. flanders -
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6. summary and discussion: theorising newspaper attention to the far-right
figure 6.7 a-c  traditional values standpoints in relationship to voting percentages  
  per election year
a. netherlands □           b. germany -                     c. flanders - -
so the contrast between the german case and the dutch and flemish cases concerning 
the nature of the associations was found for the attention to far-right standpoints as well. 
the contrast between the german case and dutch and flemish cases returns in a similar 
way throughout the range of substantial attention aspects. 
support attention
Attention to non-far-right-actors’ (nfrA) favourable attitudes towards the far-right has 
a positive association with far-right voting in the dutch and flemish cases (figure 6.8). 
for the german case there is no relation with far-right voting and a negative association 
with far-right violence. unfavourable attitudes have no associations with far-right vot-
ing or violence in the dutch and german cases, but a positive association with far-right 
voting in flanders. the last indicator, the debate on dealing with the far-right, relates 
negatively to far-right voting in the dutch case. in the german case it has no association 
with far-right voting and a positive association with far-right violence. it also related 
positively to far-right voting in the flemish case (figure 6.9). so in germany support at-
tention is not associated with far-right voting at all, whereas it is in both other contexts, 
especially flanders. the associations in germany with far-right violence do suggest a 
clear relation between media attention to nfrA attitudes and public debate about the 
far-right and far-right violence. in times of increased violence, favourable attitudes drop, 
while debate on prohibition of far-right parties and organisations increases.
figure 6.8 a-c  nfra favourable attitudes towards the far-right in relationship to 
voting percentages per election year
a. netherlands +  b. germany □   c. flanders ++
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figure 6.9 a-c  nfra debate on dealing with the far-right in relationship to voting  
  percentages per election year
a. netherlands -           b. germany □        c. flanders ++
6.2.3 two possible mechanisms
in the whole range of reported associations, there are some regularities. A first pattern 
was the cross-national strong positive association between volume attention and far-right 
voting (or violence). the second pattern concerns the reversed direction of associations 
for formal attention. this contrast gave rise to two possible explanations. 
the first possibility was that increased popularity of the far-right relates to normalisa-
tion of media attention to the far-right (and consequently its media image). this means 
that we should have found positive associations for roles in elections and roles in politi-
cal actuality and for favourable attitudes, and negative associations with roles in extra-
parliamentary violence, stigmatising associations and for unfavourable attitudes. the 
associations with active representation should at least not be negative, and associations 
with nationalist and xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints should at least not be posi-
tive. the normalisation thesis would be supported if a majority of the found associations 
fit in this expectation.
the second possibility was that increased popularity of the far-right relates to downplay-
ing the far-right in the media attention. this means that we should have found negative 
associations for roles in elections, roles in political actuality and for favourable attitudes, 
and a positive association for stigmatising associations. furthermore, associations for 
roles in extra-parliamentary violence, nationalist standpoints and xenophobic or exclu-
sionist standpoints should at least not be negative, but either absent or positive. Associa-
tions for active representation and favourable attitudes should at least not be positive. 
the downplay thesis would be supported if associations for most roles, stigmatising and 
nfrA attitudes fit the expectations.
As has been shown above, almost none of the associations that would support the nor-
malisation thesis have been found. for most substantial and support attention aspects, 
there are no associations at all, or the relations have opposite natures. only the associa-
tions for stigmatising associations (negative) and favourable nfrA attitudes (positive) fit 
for two of the three national contexts. these two associations suggest that rough edges 
of media attention disappear and are replaced with milder descriptions and an increase 
of space for support of other parties, when the far-right gains electoral popularity.
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6. summary and discussion: theorising newspaper attention to the far-right
concerning the downplay thesis, associations with roles in elections and political actual-
ity do match the expectations for the dutch and flemish cases. other than that, how-
ever, there is no cross-national support for this thesis either.
We may conclude that cross-nationally there is hardly a clear mechanism of either (1) 
downplay or (2) normalisation in the relationship between media attention and far-right 
voting. the first conclusion may be less surprising than the second. As we concluded 
before, the overall media attention can be characterised as propagating an image of the 
far-right as controversial outsiders. this may imply that there is not much more space 
or need for further downplaying. the second conclusion is somewhat more unexpected, 
even odd. there is no structural normalisation mechanism of the media image associ-
ated with the (overall) rise of the popularity of far-right parties. however, for the ger-
man case there is more support for the first, that is the downplay thesis. Moreover, for 
the german case, we found numerous contradictory associations (compared with the 
dutch and flemish cases). for the substantial and support attention aspects, where we 
found associations confirming the normalisation thesis in the dutch and flemish cases, 
associations in the german case did not. the contradictory associations for the german 
case in precisely this manner, suggest a much stronger tendency of downplaying the far-
right when these parties do well in elections. oddly enough, for the german case roles 
in political actuality related positively to far-right voting. A final interesting point is that 
media attention in germany related in a similar but stronger and clearer way to far-right 
violence, as to far-right voting and thus confirms the observed relationship between 
media-attention to the far-right and far-right success in germany.
despite strong associations between volume attention and far-right voting, other media 
attention aspects did not relate to far-right voting in a way that expressed normalisa-
tion of media attention, nor downplaying of the far-right in media attention. At best, 
associations between attention to certain roles and far-right voting point in the direction 
of downplaying (for dutch and flemish cases), while associations with stigmatisation 
and nfrA attitudes point in the direction of normalisation. this ambivalent result is 
in accordance with our earlier conclusion that for the most part the media attention is 
quite stereotypical and propagates an image of the far-right as controversial outsiders, 
although from 1998 on this image lost its sharp edges in dutch and flemish newspapers 
(see section 6.1). the contradictory associations of the german case form an exception; 
for the german case we did find associations that suggest more convincingly downplay-
ing in the case of increased far-right voting. in conclusion, this means that the german 
case shows stronger support for the downplay-thesis. this suggests that the controversial 
outsider image is emphasised in times of far-right electoral success and confirms our con-
clusion that the german press is more sensitive to far-right activity than that in the other 
national contexts, due to its exceptional history (schafraad, scheepers & Wester, 2008: 
377). outside of germany, media attention expressed its controversial outsider image of 
the far-right relatively more independent of fluctuations in far-right voting.
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A last remarkable pattern is the relatively high amount of indicators of media attention 
in the flemish case that relate strongly to far-right voting in either direction. A first gen-
eral explanation could be of a methodological kind: the flemish case is the only one in 
which there is a linear increase of voting percentages throughout the research period. A 
second one might have to do with the specific flemish context, especially concerning the 
support attention aspects. As the far-right party Vlaams Blok continued to grow elector-
ally, despite the gentlemen’s agreement to boycott all cooperation with them (‘cordon 
sanitaire’), nfrAs started to question this ‘cordon sanitaire’ policy more openly. Much 
of this debate is reported in newspapers, which becomes visible in the strong associations 
between favourable attitudes as well as the debate on dealing with the far-right and far-
right voting. 
6.2.4 theoretical implications: cultural consonance 
As we have seen, the media image of the far-right is fairly consistent, despite the fact that 
some major shifts in the position, shape and behaviour of the far-right occurred through-
out the research period. changes in media attention were slow and subtle. in three coun-
tries and over a period of 18 years we only found one real radical shift of media images 
- that in the dutch newspapers of 2004. As far as there were associations between media 
attention to the far-right and far-right voting, they did not point clearly to a mechanism 
of normalisation or downplay related to far-right success. the media attention to the far-
right thus is relatively independent of political developments. theories of news values, 
framing and discursive opportunities can be helpful to understand these deviant develop-
ments in media attention to the far-right that we have found in the coverage. in this sec-
tion we evaluate how these theories may be helpful and add our own insights to improve 
them within this context. 
the process  of cultural consonance
Whereas the far-right moved slowly towards, or even into, mainstream politics (espe-
cially in its public communication, ignazi, 2006: 234/5), its media image remained that 
of the controversial outsider. consequently the question that becomes apparent can be 
posed in at least two ways. Why did the media attention not ‘really’ change while the 
position of the far-right in politics did change considerably? or, how could a cultural lag 
arise between media attention to the far-right and its political position?
 
As this study encompasses only a small part of the ‘chain of news communication’ 
(galtung & ruge, 1965: 65) about the far-right (excluding the production and recep-
tion phases that both encompass selection and distortion of media messages), we cannot 
completely solve this problem. however, analysing the newspaper content over this long 
period of time cross-nationally does offer relevant insights into these processes (especially 
towards the production side of things). 
By now classic communication science studies showed how journalists create news in a 
highly routine manner, within institutions with their own limited capacities and applying 
a standardised set of values to decide what becomes news (i.e. galtung & ruge, 1965; 
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tuchman, 1978; gans, 1980). due to interaction of these journalist routines, news values 
and available frames, for each subject in the news, a standardised way of media atten-
tion/reporting comes about. As long as this way of reporting is more or less functional, 
or is not obstructed, it remains in use, despite possible developments in the field. how-
ever, if a crucial event, or new fact in the debate, or new forms of politics - such as that 
of fortuyn - are introduced, these may become such an obstruction that the standardised 
or “hegemonic” way of reporting will have to change. gitlin defines this major reason as 
a “political crisis” (1980: 273).  
the contemporary far-right fits into a political tradition in which the major predecessors 
have had such an impact on history that it functions as a strong symbolic benchmark for 
‘good’ and ‘bad’. Within contemporary West-european culture, this historical link has 
become a culturally shared moral tool, complete with a range of symbols in the form of 
standardised references (i.e. the use of the word ‘nazi’) and taboos (comparing a politi-
cal leader to Adolf hitler). Because this historical link has gained such a strong cultural 
meaning and function it can easily be applied in rhetorical contexts. one of these fields 
is news on the subject of the far-right. here, the historical link is easily reproduced as it 
contains multiple symbols that present certain ideas about the news fact to which they 
are connected. these symbols are used in this way by journalists on a regular basis, even 
if there is no direct cause to do so in the particular news event. the historical reference 
has become a label to evaluate the far-right actor (shoemaker, 1984). the repeated use of 
these historical references has to be understood as the use of a recognisable and clear cul-
tural frame (see gitlin, 1980; gamson & Modgliani, 1989), meaning the historical roots 
have become a culturally shared point of reference. in a similar way as the mechanism of 
resonance in discursive opportunity theory (Koopmans & olzak, 2004), the use of this 
historical-cultural frame reaffirms the connection between contemporary and earlier far-
right, and through that de-legitimises the contemporary exponent.
in deciding what is news, familiarity, repetition, consonance with previous news, fit with 
existing dominant values, surprise, and negativity or bad news are important news fac-
tors (galtung & ruge, 1965; harcup & o’neil, 2001). the affirmative consonance of 
a historical perception of the contemporary far-right is supported by this mechanism 
of news selection (and framing), in other words, cultural consonance is consolidated in 
these news factors. in this way, cultural consonance produces a continuous stream of 
news that pays attention to exactly those aspects of the far-right that fit that cultural 
frame. cultural consonance is understood as the process wherein the news about a spe-
cific phenomenon (in this case the far-right) is being framed according to a historically 
rooted and culturally widely supported understanding of the phenomenon. this framing 
occurs on such a large scale that the phenomenon (the far-right) is predominantly un-
derstood within this frame, regardless of the frame’s factual relevance in the particular 
contemporary context of the news fact. the cultural consonance thus works in a similar 
way as the mechanism of news factors, as described by galtung & ruge (1965). how-
ever, cultural consonance here is not so much concerned with the newsworthiness of an 
event as in galtung & ruge’s argument, but with a social-political phenomenon that 
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carries a strong cultural meaning regardless of the event in which it is situated. cultural 
consonance then explains not when but how this social-political category (the far-right) 
becomes news. it combines several news factors in its own mechanism, reinforces the 
standardisation of reporting on the subject and provides cultural legitimation for it.
cultural consonance in dutch, german and flemish newspapers
through this mechanism of cultural consonance, coverage of the far-right in all three 
countries continued its controversial outsider image of the far-right (rooted in the histori-
cal understanding of the far-right) for almost all of the research period, even though the 
far-right political family reached a very different position towards the end of the research 
period in two of the three national contexts. 
in germany, media attention is most univocal and constant throughout the research 
period and is most stably rooted in what Art calls a “culture of contrition”, meaning a 
high sensitivity towards any political party that bears any resemblance to the nazis (Art, 
2007: 338). on top of that, the electoral opportunities of far-right parties are much more 
limited due to the five percent threshold that obstructs the possibility of a frame altering 
‘political crisis’. Moreover, the extra-parliamentary far-right in germany is relatively ac-
tive, compared to its dutch and flemish counterparts, in a way that confirms the existing 
media image. these circumstances are such that they facilitate the mechanism of cultural 
consonance.
in both flanders and the netherlands, exclusionist standpoints became more openly 
discussed outside the far-right and the far-right had become significantly more popular 
among voters, during the second half of the nineties (Jacobs & swyngedouw, 2002; Wal-
grave & de swert, 2004, Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007). As we have seen, this was 
reflected, to a limited extent, in increased volume attention and increased diversity of the 
media attention. however, even with a strongly increased electoral popularity, the media 
image of the far-right did not really change. the mechanism of cultural consonance pre-
vented the media from mirroring these electoral developments. 
in accordance with gitlin’s claims, the ‘hegemonic routine’ of reporting, using the con-
troversial outsider image, only changed after a political crisis occurred in the nether-
lands. the rise of fortuyn and the shock of his violent death caused such alteration of 
positions that this routine had become too far removed from every current attitude to-
wards the far-right at that moment. in gitlin’s terms, the cultural consonance “no longer 
contributed to social stability (gitlin, 1980: 273).” the political crisis created the space 
for change in the routine. As this political crisis was followed by ‘after shocks’, such as 
the early end of the coalition government that included the lPf, it took some time until 
the alteration in reporting became visible. Another explanation for the delayed change in 
reporting after the ‘political crisis’ could be that the ‘hegemonic way of reporting’, was 
not abandoned entirely until the far-right lost its power position, which implies the cul-
tural consonance was not disrupted directly by the political crisis. We found significantly 
changed media attention in the 2004 dutch newspapers. 
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As it occurred only in one national context in the very last research year, it is uncertain 
as yet whether this shift is a temporary exception, or a significant relatively permanent 
shift.
Meanwhile, the flemish far-right party Vlaams Blok gained 24% of the flemish votes in 
June 2004. however, this electoral growth still did not cause a ‘political crisis’, and the 
mechanism of cultural consonance did prevent the media attention of changing through-
out the entire research period, causing a cultural lag between electoral support and 
media attention to the far-right. 
Without such a political crisis, a media image based on such strong news values does 
not change, even though it is out of step with real world developments, as was increas-
ingly so in flanders. this conclusion is not only supported by contemporary theories of 
cultural and social change, but also agrees with McQuail’s argument that media are not 
mere agenda setters, but both mirror and moulder, sometimes even leaving a cultural lag 
(McQuail, 2005: 80). Media images are strong, as Van Zoonen already argued (1992: 
457) as we have seen, they are often culturally shared and historically rooted and there-
fore very stable and shock-resistant. in other words, concerning their attention to the 
far-right, newspapers have been quite conservative, they do not change the media image 
easily, but once reality has pushed them forcefully enough, they may become a formative 
influence after leaving a cultural lag, as the late but radical change of the media image of 
the far-right two years after fortuyn’s death suggests.
6.2.5 conclusion
in this section we have provided explanations for the longitudinal and cross-national 
variation in the media attention to the far-right. first, we showed how media attention 
related to far-right voting. We found no patterns that clearly point to a mechanism of 
either normalisation or downplay in this relationship. the german situation came closest 
to the downplay mechanism, although it contained some odd irregularities. in both other 
countries we found evidence for the fact that there may be some ambiguous tendencies in 
both directions simultaneously. the simultaneous opposite tendencies, combined with all 
other aspects of media attention having a rather arbitrary relation, or no relation at all, 
with electoral support, suggest an independence of media attention from electoral sup-
port for the far-right.
As an explanation for this rather ‘stubborn’ continuation of a specific kind of media at-
tention, expressed in the media image of the controversial outsider, we introduced the 
mechanism of cultural consonance. cultural consonance refers to a mechanism or proc-
ess that combines news factors and framing, and states that if there is a strong historical 
point of reference available that is culturally rooted and widely shared, and thus is very 
suitable to package news on the far-right, it enables a routine of media attention to the 
far-right in terms of a controversial outsider independent of electoral support for the far-
right and regardless of its relevance in particular situations.
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6.3  differences between types of newspapers
in this section we discuss the cross-cultural comparative analysis of the differences be-
tween newspapers. We do this along two lines: first, along the distinction between qual-
ity and popular newspapers, second, along the distinction between left and right leaning 
newspapers. in doing so, we combine answering the third and fourth research question: 
(rQ3) are there any differences between the coverage of the far-right in different news-
papers? What differences are there in the media attention to the far-right between dutch, 
german and flemish newspapers? (rQ4). next, we discuss the outcomes of this analysis 
in the light of the theoretical debate that has been presented in chapter 1.
6.3.1 quality and popular newspapers
A first distinction between newspapers in our study was made between so called quality 
and popular newspapers. this distinction has proven to be useful in many other studies 
(e.g. ter Wal, 2004; Van gorp, 2005; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006; scholten & ruigrok, 
2006; heijting & de haan, 2005). for each country we selected two quality newspapers 
(de volkskrant, nrc handelsblad, süddeutsche zeitung, frankfurter allge-
meine zeitung, de morgen and de standaard) and one popular paper (telegraaf, 
bild, het laatste nieuws). Popular newspapers generally pay more attention to non-
political subjects and have more visuals and shorter articles. some, but not all, popular 
newspapers can also be characterised as tabloids. of the popular newspapers in our 
study, bild is the only newspaper that is generally characterised as a tabloid.
in hypothesis 1 we formulated two statements about expected differences between qual-
ity newspapers and popular newspapers. the first statement (h1a), quality newspapers 
pay more volume attention to the far-right than popular newspapers, is confirmed in all 
three national contexts, most radically in the german context (due to the tabloid charac-
teristics of bild) and least clearly (but still significantly) in the flemish context where the 
popular paper hln paid less volume attention to the far-right than quality papers dM 
and ds. on the aggregate level, concerning volume attention hypothesis 1 is confirmed. 
however, we found no significant differences in formal attention and thus no support for 
hypothesis 1b. the kind of newspaper does influence the amount of news, but once the 
far-right has become news there is no difference between quality and popular newspa-
pers in the visibility or prominence of the far-right in that coverage.
in hypothesis 2 we postulated that a greater variation of substantial aspects would re-
ceive more attention from quality papers than from popular newspapers. in the analysis 
we focused this hypothesis especially on the range of roles (h2a) in which the far-right 
can be portrayed and the range of far-right standpoints (h2b) that received attention 
in the press. We found the same pattern in all three countries: there was hardly any 
difference between newspapers concerning the range of roles in which the far-right is 
portrayed. however, significant differences were found in the range of standpoints that 
receive attention. in quality papers, a more diverse range of standpoints received atten-
tion, while popular newspapers concentrated their attention on the most obvious 
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far-right standpoint, that of xenophobia and exclusionism, which confirms h2b. thus 
for hypothesis 2, we found partial support across all three countries. An explanation 
might be that for the kind of role in which a party is portrayed, concrete events are 
a highly determining factor. different events, then, cause newspapers to portray the 
far-right in different roles, while such a strong independent variable is absent for stand-
points, as these are more steadier, making it less necessary for journalists to increase the 
complexity of the far-right media image.
the third hypothesis about quality and popular newspapers concerns support attention. 
here again, we found a situation that demands a nuanced and secure interpretation of 
the outcomes. Quality and popular newspapers turned out to pay about the same level 
of attention to attitudes of non-far-right actors towards the far-right. Again the coverage 
of quality papers seemed more complex and detailed, because we did find differences (of 
varying strength) between quality and popular newspapers in the amount of attention 
they paid to debate among non-far-right actors about strategies to deal with the far-right. 
so quality newspapers do have higher levels of support attention, but only on a specific 
aspect of it. the often difficult discussions between non-far-right stakeholders about the 
legitimacy and efficiency of their strategies towards the far-right were most prominent in 
quality papers. More simple favourable or unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right 
feature in popular newspapers, just as they do in quality newspapers.
despite the fact that not all hypotheses have been confirmed, we can conclude in general 
terms that quality newspapers give a broader and more diverse attention to the far-right 
than popular newspapers. An explanation for the fact that there were no differences in 
the attention to situated roles is probably that all newspapers have an event-driven re-
porting style. Attention to situated roles of course depends greatly on the kind of event, 
while the choice to discuss standpoints in the coverage can be made relatively independ-
ently of the news event.
6.3.2 left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers
A second dimension in which we compared newspapers is between left-leaning and right-
leaning. Although partisanship of the press has practically disappeared in contemporary 
democratic corporatist countries, the press is still politicised (hallin & Mancini, 2004: 
180). using media landscape literature, we distinguished between left-leaning and right-
leaning newspapers, whereby de volkskrant, süddeutsche zeiting and de morgen 
are left-leaning, while nrc handelsblad, frankfurter allgemeine zeitung, de 
standaard, de telegraaf, bild and het laatste nieuws are right-leaning newspapers 
(de Bens, 2001; Ward, 2004). in the analysis we placed more importance on the com-
parison between the left-leaning quality paper (VK, sdZ, dM) and right-leaning quality 
paper (nrc, fAZ, ds) than on the comparison between left-leaning (quality) papers and 
right-leaning popular papers in order not to confuse the two comparative dimensions.
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hypothesis 4 expected more volume and formal attention in left-leaning newspapers. 
indeed, all left-leaning newspapers gave more volume attention to the far-right than the 
right-leaning newspapers. however, differences between dutch and flemish newspapers 
are very small. Moreover, there were no relevant differences between newspaper in for-
mal attention. in conclusion, here too we have to distinguish between volume attention 
and formal attention. concerning formal attention the hypothesis is not confirmed. Vol-
ume attention differences are relevant, but very small if we leave out the popular papers. 
this means, we found only weak support for hypothesis 4.
hypothesis 5 expected more substantial attention in left-leaning than in right-leaning 
newspapers. here we focussed especially on roles (h5a), stigmatising associations (h5b) 
and standpoints (h5c). in terms of roles something interesting shows in the table (Appen-
dix 4.5 and 5.5). right-leaning newspapers paid more attention to the far-right in roles 
in political actuality than left-leaning newspapers. on the other hand, left-leaning papers 
paid slightly (not significant in all cases) more attention to the far-right in legal conflicts 
and significantly more to roles in extra-parliamentary activity (especially violence). due 
to this varying attention preferences h5a cannot simply be rejected, or confirmed. Both 
left- and right-leaning newspapers apparently have their own specific preferences for 
particular situated roles, and (or) downplay others. stigmatising associations were found 
more in left-leaning newspapers than in right-leaning newspapers, but this difference 
was only significant for flemish newspapers (h5b confirmed). left-leaning newspapers 
paid more attention to far-right standpoints in general (h5c confirmed). the german 
sdZ is an exception, however. looking at the specific standpoints to which left-leaning 
newspapers paid more attention, we found that especially anti-democratic standpoints 
and xenophobic-exclusionist standpoints received more attention in dutch and flemish 
left-leaning newspapers.
the statement that left-leaning newspapers not only pay more attention to the far-right, 
but also to a more diverse range of aspects of the far-right, is too general. left-leaning 
and right-leaning newspapers each have their own accents in their reporting on the far-
right. Most left-leaning newspapers in this study paid more attention to the most explic-
itly morally unacceptable features of the far-right - their frequent problems with the law, 
roles in extra-parliamentary violence and their xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints, 
while there is slightly more stigmatising in left-leaning newspapers as well. Meanwhile, 
right-leaning newspapers paid more attention to the far-right in roles in political actual-
ity, which suggests more attention to ‘normal’ roles for political actors (parties), and the 
possibility that they downplay the morally unacceptable aspects.
our sixth hypothesis about differences between newspapers expected more support atten-
tion in left-leaning than in right-leaning newspapers. Again with the exception of german 
newspapers, left-leaning newspapers paid more attention to attitudes of non-far-right ac-
tors towards the far-right, especially unfavourable attitudes. debates on dealing with the 
far-right among non-far-right actors did not feature significantly more in left-leaning than 
in right-leaning newspapers. strongest support was found for the hypothesis that left-
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leaning newspapers generally pay more attention to unfavourable attitudes towards the 
far-right than right-leaning newspapers. Again this is a specification of the original 
hypothesis. All together, this means that we found support for hypothesis 6 concerning 
attitudes towards the far-right.
in conclusion we can state that left-leaning newspapers pay more attention to the morally 
unacceptable aspects of the far-right (whether their behaviour or standpoints) than right-
leaning newspapers do. left-leaning newspapers have a more confrontational approach 
to the subject. they emphasise the morally unacceptable characteristic to explicate their 
unacceptability.
conclusion
left-leaning quality papers are slightly more explicit and elaborate on the backgrounds 
of the far-right than right-leaning quality papers, which in their turn are slightly more 
explicit and elaborated than right-leaning popular papers. An explanation could be that 
quality press may be more concerned with its democratic function than popular news-
papers, thus putting more effort than popular papers into explaining backgrounds and 
placing the far-right in perspective. At the same time there is greater ideological distance 
between left-leaning newspapers (and their audience) and the far-right than between 
right-leaning newspapers and the far-right. therefore, left-leaning newspapers pay more 
attention to unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right and their opposite standpoints. 
this conclusion agrees with earlier research on political orientations of newspapers (Van 
der eijk, 2000: 329). Although we have found relevant distinctions in the media atten-
tion of different types of newspapers across national borders, the general impression 
of the newspapers is that they propagate similar media images, whether popular, qual-
ity, left- or right-leaning newspapers. the differences express different accents within a 
media image rather than different media images. however, this does not mean there are 
no significant differences between types of newspapers.
figure 6.10 summary differences between newspapers
Quality popular
Left-leaning ElaborateMost explicit
right-leaning Elaborate SimpleExplicit
Whereas the same media image in popular newspapers is merely a caricature, in left-leaning 
newspapers it contains more moralism and in quality newspapers there is more contextualisa-
tion and interpretation. so the media image of the far-right in different types of newspapers 
is not contradictory, but receives different colouring. the explicitness in popular newspapers 
(fig 6.10) for example, is caused by strong simplification, while the explicitness in left-leaning 
(quality) newspapers is caused by the extra investigative efforts they pursued.
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6.3.3 theoretical reflections: modest diversity
in their extensive volume on the relationship between the far-right and the media, Maz-
zoleni, steward and horsfield compare what they call ‘elite’ and ‘tabloid’ newspapers, a 
distinction that overlaps with our ‘quality’ and ‘popular’ newspapers (2003). Based on 
several (very different) case studies they conclude that the media “- to various extents, 
depending on whether elite or tabloid outlets – tend to highlight controversial aspects 
of the movement” (steward, Mazzoleni & horsfield, 2003: 226). But they found dis-
tinguishing characteristics of the coverage of the far-right in both kinds of newspapers 
as well: elite papers report on populists seriously, while tabloids focus on sensationalist 
aspects, stripped of complex details (steward, Mazzoleni & horsfield, 2003: 225; Plasser 
& ulram, 2003: 27). 
All three national contexts in our study belong to one type of media system; hallin and 
Mancini have described it as the democratic-corporatist model (2004: 143). ideal type 
democratic-corporatist media systems have partisan media. however, hallin & Mancini 
argue convincingly that this is no longer reality in most contemporary democratic-corpo-
ratist media systems (ibid 178/9). According to them, this does not mean that media have 
become neutral. on the contrary, hallin and Mancini argue that these media are still 
politicised, just not necessarily along party lines (ibid, 180-183).
We took these findings as a starting point to deepen the analysis of differences in their re-
porting on the far-right between newspapers. Where Mazzoleni et.al. gathered different 
case studies, mostly with little or no systematic content analysis and hallin & Mancini 
base their arguments on a meta-study, we carried out a systematic content analysis of 
nine particular newspapers from three countries in order to compare systematically dif-
ferent types of newspapers across national contexts. We found significant differences be-
tween types of newspapers within one type of media system, the democratic-corporatist 
model. this too distinguishes our study from that of Mazzoleni et.al., as they compared 
across different media systems without really distinguishing them. We thus held two 
major consistencies in our design - first the measurement of the concept of media atten-
tion, and second the media system, which is the most relevant structural factor for our 
study. this makes the outcomes of our study better comparable within a certain realm, 
namely other democratic-corporatist media systems.
in their conclusion, steward, Mazzoleni & horsfield argue that the case studies in their 
book confirm their statement that popular newspapers focus on sensational aspects of 
the far-right and suggest this is to the benefit of far-right leaders, as these adapt their 
approach to the media in their turn by addressing the same issues (2003, 233). in their 
analysis, far-right actors, standpoints and issues sometimes blur. the beneficial effect of 
this particular attention focus of popular papers may be relevant when it concerns politi-
cal issues and themes that both far-right leaders and popular newspapers like to address 
- migration and crime. in case of the attention to the far-right parties themselves this is 
not the case. As far as we found evidence for the assumption that popular newspapers 
focus their attention on sensational aspects of the far-right, these sensational aspects are 
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the extremism or deviant behaviour of the far-right, emphasising the controversial media 
image. the sensational aspects on which newspapers focus concern violent outbursts, 
internal struggles that are fought in public, or the amateurism of many far-right politi-
cians. for example, the seemingly endless row of news items on dysfunctional MPs, illus-
trated by this news clip:
 
“Before the new parliament could start working, one of the dVu MPs withdrew: 
he did not know he had been candidate for a neo-nazi party. other dVu candi-
dates are suspects of possession of illegal arms, battery and illiteracy.”27 
this means that an analytical distinction has to be made between news on the far-right 
actors (or the far-right as a political family) and news on political issues ‘owned’ by the 
far-right (i.e. migration and crime). the attention sensibility for sensational aspects may 
have contradictory consequences depending on whether a far-right actor (party) or a far-
right issue is the subject.
in general terms, different types of newspapers do not express different media images 
of the far-right. in fact, they are univocal in their evaluation of the far-right (although 
not necessarily in the same way). our analysis also confirms the conclusion of steward, 
Mazzoleni & horsfield (2003: 223) that popular newspapers focus more on sensational 
aspects of the far-right than quality newspapers. however, this is not across the board, 
but only holds true for specific aspects of the far-right, as we pointed out above. Popular 
newspapers single out one (sensational) far-right standpoint (xenophobic or exclusionist 
standpoints), but do not focus on more sensational roles, such as legal conflict or extra-
parliamentary violence. concerning these situated roles, quality and popular newspapers 
seem to follow a similar media logic (Mazzoleni & schultz, 1999; Van Praag & Brants, 
2006) of concentrating on the extraordinary. concerning other substantial and support 
attention aspects, quality newspapers include many more nuances in the media image.
Moreover, our study shows that it is important to distinguish more than one type of 
newspaper difference. not only the distinction between quality and popular newspapers 
showed significant differences in media attention, also halin & Mancini’s thesis (2004) 
of continued politicisation of media (despite the decline of political parallelism) in the 
democratic-corporatist media systems has been confirmed in this study. left-leaning 
newspapers emphasise different accents in their coverage of the far-right than right-
leaning newspapers do. Political distance between newspaper and subject (the far-right) 
is relevant for the way the far-right is portrayed in the coverage. the greater the political 
distance between the newspaper and the far-right, the more explicitly they emphasise the 
controversial characteristics of the far-right.
27  ‘Nog voordat het nieuwe parlement haar werkzaamheden kon opnemen, heeft één van de DVU’ers 
zich teruggetrokken: Hij wist niet dat hij voor een neonazipartij had gekandideerd. Andere lijstgenoten worden 
verdacht van verboden wapenbezit, mishandeling en analfabetisme.’  de	Volkskrant, May 5th 1998.
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6.4  evaluation of the model of media attention to the far-right
the central question of this study is ‘how do newspapers pay attention to the far-right?’. 
it demanded an analysis with more detail than a mere evaluation of the presence of 
the far-right in newspaper coverage. former research on the topic of media coverage of 
the far-right was mostly focussed on the salience (or volume and formal attention) of 
far-right actors in the news (lubbers & scheepers, 2001; Walgrave & de swert, 2004; 
Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007). salience is the common measurement of attention 
in much agenda setting research (Mccombs & shaw, 1972; Kockski, 1993; Walgrave & 
Van Aelst, 2006). Analysing the use of a set of ‘generic frames’ would have been a way 
to shed light on the angle whereby newspapers view the far-right (semetko & Valken-
burg, 2000; de Vreese, 2005). As the word ‘generic’ already indicates, this would be a 
rather rough and unspecified approach, especially, because our central topic is a rather 
specific political family. therefore, we choose to develop our own model that is tailored 
to the purpose of this study. like Brosius & eps (1996) who studied the coverage of the 
extreme right assaults in germany in the early nineties, we looked specifically at substan-
tial aspects of media attention. furthermore, we added the aspect of support attention 
because the portrayal of the far-right in the news happens within a context with other 
actors that obtain certain positions in relationship to the far-right. 
6.4.1 a better grip on media attention?
these considerations let us to build a model of media attention to the far-right that 
consists of four aspects - volume attention, formal attention (both salience), substantial 
attention (portrayal of far-right actors and standpoints) and support attention (non-far-
right-actors’ attitudes towards the far-right). 
the foundation of the model
the substantial and support attention aspects of media attention to the far-right were 
based on the state of the art in sociological, historical and political science research, 
more specifically on both sociogenetic and ideological characteristics of the far-right in 
the contexts of dutch, german and flemish politics in the research period. this ena-
bled us to formulate both theoretically and socially relevant variables of media attention 
to the far-right. furthermore, this approach ensured the content validity of the model 
and instrument. substantial and support attention have been subdivided in multiple 
dimensions and indicators by which we measured the levels of media attention. these 
indicators have been designed in order to include all possible variety due to both the 
longitudinal characteristics of the research project as well as the cross-national charac-
teristics. for example, the support attention issue of ‘debate amongst non-far-right-actors 
about dealing with the far-right’ was included because such debates have been known to 
take place at times, especially in flanders and germany. in both countries the ‘strategies’ 
discussed are very different, so we formulated an indicator that would encompass such 
debate in newspapers from both national contexts.
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applying the model in empirical research
As has been shown in chapter two, section 4.3, we were able to reach reasonable to high 
reliability levels for coding based on the model. this means that with considerable coder 
training and instructions, the model is applicable in empirical research. in reliability tests 
we found that in one or two original indicators in the instrument there remained some 
reliability problems. these have been dealt with by either not using them in the analysis, 
or recoding and retesting them until sufficient levels of reliability were reached. All re-
sults of this study can therefore be taken as reliable. this is even more important due to 
the comparative design of the study. As suggested by Peter & lauf (2002) language skills 
and context relevant political knowledge were two important issues for coder selection 
and training for this study. the levels of reliability show that extra effort in these matter 
as well as in the coder instructions as in the instrument paid off. Peter & lauf’s emphasis 
on contextual knowledge for coders of course is equally important in longitudinal de-
signs as it is in cross-national designs because in both cases coders have to interpret news 
from other contexts than that closest to the researcher. Maybe their argument is even 
more important in longitudinal designs than in cross-national ones, because the language 
and political knowledge issues can be dealt with by using native coders (as we did in this 
study). however, in longitudinal research designs, even the use of older coders can only 
partially solve the historical problem, as one cannot totally rely on their memory. train-
ing is thus extra important.
model benefits 
the most important test of a model of analysis is the question whether the model pro-
duced new relevant information about how the media pay attention to the far-right. As 
the previous pages convincingly show, the model did produce new and relevant informa-
tion about the way dutch, germany and flemish media paid attention to the far-right 
between 1986 and 2004. Apart from volume and formal attention, we could also indi-
cate details on substantial and support attention aspects. the model enabled us to show 
changes and cross-sectional differences that revealed relevant patterns of media attention 
to the far-right. it even enabled us to indicate the generally (and cross-nationally) applied 
media image favoured for use in newspaper coverage - the controversial outsider.
limitations of the model
Although the model answered all demands, there are two points on which improvements 
can be made. Both concern the substantial aspect of media attention to the far-right. 
the dimension of representation now consists of two indicators, an identification of 
far-right actors and the actual manifest representation form in the news item (passive or 
active representation). however, these manifest representations can be used with various 
discursive meanings that are not considered in the model. on the contrary, it assumes 
that the discursive meaning of, for example a citation, equals the manifest meaning of 
active representation, no more, no less. An improvement of the model would be to add 
indicators for this part of the representation dimension in order to get a better grip on 
the complexity of representation of actors in media texts.
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Another relevant supplement to the model would be to not only include attention to pre-
defined far-right standpoints, but also far-right statements about any political issue. this 
improvement has multiple benefits. first, it would give a more complete image of the top-
ics with which they are involved (and which newspapers find worthy of attention). this 
becomes increasingly important in contexts where far-right parties have growing num-
bers of MPs, such as in flanders, or the last few years in the dutch case. the second ben-
efit is that possible changes, or paradoxes in standpoints that are reported become visible 
when both pre-defined far-right standpoints and the mere issues are coded, because this 
would give insight in the match between the attention to these standpoints and the issue 
of the standpoint. 
conclusion
With our model of media attention to the far-right, it is now possible to review large 
amounts of media coverage of the far-right in greater detail than previous research has 
done. the addition of the substantial and support aspects to the analysis of media atten-
tion to this political family served the purpose of filling the void in the knowledge about 
the way media deal with the far-right. until now, only assumptions were made about 
the way media pay attention to the far-right. the model enabled us to analyse changes 
and differences in how newspapers paid attention to the far-right, as well as how much 
attention has been paid to the far-right by the media. the model served its purpose very 
well in the empirical studies. it answered all our demands; it delivered unique relevant 
information on the dynamics of how newspapers reported on the far-right; it was very 
applicable in systematic-quantitative content analysis and was well-tailored for use in 
comparative, longitudinal and cross-national research.
6.4.2 future research
so far we have seen that this study delivered valuable results concerning the way news-
papers paid attention to the far-right. the study covered a period of 18 years, three 
national contexts and nine leading newspapers. this does not mean we can generalise 
the results to an unlimited extent. concerning the research period, one may wonder, for 
example, if the exceptional media image in dutch newspapers in the last election year of 
the study is an exception, or the prelude to an overall definite change in the media atten-
tion to the far-right? it is hard to answer that question with good arguments, although 
the media image has proven to be quite stable, so a similar change is not necessarily to be 
expected in other countries. 
the model is explicitly rooted in studies on the West-european far-right and has only 
been applied in countries with a democratic-corporatist media system. therefore, gener-
alisation of the outcomes of our study should remain within these two limits. Whether 
the outcomes can be seen as representative for the general situation within these limits, is 
still a difficult question. As we argued in section 6.1, the german newspaper attention is 
most likely the exceptional case. it shows that the cultural and historic contexts are very 
important. the dutch situation in the new millennium shows that after a political crisis, 
a change in media attention may very well occur. together these two conclusions should 
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be taken into account when generalising the outcomes to other contexts. this means that 
for West-european countries with a more or less similar media system and no very differ-
ent cultural and historical contexts (regarding the far-right, or the political system), for 
example scandinavian countries or perhaps france, the media attention to the far-right is 
probably not very different from that in the flemish and dutch (pre 2004) newspapers. A 
future endeavour would therefore be to extend the comparative dimension of this study 
and include more countries.
Another choice we had to make, which is not without consequences, is to incorporate 
particular newspapers in our research. We opted for three national daily newspapers 
with different backgrounds in terms of quality/popular and left-/right-leaning tendencies. 
We could only research a limited number of newspapers. therefore we choose to take 
leading national newspapers which belong to the larger (in terms of print run) newspa-
pers of the country. this choice suited our purpose of analysing trends in the coverage, 
and differences between countries and those between these particular types of newspa-
pers. for a study on a less aggregated level, a different choice might be more logical. for 
studies of effects on individual readers for example, regional newspapers might be the 
better choice as their readership corresponds more closely to the backgrounds of people 
who are most likely to vote far-right (Bakker & scholten, 2003: 16). furthermore, for 
a more complete study of differences between newspapers, a greater variety of types of 
newspapers would be recommended, local and regional newspapers should be added, as 
well as the relatively new category of free newspapers (Bakker, 2007). the category of 
popular newspapers might also have to be split into popular and tabloid newspapers. in 
this study we put them together in one category, as they were too few to divide (bild was 
the only tabloid), but if the characteristics of bild are exemplary for tabloid newspapers, 
tabloids should be treated as a separate category of newspapers in terms of how they 
cover the far-right. A further investigation of newspaper differences is useful to further 
develop media system theory and test media logic hypotheses.
Another issue that we have left untouched here is the huge diversity within the far-right 
political family. As we have seen that precisely the most exceptional (among the rest) 
party eventually was the one that received a different media image, this may be less of 
an exception than it seemed. it is not unlikely that different types of far-right parties, as 
they have been distinguished by i.e. ignazi (2006), or fennema (2005) (see also chapter 
1), receive different media attention, which then again may have consequences for their 
political endeavours. this seems to be a promising research agenda, especially now that 
particular, often new, far-right parties become electorally successful with new ‘packaging’ 
of the far-right ideological agenda and also new features. A good example of this develop-
ment is the rise of the partij voor de vrijheid (PVV) of leader geert Wilders in the 
netherlands. Much of his agenda fits the general far-right agenda (i.e. exclusionism, law 
& order, nationalism), as does part of the PVV’s sociogenesis (non-democratic structure, 
voter support), but other features of that party are harder to position (see davidović et al., 
2008: 191-193). 
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it is not unlikely that research in that direction will find significant differences between 
coverage of different types of far-right parties and organisations, which would then help 
to explain variation within and between cultural contexts and time periods.
As this study showed that we have developed a useful model of media attention to the 
far-right and it has produced interesting outcomes about variety in newspaper attention 
to the far-right, a next step in the research on the relationship between media attention 
and the popularity of the far-right would be to incorporate it in agenda setting research. 
in the current research design it was not possible to do so, as the necessary collection of 
newspaper articles would be too much work to handle for 9 newspapers over 18 years, of 
which most material is not digitally available. in a different design with content analysis 
of both coverage of the far-right and the immigration issue, combined with time series 
analyses it would be very useful to explain the relationship between newspaper coverage 
and far-right voting. 
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APPendiX 1
list of PArty / PoliticAl orgAnisAtion nAMes
cd  centrumdemocraten (centre democrats, dutch far-right party)
cP  centrum Partij (centre Party, dutch far-right party)
cP’86  centrum Partij ‘86 (centre Party 1986, radical follow up of cP)
csu  christlich-soziale union (Bavarian christian democratic party)
dVu  deutsche Volksunion (german People’s union, german far-right party)
fn  front national (national front, Walone far-right party)
fAP  freiheitliche Arbeiters Partei (check) (free Workers Party)
lr  leefbaar rotterdam (fortuyn’s local party in rotterdam)
lPf  lijst Pim fortuyn (list Pim fortuyn, national party)
nA  nationale Alliantie (national Alliance, dutch far-right splinter party)
nnP  nieuwe nationale Partij (new national Party, dutch far-right splinter party)
nPd  nationaldemokratische Partei deutschlands
nr  nieuw rechts (new right, split off, from lr)
nsdAP-Ao  national-socialistische demokratische Arbeiters Partei – Aufbau organisation
nVu  nederlandse Volksunie (oldest existing dutch far-right party)
PVV  Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for freedom)
reP  republikaner (republicans, german far-right party)
VB  Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang (flemish Block/interest)
  Voorpost (flemish nationalist organisation)
  Wiking Jugend (Viking youth, german nazi organisation) 
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APPendiX 2.1 
circulAtion of neWsPAPers in the three countries 
All circulation figures are from the year 2002 (Ward, 2004).
in all three countries the circulation numbers have decreased during the research period.
netherlands 4.100.000
total circulation of daily newspapers 4,100,000. of which de telegraaf is responsible 
for 767,000, de Volkskrant  326,124 and nrc handelsblad 265,000. de telegraaf is 
the  largest title in nl. nrc handelsblad & de Volkskrant are both in the top 5. 45% of 
newspapers is national.
sample: 32%
Germany 28,000,000
Almost all of the newspaper sector is regional. 5.5 million copies of a total of 28.7 mil-
lion are national newspapers. 3.9 million of these is Bild. süddeutsche Zeitung and 
frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung are second and third with 448,000 and 407,000 copies.
sample: 15%
Flanders: 1,263,716
het laatste nieuws has a circulation of 314,257 and is the largest newspaper in flanders, 
de standaard is the biggest of the two quality papers in the sample with 93,500 and de 
Morgen the smallest with 68,359. top 5 are all regional papers except hln and het Volk.
sample: 37%
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APPendiX 2.2 
coding instruMent
this is the original instrument excluding the items not used in this study.
Waarnemingsinstrument project ‘extreemrechts in de pers’
versie 9.2 (25-05-07)
© Pytrik schafraad
dit is het waarnemingsinstrument voor het onderzoek naar de veranderingen, verschillen 
en overeenkomsten van/tussen berichtgeving over extreemrechts in landelijke dagbladen 
in nederland, duitsland en Vlaanderen. het onderzoek is ingesteld naar aanleiding van 
aanwijzingen van andere onderzoekers, dat er een relatie bestaat tussen berichtgeving 
over extreemrechts in dagbladen en kiesgedrag, ofwel de populariteit van extreemrech-
tse partijen. het onderzoek bestaat uit twee complementaire delen: een systematische 
inhoudsanalyse en een nadere kwalitatieve analyse van de inhoud van de berichten. dit 
waarnemingsinstrument is t.b.v. de inhoudsanalyse. onderzoekseenheden zijn kranten-
berichten waarin extreemrechts op enige wijze aan de orde wordt gesteld.
het instrument (codeboek) bestaat uit vijf secties. het eerste deel heeft betrekking op 
de algemene kenmerken van het bericht, zoals de plaats in de krant en de omvang. het 
tweede, derde en vierde deel gaan over de inhoud van de artikelen. in het tweede deel 
worden vragen gesteld over de (extreemrechtse) actoren (met vragen over hun rol t.o.v. 
die van anderen). in het derde deel staan andere actoren centraal en in het vierde deel 
gaan we in op de ideologische thema’s van extreemrechts. het vijfde deel is bedoeld om 
het algemeen karakter van het artikel te bepalen.
de werkwijze voor het toepassen van dit instrument is als volgt:
1. lees het Bericht nog niet, registreer eerst de globale berichtkenmerken 
(item 1 tot en met 10);
2. lees het totale bericht en beantwoord pas daarna de resterende items (11-34). ge-
bruik een markeerstift om relevante informatie die je al lezend tegen komt te mark-
eren.
3. Zet de vraagnummers bij het tekstdeel waarop je het antwoord op de vraag baseert en 
lever de artikelen ook weer in.
4. Voer je coderingen na het lezen en markeren van het krantenbericht in  met behulp 
van in-data. houdt daarbij constant dit codeboek erbij.
5. noteer twijfelgevallen en onduidelijkheden en raadpleeg zonodig de onderzoeker.
0.  codeur identificatie
1. codeurnummer (vul hier het aan jou toegekende codeurnummer in)  
<Var001, codeurnr>
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1.  berichtkenmerken
1.1 identificatie analyseeenheid (het krantenbericht)
	
2. volgnummer. Wat is het volgnummer dat rechts bovenaan het artikel is 
 geschreven? <Var002, volgnr>
het nummer ziet er bij voorbeeld zo uit: dM99-024, sdZ94Bt-103, of nrc86-261.
1.2 identificatie van het dagblad
3.  dagbladtitel: Wat is de naam van de krant? <Var003, naamkrant>
01. =  de Morgen (dM);
02. =  de standaard (ds);
03. =  het laatste nieuws (hln);
04. =  de Volkskrant (VK);
05. =  de telegraaf (dtg);
06. = nrc handelsblad (nrc);
07. =  frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (fAZ);
08. =  süddeutsche Zeitung (sdZ);
09. =  Bild (Bild);
10. = gazet van Antwerpen (gvA);
11. = nieuwsblad (nB).
4. datum waarop het artikel is verschenen. <Var004, datum>
dag – Maand – Jaar
5. dag waarop het artikel is verschenen. Wanneer dit niet aangegeven staat op het 
artikel, maak dan gebruik van de kalender in bijlage 8. <Var005, dag>
01. = Maandag
02. = dinsdag
03. = Woensdag
04. =  donderdag
05. = Vrijdag
06. =  Zaterdag
1.3 uiterlijke kenmerken van het bericht
6. Plaats in de krant: staat het artikel op de voorpagina van de krant? 
<Var006, plaats>
00.  = nee
01.  = Ja
02. = onbekend
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7. Omvang van het bericht: hoe groot is het bericht? <Var007, omvang>
7a. geef voor alle berichten aan in welke van de onderstaande vier categorieën het 
bericht past:
01. = Klein. 
Maximaal 150 woorden, drie alinea’s. Bijvoorbeeld korte, zich tot enkele feiten 
beperkende nieuwsberichten of ingezonden brieven. foto’s en illustraties tellen 
niet mee. Korte geprinte berichten uit het  lexus-nexus of Mediargus archief zijn 
maximaal een halve pagina tekst. dat kun je controleren door het blad tweemaal 
over de breedte te vouwen (in drieën) zodat het in een gewone briefenveloppe zou 
passen. Blijft het onderste part leeg, dan is het een kort artikel. indien het exacte 
aantal woorden op het bericht is aangegeven neem je dat als uitgangspunt.
02. = Midden. 
151-400 woorden. foto’s en illustraties tellen niet mee. Middenlange berichten 
uit het lexus-nexus of Mediargus archief zijn minimaal een halve en maximaal 
tot 1 pagina tekst. indien het exacte aantal woorden op het bericht is aangegeven 
neem je dat als uitgangspunt.
03. = groot. 
Berichten 400-800 woorden. foto’s en illustraties tellen niet mee. grote geprinte 
berichten  uit het lexus-nexus of Mediargus archief zijn meer dan één pagina 
tekst. indien het exacte aantal woorden op het bericht is aangegeven neem je dat 
als uitgangspunt.
04. = Zeer groot.
Berichten langer dan 800 woorden. foto’s en illustraties tellen niet mee. grote 
geprinte berichten  uit het lexus-nexus of Mediargus archief zijn ongeveer 2 pa-
gina’s tekst of langer. indien het exacte aantal woorden op het bericht is aange-
geven neem je dat als uitgangspunt.
7b. geef indien vermeld op de afdruk van het krantenbericht het exacte aantal 
woorden aan (open vraag). indien het exacte aantal woorden onbekend is vul je 
nul in <0>. 
8. Wordt in de kop duidelijk gemaakt dat het artikel gaat over extreemrechts? 
<Var008, erinkop>
00. = nee
01. = Ja 
er worden in de kop, of ondertitel (deze kan soms ook boven de hoofdkop 
staan) direct aan extreemrechts gerelateerde termen gebruikt. Bij voorbeeld een 
partijnaam, of de naam van een publiek bekend extreemrechts individu of een 
rechtstreekse verwijzing (neonazi, skinheads racisten, etc.). Zie bijlage 1 voor de 
namen van partijen en bijlage 2 voor publiek bekende extreemrechtse individuen 
(nB. deze lijsten zijn niet uitputtend).
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2. extreemrechtse actoren en de rol van extreemrechts in het bericht
2.1 extreemrechtse actoren
Voor het onderzoek zijn een aantal partijen specifiek geïdentificeerd als extreemrechts. 
Meestal op basis van hun ideologie, soms ook op basis van hun sociogenese. over de 
aanwezigheid van deze partijen gaan de vragen 11-12.. Wanneer het gaat om het herken-
nen van partijen, organisaties en groepen die niet bij de vragen 11-12 of in bijlage 1-2 
genoemd worden dienen de volgende vragen als richtlijn:
•	 Wordt de betreffende actor expliciet als extreemrechts aangeduid?
•	 Bezigt de betreffende actor extreemrechtse standpunten? (bijlage 3: extreemrechtse 
standpunten);
•	 Bezigen de aanhang en/of leden van de actor extreemrechtse standpunten?
indien op een of meer van deze vragen bevestigend antwoord gegeven kan worden dient 
de betreffende actor als extreemrechts geduid te worden bij een van de vragen 11-14.
11. Komen er een of meerdere extreemrechtse actoren op enigerlei wijze voor  in het 
artikel? <Var011, eractor>
 een extreemrechtse actor is een politieke partij (bij voorbeeld Vlaams Belang), 
politicus (bij voorbeeld constant Kusters, of Phillip dewinter), andere extreem-
rechtse organisatie (bij voorbeeld Blood & honour), of een niet officieel geor-
ganiseerde groep (bij voorbeeld een groepje nazi-skinheads), of een expliciet als 
extreemrechts aangeduid individu (niet behorend tot een van bovenstaande ac-
toren). Voor een lijst van politieke partijen, politici en organisaties zie bijlage 1. 
00.  = nee;
01. = Ja zij wordt/worden alleen genoemd;
02. = Ja zij wordt/worden geparafraseerd;
d.w.z. de auteur van het artikel omschrijft met eigen woorden het gedachten-
goed, of uitlatingen van de extreemrechtse actor(en).
03. = Ja zij wordt/worden geciteerd;
d.w.z. letterlijke teksten uit publicaties of uitspraken worden herkenbaar (met 
aanhalingstekens) aangehaald of overgenomen in de tekst van het artikel;
12. Wat is de naam van de extreemrechtse actor(en) die in het bericht voorkomt/
komen? gebruik bij partijen de afkorting zoals hieronder aangeven. in het geval 
dat het een politicus betreft, noem je de naam van de partij waar hij of zij bij 
hoort.
centrumdemocraten (cd), centrumpartij ’86 (cP’86), centrumpartij (cP), 
nederlandse Volksunie (nVu), nederlands Blok (nB), nieuwe nationale Partij 
(nnP),lijst Pim fortuyn (lPf), leefbaar rotterdam (lr) (let op, andere leef-
baren horen hier niet bij!), nieuw rechts (nr), republikaner (reP), deutsche 
Volksunion (dvu), nationaldemokratische Partei deutschlands (nPd), Partei 
rechtstaatliche offensieve (Pro), schill Partei (schill), Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Be-
lang (VB), front nationale (fn). 
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2.2 de rol van extreemrechts
de volgende vragen gaan in op de rol die extreemrechts in het artikel vervult. Zij kan 
bijvoorbeeld partij zijn in een juridisch geschil, deelnemer aan verkiezingen, of partij zijn 
in een debat over een onderwerp dat op de agenda van het parlement staat. Binnen een 
artikel kan zij ook een combinatie van twee of meer van die rollen vervullen. Wanneer 
verschillende extreemrechtse actoren voorkomen in het artikel en deze verschillende rol-
len vervullen telt bij deze vragen (13-18) het aantal verschillende rollen dat zij tezamen 
vervullen, los van de vraag welke actor precies welke rol vervult. het gaat dus om de ver-
schillende rollen die voorkomen in het bericht.
13.  rol verkiezingen. Vervult extreemrechts in het artikel een rol als deelnemer aan 
de verkiezingen? dit is bij voorbeeld het geval wanneer het bericht (delen van) 
verkiezingsprogramma’s behandeld, gaat over opiniepeilingen, campagnes, uit-
slagen, de kabinetsformatie of verkiezingsbijeenkomsten. <Var013, rolverki>
00 = nee.
01 =  Ja.
14.  rol politieke actualiteit. Vervult extreemrechts in het artikel een rol als deelne-
mer aan de politieke actualiteit, d.w.z. in het primaire politieke proces. dit is het 
geval als er een onderwerp op de beleidsagenda van politieke instellingen zoals 
het parlement, gemeentebestuur of ministerraad is waar een extreemrechtse par-
tij zich over uitspreekt, of deelneemt aan een politiek debat (‘een nieuwe asielwet 
wordt voorgelegd aan het parlement’, of ‘partij x wil dat de gemeente hang-
jongeren strenger gaat aanpakken’)? <var014, rolpolac>
00 = nee.
01 =  Ja.
15. rol juridisch geschil. Vervult extreemrechts een rol als partij in een juridisch 
geschil? Arrestaties, rechtzaken en veroordelingen door een rechter behoren 
hiertoe. Bij voorbeeld wanneer een extreemrechtse politicus veroordeeld wordt 
wegens racisme, of criminele activiteiten zoals drugshandel. <Var015, roljusti>
00 = nee.
01 =  Ja.
16. rol extraparlementair. Vervult extreemrechts een  rol  in buitenparlementaire ac-
tiviteiten?  Bij deze vraag onderscheiden we een drietal soorten buitenparlemen-
taire activiteit <Var016, rolexpar>
00 = nee.
01 =  Ja, in gewelddadige (racistische) activiteiten;
(bij voorbeeld het plegen van aanslagen)
02= Ja, in rellen of confrontatie met politie of politieke tegenstanders;
03= Ja, in geweldloze buitenparlementaire activiteiten.;
 Bij voorbeeld vreedzame demonstraties en ludieke acties.
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17. rol intern. Vervult extreemrechts in het artikel een rol in ontwikkelingen en ge-
beurtenissen binnen extreemrechtse kringen? Bijvoorbeeld een partijcongres, of 
een ruzie tussen partijleden. <Var017, rolinter>
00 =  nee.
01 =  Ja, in een positieve interne gebeurtenis 
(partijcongres, lijsttrekkerverkiezing, de leden-parij).
02 = Ja, in een negatieve interne gebeurtenis 
(ruzies, intriges, partijsplitsingen).
18. andere rol extreemrechts. Vervult extreemrechts een andere rol dan die genoemd 
zijn bij de vragen 13 tot en met 17? Beantwoord deze vraag alleen bevestigend als 
je kunt beredeneren waarom de rol bij geen enkele van bovenstaande rollen past. 
<Var018, rolander>
00 = nee;
01 =  Ja.
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3. niet-extreemrechtse  actoren en hun verhouding met  
 extreemrechts
3.1 niet extreemrechtse actoren
de volgende vragen gaan over niet-extreemrechtse actoren die eventueel voorkomen (een rol 
spelen) in het artikel. dat kunnen zowel politieke partijen, politici, maatschappelijke organisa-
ties  sociale bewegingen, overheidsorganisaties, of anonieme en naamloze groepen/organisa-
ties, dan wel burgers al dan niet in hun rol als kiezer zijn. het gaat bij deze vragen niet om het 
al dan niet voorkomen van de actoren in het bericht, maar om de vraag welke herkenbare (en 
dus expliciet aanwijsbare) houding ten opzichte van extreemrechts zij hebben.
19. Positieve attitudes. Komen er in het artikel een of meerdere niet-extreemrechtse ac-
toren aan het woord,  of wordt hun standpunt over een bepaald onderwerp naast of tegenover 
dat van extreemrechts gezet op dus danige wijze, dat dit duidt op een positieve attitude ten 
opzichte van extreemrechts, of een extreemrechts standpunt? <var019, posatti
er is sprake van een positieve houding t.o.v. extreemrechts wanneer de betreffende de niet-
extreemrechtse actor een zelfde of soortgelijk standpunt inneemt als extreemrechts (in het 
artikel),  
of op een andere manier steun betuigt aan extreemrechts;
00. = nee. Ga dan verder met vraag 21.
01. = Ja.
21. negatieve attitudes. Komen er in het artikel een of meerdere niet-extreemrechtse ac-
toren aan het woord,  of wordt hun standpunt over een bepaald onderwerp naast of tegenover 
dat van extreemrechts gezet op dus danige wijze, dat dit duidt op een negatieve attitude ten 
opzichte van extreemrechts, of een extreemrechts standpunt? <var021, negatti> 
er is sprake van een negatieve attitude is wanneer de betreffende de niet-extreemrechtse actor 
een tegengesteld standpunt heeft ten opzichte van dat van extreemrechts (in het artikel), of op 
een andere manier extreemrechts of haar standpunt verwerpt, of ontkracht. Bij voorbeeld ook 
in het geval een rechter een extreemrechtse actor veroordeeld/schuldig bevindt, dan wel deze 
expliciet verdacht wordt van een strafbaar feit (niet bij enkel een arrestatie of onderzoek naar 
eventuele feiten);
00. = nee. Ga dan verder met vraag 23.
01. = Ja.
3.2 verhouding extreemrechts – niet extreemrechts als onderwerp van  
discussie in het bericht.
23. is de manier waarop niet extreemrechtse actoren om gaan, of zouden moeten gaan 
met extreemrechts onderwerp van discussie voor de actoren in het artikel? is een z.g. cordon 
sanitaire, samenwerking, partijverbod, demonstratieverbod, of een ander manier van omgaan 
met, of bestrijding van extreemrechts onderwerp van discussie? <var023, omganger>
00 = nee;
01 =  Ja.
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4. ideologische thema’s van extreemrechts in het artikel
hoewel de term extreemrechts een grote variëteit aan partijen en organisaties dekt, die 
verschillen in standpunten en mate van radicaliteit, zijn er wel degelijk een aantal ideolo-
gische kernthema’s aan te wijzen die tot het extreemrechts gedachtegoed behoren. Met 
de volgende vragen wordt de aanwezigheid van die thema’s in het artikel getoetst. Zie bij 
twijfel ook bijlage 3 waarop een toelichting op de extreemrechtse issues staat.
24. antiprogressief. Komt het thema antiprogressief voor in het bericht, of is er 
sprake van antiprogressieve uitspraken? <Var024 antiprog>
00. = nee;
01. = Ja.
in het bericht komt het thema antiprogressief aan de orde doordat een van de 
volgende termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: antifeminisme, 
tegen emancipatie, anticommunisme, of er is sprake van antiprogressieve, of 
antilinkse uitspraken, bijvoorbeeld in termen van bestrijding van volksvijandige 
elementen.
25. antidemocratisch. Komt het thema antidemocratisch voor in het bericht, of is er  
 sprake van antidemocratische uitspraken? <Var25 antidem>
00. = nee;
01. = Ja.
in het bericht komt het thema antidemocratisch aan de orde doordat een van 
de volgende termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: afschaffen of 
beperken van het democratisch systeem, autoritaire staat, sterke leider, of een ex-
plicitering van een hiërarchisch systeem waarbinnen vrije verkiezingen en stem-
recht sterk of geheel beperkt worden.
26. Populisme algemeen. Komt het thema Populisme of anti-establishment voor in 
het bericht? <Var026, popalg>
00. = nee;
01. = Ja.
in het bericht komt het thema populisme aan de orde doordat een van de vol-
gende termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: populisme, populis-
tisch, opportunisme, proteststem, anti-partij, anti-establishment, regenten, ‘de 
haagse kaasstolp’, het centraal stellen van gevoelens die onder het volk ‘leven’,  
of doordat er op een andere wijze blijk wordt gegeven van het tegen de politieke 
elite zijn.
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27. nationalisme. Komt het thema nationalisme voor in het bericht? 
<Var027, national>
00. = nee;
01. = Ja. 
in het bericht komt het thema nationalisme aan de orde doordat een van de vol-
gende termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: etnisch nationalisme, 
staatsnationalisme, nationalisme, ijzerbedevaart, Vlaamse beweging, communau-
tair, splitsing sociale zekerheid, Vlaamse onafhankelijkheid, of nationaal social-
isme. nationalisme wil zeggen dat een volk en haar (vermeende, vaak homogene) 
identiteit centraal worden gesteld.
28. Xenofobie algemeen. Komt het thema xenofobie voor in het bericht? 
<Var029, xenoalg>
00. = nee;
01. = Ja. 
Xenofobie is de angst voor andere bevolkingsgroepen. in het bericht komt het 
thema xenofobie (vreemdelingenhaat) aan de orde doordat een van de volgende 
termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: xenofobie, vreemdelingen-
haat, racisme, fascisme, discriminatie, apartheid, antisemitisme, of een angst 
voor gastarbeiders, asielzoekers, illegalen, buitenlanders, moslims, migranten, 
sans papiers.  Bijvoorbeeld uitspraken in termen van ‘volksvreemde’ elementen, 
of in programmapunten zoals het 70 puntenplan van het Vlaams Blok, en partij-
leuzen als ‘vol is vol’ of ‘eigen volk eerst’.
29. exclusionisme algemeen. Komt het thema exclusionisme voor in het bericht? 
<Var029, exclualg>
00. = nee;
01. = Ja. 
exclusionisme = de actieve uitsluiting (of het (beleids-)voornemen daartoe) van 
andere bevolkingsgroepen. Zijn uitsluitingsideologieën, uitsluitingsplannen of 
beleid of de concrete uitsluiting van gastarbeiders, asielzoekers, illegalen, buiten-
landers, moslims, migranten, sans papiers onderwerp in het bericht? Bij voor-
beeld de uitsluiting van een van deze groepen (‘grenzen dicht voor asielzoekers’, 
‘geen migrantenstemrecht’),
30. law & order algemeen. Komt het thema law & order voor in het bericht? 
<Var030, lawalg>
00. = nee;
01. = Ja. 
in het bericht komt het thema law & order aan de orde doordat een van de vol-
gende termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: sterke staat, ‘’meer 
blauw op straat, ‘zero tolerance’ beleid, criminaliteitsbestrijding, veiligheid als 
issue, of doordat op andere wijze de nadruk op orde en gezag wordt gelegd.
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31. traditionele waarden algemeen. Komt het thema traditionele waarden voor in 
het bericht? <Var031, tradwtalg>
00. = nee;
01. = Ja. 
in het bericht komt het thema traditionele waarden aan de orde, bij voorbeeld 
door een van de volgende standpunten vermeld staat, of een omschrijving 
daarvan: tegen abortus, tegen het homohuwelijk, tegen euthanasie, het gezin als 
hoeksteen van de samenleving, of in termen als: gezinspolitiek, ‘de ethische par-
tij’. Meestal gaat het hier inderdaad om ethische kwesties. Wanneer het politieke 
ideologieën betreft, valt dit onder vraag 27 ‘anti-progressief’.
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5.	 extreemrechts	algemeen
32. extreemrechts expliciet. Wordt in het artikel het thema extreemrechts als zo-
danig benoemd op een manier dat de extreemrechtse actor als stereotype ex-
treemrechts wordt neergezet  Wordt  er in het artikel  expliciet gemaakt dat de 
lezer hier te doen heeft met extreemrechts? Wordt de lezer daar op geattendeerd 
door expliciete terminologie? <Var032, extrrech>
00. = nee;
01. = Ja. 
 in het artikel komt minstens 1 keer een van de volgende termen (of een verbuig-
ing ervan) voor: extreemrechts, rechtsradicaal, nationaal-socialisme, (neo-)
nazi, bruinhemden, skinhead, lonsdale jongere, rechtse extremist, of een andere 
duidelijke term, of rechtstreekse verwijzing naar nazi-duitsland (1933-1945). 
impliciete verwijzingen, of alleen het noemen van namen van partijen of indivi-
duen leiden tot het antwoord ‘nee’.
33. Prominente plaats. is extreemrechts in het bericht het belangrijkste thema, of 
vervult het de rol van hoofdrolspeler of centraal ondewerp in de narratieve struc-
tuur? de hoofdrolspeler is de belangrijkste actor in de verhaallijn. in de literatuur 
ook wel de drager van het (nieuws)verhaal genoemd. <Var033, prominent>
00. = nee;
01. = Ja.
34. titel. hoe luidt precies de titel van het bericht? <Var034, titel>
geef eerst de titel en dan de ondertitel. onderscheidt titel en ondertitel door een 
punt (.) Als het onderscheid niet duidelijk is, neem dan de groots weergeven titel 
op als titel en de kleiner afgedrukte titel (zowel boven als onder de hoofdtitel 
weergegeven) als ondertitel. indien in lnA en Mediargus materiaal dit ondersc-
heid is weggevallen de chronologische volgorde aanhouden.
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BiJlAgen codeerinstructie
Waarnemingsinstrument ‘extreemrechts in de pers’ v9.1 (dld) 
 
Mei 2007
inhoud:
1. extreemrechtse partijen
2. extreemrechtse politici
3. extreemrechtse standpunten
4. Politieke partijen (progressief, liberaal, conservatief)
5. overzichtje verkiezingsdata Bt en eP
6. overzicht relevante gebeurtenissen rond de verschillende verkiezingsjaren
losse bijlagen:
7. indata instructie ‘invoeren’ (je kunt ook de gehele handleiding downloaden van  
 de website van het rtog http://www.socsci.kun.nl/rtog/
8. Kalenders t.b.v. coderen van dag: item 5 in het codeboek  —>  
 ook op je computer op te vragen als je bijvoorbeeld beschikt over ‘outlook’. 
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Bijlage 1 – extreemrechtse partijen
dit overzicht is niet volledig, doch alle relevante, in parlementen vertegenwoordigde par-
tijen zijn opgenomen, plus enkele anderen.
1. nederland
• centrumdemocraten (cd).
• centrum Partij (cP) – wordt in 1986 opgeheven en opgevolgd door cd en cP’86.
• centrum Partij ’86 (cP’86) – wordt in 1998 verboden.
• nieuwe nationale Partij (nnP) – kan gezien worden als opvolger van cP’86 .
• nederlandse Volksunie (nVu) – oudste extreemrechtse partij in nederland.
• nederlands Blok (nB) – lokale utrechtse partij.
• lijst Pim fortuyn (lPf) – populistische partij met enkele extreemrechtse kenmerken.
• leefbaar nederland (ln) – populistische partij met enkele extreemrechtse ken-
merken.
• leefbaar rotterdam (lr) – populistische partij waarmee fortuyn in 2002 de rotter-
damse gemeenteraadsverkiezingen won. onafhankelijk van ln.
• conservatieven.nl – afsplitsing van lPf.
• nieuw rechts (nr) – lokale rotterdamse partij, afsplitsing van leefbaar rotterdam
• groep Wilders – afsplitsing van de conservatief-liberale VVd.
• Boerenpartij – partij van boer Koekkoek die vanaf de jaren vijftig tot begin jaren 
zeventig in het parlement zetelde.
2. vlaanderen
• vlaams Blok (VB) – wordt in 2004 gedwongen haar naam te veranderen.
• vlaams Belang (VB) – nieuwe naam Vlaams Blok.
• Front national – Waalse extreemrechtse partij.
3. duitsland
• republikaner (reP) – met name actief in zuid duitsland.
• deutsche volksunion (dVu) – partij van extreemrechtse uitgever.
• nationaldemokratische Partei deutschlands (nPd) – meest traditionele extreem-
rechtse partij in duitsland.
• deutsche liga für volk und Heimat – zeer kleine partij die meestal niet meedoet aan 
nationale verkiezingen.
• Partei rechtsstaatlichte Offensive (Pro) – populistische partij, aanvankelijk onder 
leiding van schill.
• schill Partei – populistische partij rond voormalig strafrechter schill.
4. andere europese landen
• Front national (fn) – frankrijk
• British national Party (BnP) – Verenig Koninkrijk
• Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs (fPÖ) – oostenrijk
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Bijlage 2 – extreemrechtse politici
supplement behorende bij het codeboek van het project ‘extreemrechts in de pers’
Bij vraag 11-13
nB: deze lijst is niet volledig
1. nederland 2. Vlaanderen 3. duitsland
Hans Janmaat (CD)
Wil Schuurmans (CD)
Wim Beaux (CD/CP’86)
Martijn Freling (CP’86)
Joop Glimmerveen (NVU)
Constant Kusters (CP’86/NVU)
Michiel Smit (NR)
Wim Vreeswijk (NB)
Mark Hoogstra (NNP)
Tim Mudde
Hilbrand Nawijn (LPF)
Marcel Rüten (Voorpost)
Karel Dillen (VB)
Gerolf Annemans (VB)
Filip Dewinter (VB)
Frank Vanhecke (VB)
Filip Deman (VB)
Alexandra Colen (VB)
Francis van den Eynde (VB)
Johan Demol (VB)
Anke van der Meer (VB)
Marie-Roos Morel (VB)
Rolf Schlierer (REP)
Franz Schönhuber (REP)
Udo Voigt (NPD)
Gerhard Frey (DVU)
Roland Schill (Schill Partei /
PRO)
Deckert (NPD)
Mußgnug (NPD)
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Bijlage 3 – extreemrechtse standpunten
supplement behorende bij het codeboek van het project ‘extreemrechts in de pers’
bij sectie 2.1 (vraag 11-13). nB: deze lijst is niet volledig en geeft enkel aan hoe standpunten  
kunnen voorkomen.
• Politieke attitudes
1. Populisme
opportunistisch, zegt als enige wel namens het gewone volk te spreken en te weten wat er onder de 
mensen leeft. tegen de politieke elite. Populisme kan onderscheiden worden in populistische stand-
punten (tegen het establishment, het geleefde belang van het volk voor op stellen) en een politieke 
attitude waarin een opportunistische stijl (het verkondigen van eenvoudige directe oplossingen 
voor maatschappelijke problemen etc.). Veelal gaan beide samen.
2. antiprogressief
Zeer  anticommunistisch, antifeministisch, actief en expliciet tegen progressieve politieke bewegin-
gen (vaak in termen van ‘volksvijanden’) en gedachtegoed in het algemeen, vaak antidemocratisch. 
deze en de xenofobe standpunten gaan vaak gepaard met complotdenken.
3. antidemocratisch
tegen het systeem van parlementaire vertegenwoordiging, of voor inperking daarvan. tegen pers-
vrijheid, of voor inperking daarvan. Voorstanders van een systeem met een sterke (absolute) leider. 
• ideologische standpunten met betrekking tot etnische relaties
3. nationalisme
Blut und Bodem ideeën; etniciteit gebonden aan territorium. een voorbeeld is het Vlaams nation-
alisme, of de ‘grootduitse gedachte’. het belang van het aan een expliciet territorium gebonden 
volk staat voorop.
4. Xenofobie
Angst voor of haat tegen andere dan de eigen groepen, in het bijzonder etnische groepen, of 
vreemde religies. ook wel in termen van het ‘volksvreemde’. Men is bij voorbeeld bang dat 
‘moslims de boel hier overnemen’, of ‘Marokkanen hier straks in de meerderheid zijn’.
5. exclusionisme
uitsluiten van bepaalde groepen van delen van de samenleving, burgerrechten e.d.
 Bij voorbeeld: grenzen dicht voor asielzoekers, geen stemrecht voor migranten of homoseksuelen 
uitsluiten van het huwelijksrecht.
• conservatieve standpunten
6. law & Order
sterke staat, militarisme (geldt meestal alleen voor traditionele extreemrechtse partijen), re-
pressieve houden t.o.v. criminaliteit (zware straffen, doodstraf, ‘three strikes and you are out).
7. traditionele waarden
het gezin centraal, (mannelijk) kostwinnerschap, tegen abortus en euthanasie, tegen het homohu-
welijk, adoptie door homoparen en vaak ook openlijk discriminerend tegenover homoseksuelen in 
het algemeen.
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Bijlage 4 – Politieke Partijen
supplement behorende bij het codeboek van het project ‘extreemrechts in de pers’
Bij sectie 3.1 (vraag 19-22). nB: deze lijst is niet volledig. Met name de Vlaamse  
partijnamen kunnen in oudere casussen afwijken.
Nederland Vlaanderen  
(inclusief Waalse partijen)
Duitsland
Progressief Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), 
Groen Links, Socialistische 
Partij (SP), Communistische 
Partij Nederland (CPN), 
Politieke Partij Radicalen 
(PPR), Pacifistisch 
Socialistische Partij (PSP), 
Evangelische Volkspartij 
(EVP)
Socialistische Partij – Anders 
(SP-A)
Partij van de Arbeid
Ecolo
Parti Socialiste (PS)
Spirit
Agalev
Groen! 
Vivant
Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschalds (SPD)
Die Grünen
Bindnis90
Partei des Demokratischen 
Sozialismus (PDS)
Die Linke
WASG
Conservatief/
Confessioneel
Christen Democratisch Appel 
(CDA), Christen Unie (CU), 
Gereformeerde Volkspartij 
(GVP), Reformatorisch 
Politieke Federatie (RPF), 
Staatkundig Gereformeerde 
Partij (SGP)
Christendemocratisch en 
Vlaams (CD&V)
Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie 
(NV-A)
Volksunie (VU)
centre democrate Humaniste 
(cdH)
Christlich Demokratische 
Union Deutschland (CDU)
Christlich Soziale Union 
(CSU)
Liberaal Democraten ’66 (D’66), 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie (VVD)
Vlaamse Liberalen en 
Democraten (VLD)
Mouvement Reformateur 
(MR)
PRL
FDF
Freie Demokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (FDP)
Andere partijen 
(bij voorbeeld 
lokaal)
Leefbaar … (plaatsnaam)
Dorpsbelangen
Ouderenpartij/Unie 55+
AOV (Algemeen Ouderen 
Verbond)
Europa Transparant
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APPendiX 2.3 
reliABility 
 
dutch case 
(n 176)
german case 
(n 186)
Flemish case 
(n 156)
Variable name holsti π holsti π holsti π
General and formal attention     
Newspaper title 0.93 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
Week day 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.97 0.97
Size 0.94 0.89 0.97 0.95 0.76 0.63
Front page appearance 0.96 0.89 0.90 0.79 0.99 0.97
Headline appearance 0.96 0.91 0.95 0.90 0.96 0.91
Prominence 0.85 0.70 0.91 0.78 0.90 0.79
Substantial attention variables    
Reppresentation 0.72 0.57 0.84 0.67 0.89 0.78
Role in elections 0.81 0.62 0.96 0.91 0.89 0.73
Role in political actuality 0.85 0.53 0.96 0.52 0.94 0.70
Role in legal conflict 0.94 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Role in extra-parliamentary situations 0.95 0.75 0.87 0.70 0.94 0.74
Role in internal situations 0.94 0.59 0.87 0.54 0.94 0.66
Positive and negative roles 0.89 0.72 0.81 0.68 0.85 0.69
stigmatising associations 0.92 0.76 0.85 0.69 0.97 0.93
Standpoints general 0.81 0.58 0.90 0.78 0.90 0.80
Anti-progressive standpoints 0.96 -0.02 0.98 0.56 0.99 0.80
Anti-democratic standpoints 0.98 0.49 0.97 0.65 0.99 0.66
Populist/anti-establishment standpoints 0.92 0.61 0.97 0.43 0.92 0.60
Nationalist standpoints 0.96 -0.02 0.93 0.63 0.96 0.86
Xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints 0.92 0.74 0.95 0.88 0.93 0.84
Law & order standpoints 0.97 0.81 0.99 0.67 0.99 0.91
Traditionalist standpoints 1.00 1.00 0.99 -0.28 0.99 0.95
Support attention     
NFRA favourable attitudes 0.86 0.42 0.93 0.28 0.95 0.75
NERA unfavourable attitudes 0.72 0.42 0.82 0.63 0.87 0.73
Debate about dealing with the far-right 0.94 0.66 0.90 0.51 0.97 0.84
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the spps matrix used to calculate reliability coefficients was developed by  
pieter van groenenstijn. this version is applicable in spss 15.
set printback none. 
 
/*----------------------------------------------------------------.   
 
define !coder3 (!pos !tokens(1) / !pos !tokens(1)).  
dataset name pietje.  
 
Autorecode  
  VAriABles=!1 !2 /into @newvar1 @newvar2  
  /grouP  
  /Print. 
VAr leVel @newvar2 @newvar1 (ordinAl).  
oMs  
  /select tABles  
  /if suBtyPes = [“custom table”]  
  /destinAtion forMAt = sAV  
   outfile = “c:\temp\outputfile_oms.sav”.  
* custom tables.  
ctABles  
  /VlABels VAriABles=@newvar2 @newvar1 disPlAy=defAult  
  /tABle @newvar1 [count f40.0] By @newvar2  
  /cAtegories VAriABles=@newvar2 @newvar1 order=A Key=VAlue 
eMPty=include.  
oMsend.  
match files file = *  
  /drop @newvar1 @newvar2. 
 
get file=”c:\temp\outputfile_oms.sav” /droP=command_ to Var2.  
MAtriX.  
get mat /file=* .  
compute nkol=ncol(mat). 
compute nrij=nrow(mat). 
 
do if ((nrij = 1) And (nkol = 1)). 
compute holsti=1. 
compute pi=1. 
compute kappa=1. 
compute alpha=1. 
else. 
compute rowa = rsum(mat). 
compute rowb = t(csum(mat)). 
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compute k = ncol(mat). 
compute abmean = (rowa+rowb)/2. 
compute n = csum(rowa). 
compute expk = trace((rowa*t(rowb)/(n*n))). 
compute exps = trace((abmean*t(abmean)/(n*n))). 
compute agr = trace(mat). 
compute holsti = trace(mat)/n. 
compute pi =   (holsti-exps)/(1-exps). 
compute kappa = (holsti-expk)/(1-expk). 
compute rowab=rowa+rowb. 
compute pmt=(msum(rowab*t(rowab))-trace(rowab*t(rowab)))/2. 
compute pfu= n-agr. 
compute alpha = 1 - (((2*n)-1)*(pfu/pmt)). 
end if. 
 
** print results ***.  
 
print        /title = “coder reliability”. 
compute  agre = {holsti; pi; kappa; alpha}. 
print agre /title = “ “/rlabels = “holsti” “scott pi” “Kappa” “Alpha” /format = f10.4. 
end matrix. 
 
dataset activate pietje. 
 
dataset close pietje. 
 
!enddefine 
 
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------.
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APPendiX 2.4  
Protocol selection releVAnt Articles 28
General Applied
A. Developing a keyword list
 • Derive overview relevant characteristics of central themes of research from theoretical framework and from 
a random sample of newspaper articles in order to guarantee theoretical and empirical relevance. Define key 
concepts and synonyms.  
   ò
 • Operationalisation  in keyword list (first version). 
   ò
 • Test productivity and selectivity of the keyword list by applying to one or more small samples. 
   ò
 • Second version.  
   ò
 • Repeat testing until the list of key words has reached a sufficient level of productivity and selectivity. 
   ò
 • Carry out a search with the keyword list in a electronic data source and compare outcomes to a paper search. If 
the paper search does not reveal relevant articles that have not been found with the keyword list, the keyword list 
is ready for application. 
   ò
 • Final version.
B. Selection of the articles/sampling
1. Carry out a search within the set time period and 
newspaper title with the complete keyword list. When 
searching paper or MF data, scan headlines, leads and 
then paragraphs for key words.
 • Electronic: type in the keywords in ‘search term’ box 
and define title and dates;
 • Paper/MF: Scan pages of the newspapers in the 
given time period for the keywords.
2. Save the resulting rough selection.  • Electronic: There is an option for downloading the 
selection;
 • Paper/MF: Print/copy the selected articles.
3 .Scan the rough selection by hand, delete irrelevant 
articles based on explicated criteria:
 • the delineation of newspaper sections
 • topic relevance
 • possible included disambiguaties
 • case specific criteria (for example related to critical 
events)
Exclude for example articles found:
 • With a last name of a politician that appears to deal 
with another person with the same name;
 • Lists of (chosen) MP candidates;
 • Foreign news covering other countries then the 
Netherlands, Belgium or Germany;
 • Articles from the literature sections (book reviews);
 • Articles from the culture and leisure sections: CD 
reviews (especially in Dutch papers);
 • Reviews of plays, films and other cultural events, 
sections not mentioned in step 2;
 • Articles on the dioxin affair in the Flemish papers.
4. Save  final selection.  • Electronic: save each article starting on a new page 
(needs editing in the case of LNA) and print for filing;
 • Paper/MF: file.
 
28 Taken from Schafraad, P.,  Wester, F. & Scheepers, P. (2006). Using ‘new’ data sources for ‘old’ 
newspaper research: developing guidelines for data collection. Communications 31 , 455-467.
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APPendiX 3 
tABles Belonging to chAPter 3
appendix 3.1 size of articles per newspaper
Newspaper VK NRC Tel Total
n 464 521 330 1315
S (< 150 words) 13 12 18 14
M (150 – 400 words) 30 30 45 34
L (> 400 words) 56 58 37 52
Total 100 100 100 100
appendix 3.2 front page, headline & prominence
Newspaper VK NRC Tel Total
n 464 521 330 1315
Frontpage 13 13 4* 11
Headline appearance 54 40 44 46
Prominence 54 43 53 49
*) de Telegraaf figure is an underestimation, as de Telegraaf corpus 
retrieved from lexis-nexis did not contain this information.
appendix 3.3 representation of the far  
right in three newspapers
Newspaper VK NRC Tel Total
n 464 521 330 1315
No representation 1 1 2 1
Passive representation 48 44 45 46
Active representation 51 55 52 53
Total 100 100 100 100
appendix 3.4 situated roles per newspaper
Newspaper VK NRC Tel Total
n 464 521 329 1314
In elections* 61 53 57 57
In political actuality* 9 23 20 18
In legal conflict* 17 16 11 15
In extra-parliamentary activity 14 15 10 13
In normal internal situations 3 4 4 4
In negative internal situations 11 11 9 10
*) differences significant at p < 0,05 
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appendix 3.5 stigmatising associations per newspaper
Newspaper VK NRC Tel Total
n 464 521 330 1315
Stigmatising associations 24 20 21 22
None 76 80 79 78
Total 100 100 100 100
appendix 3.6 percentage of coverage including one or more far-right 
standpoints
Election year 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2004 Total
n 111 77 223 96 348 338 122 1315
Far-right standpoints 23 36 53 31 28 29 31 33
None 77 64 47 69 72 71 69 67
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
appendix 3.7 far-right ideological standpoints per newspaper
Newspaper VK NRC Tel Total
n 464 521 330 1315
Anti-progressive * 3 1 0 2
Anti-democratic 2 2 1 2
Anti-establishment/populist 6 5 5 5
Nationalist 3 5 2 4
Xenophobic/Exclusionist 30 26 23 27
Law & Order* 8 6 16 9
Traditional Values 1 1 2 1
*) differences significant at p < 0,05 
appendix 3.8 nfra attitudes per newspaper
Newspaper VK NRC Tel Total
n 464 521 330 1315
No NFRA attitudes 50 53 47 51
Exclusively favourable attitudes 7 9 15 10
Exclusively unfavourable attitudes 38 29 35 34
Both fav. and unfav. attitudes 4 8 3 6
Total 100 100 100 100
appendix 3.9 debate about dealing with the far right
Newspaper VK NRC Tel Total
n 464 521 330 1315
Debate 8 8 5 7
No debate 92 92 95 93
Total 100 100 100 100
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APPendiX 4 
tABles Belonging to chAPter 4
appendix 4.1 size of articles per newspaper
Newspaper FAZ SDZ Bild Total
n 657 859 105 1621
Small 22 28 50 27
Medium 29 32 30 31
Large 26 29 18 27
X Large 23 11 2 15
Total 100 100 100 100
appendix 4.2 front page, prominence and headling appearance per 
newspaper
Newspaper FAZ SDZ Bild Total
n 657 859 105 1621
Frontpage  11 4 24 8
Headline appearance 29 53 73 45
Prominence 62 68 80 66
appendix 4.3. representation of the far right (in percentages)*
Election year 1987 1989 1990 1994EP 1994BT 1998 1999 2002 2004 Total
n 42 200 65 303 302 262 145 189 113 1621
Passive 
representation 69 64 68 66 64 50 66 59 70 62
Active 
representation 26 32 29 16 21 16 21 30 13 22
No representation 5 4 3 18 15 34 14 11 17 16
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
*) p < 0,05
appendix 4.4. representation in three newspapers*
Newspaper FAZ SDZ BILD Total
n 657 859 105 1621
Passive representation 65 61 63 62
Active representation 18 23 35 22
None/no actor 17 17 2 16
Total 100 100 100 100
*) p < 0,05
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appendix 4.5. coverage with the far right in specific roles in three 
newspapers
Newspaper FAZ SDZ BILD Total
n 657 859 105 1621
In elections 33 34 31 24
In political actuality* 6 4 13 5
In legal conflict 17 17 21 17
In extra-parliamentary violence* 12 14 25 14
In extra-parliamentary confrontation* 4 3 10 4
In extra-parliamentary peaceful 8 9 6 8
In normal internal 8 10 4 9
In negative internal 4 4 4 4
*) p < 0,05
appendix 4.6. coverage with far right in positive and negative roles
Newspaper FAZ SDZ BILD Total
n 657 859 105 1621
Positive roles 15 17 18 17
Negative roles 32 31 45 33
Rest 52 51 37 51
Total 100 100 100 100
*) p < 0,05
appendix  4.7. coverage with stigmatising associations in thee newspapers*
Newspaper FAZ SDZ BILD Total
n 657 859 105 1621
Stigmatsings associations 51 55 33 52
None 49 45 67 48
Total 100 100 100 100
*) p < 0,05
appendix 4.8. percentage of the coverage with far-right standpoints*
Eection year 1987 1989 1990 1994EP 1994BT 1998 1999 2002 2004 Total
n 42 200 65 303 302 262 145 189 113 1621
Ideological 
standpoints present 24 44 22 43 41 39 25 37 35 38
Not present 76 57 78 57 59 61 75 63 65 62
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
*) p < 0,05
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appendix  4.9. coverage with far right standpoints in thee newspapers
Newspaper FAZ SDZ BILD Total
n 657 859 105 1621
Anti-progressive 1 1 3 1
Anti-democratic* 6 4 1 4
Anti-establishment/populist* 4 5 0 4
Nationalist 12 10 11 11
Xenophobic or Exclusionsit 26 29 35 28
Law & order* 0 1 4 1
Traditional Values 1 2 0 2
*) p < 0,05
appendix 4.10. percentage of the coverage with non-far-right actor’s 
attitudes*
Newspaper FAZ SDZ BILD Total
n 657 859 105 1621
Favourable attitudes 1 1 3 1
Unfavourable attitudes 46 46 49 46
Both 2 2 4 2
None 51 51 45 50
Total 100 100 100 100
*) the chi-square test (fisher’s exact) shows a too high p value (p = .518)
the found scores can therefore not be viewed as significantly different. 
appendix 4.11. percentage of the coverage with debate on dealing 
with the far right*
Newspaper FAZ SDZ BILD Total
n 657 859 105 1621
No debate 86 88 90 87
Including debate on dealing with the far right 14 12 10 13
Total 100 100 100 100
*) the chi-square test showed a too high p value (p = .496) for the complete table. 
Between the two extremes the difference has also been found insignificant (p = .326).
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APPendiX 5  
tABles Belonging to chAPter 5
appendix 5.1 
size of the articles (in percentages)
newspaper dM ds hLn total
n 881 829 646 2356
S <150 9 16 48 22
M 151-400 36 44 38 40
L 401-800 39 29 11 28
XL >800 16 11 3 11
Total 100 100 100 100
appendix 5.2 
front page, headline appearance and prominence (in percentages)
newspaper dM ds hLn total
n 881 830 647 2358
Front page 8 7 6 7
Headline appearance 41 39 38 39
Prominence* 55 46 55 52
*) significant at p < .05
appendix 5.3 
representation per newspaper (in percentages)*
newspaper dM ds hLn total
n 881 830 647 2358
No actor 2 2 3 2
Passive representation 59 53 52 55
Active representation 38 44 45 42
Total 100 100 100 100
*) no significant differences found
185
Appendices        
appendix 5.4 
the far right in situated roles (in percentages)
newspaper dM ds hLn total
n 881 829 646 2356
In political actuality 6 12 17 11
In legal conflict 16 12 11 13
In extra-parliamentary violence 8 4 4 6
In extra-parliamentary confrontation 3 3 5 3
In extra-parliamentary peaceful situations 3 2 4 3
In normal internal situations 4 3 2 3
In negative internal situations 5 3 3 4
appendix 5.5 
the far right in positive and negative evaluated roles
newspaper dM ds hLn total
n 881 829 646 2356
Undecided 74 74 69 72
Positive roles 11 17 21 16
Negative roles 15 9 11 12
Total 100 100 100 100
appendix 5.6 
percentage of coverage including stigmatising associations*
newspaper dM ds hLn total
n 881 830 647 2358
Stigmatising associations 41 20 15 27
None 59 80 85 73
Total 100 100 100 100
*) significant at p < .05
appendix 5.7 
percentage of coverage including any far-right standpoints
election year 1987 1989 1991 1994 1995 1999 2003 2004 total
n 82 79 260 200 226 473 474 562 2356
One or more standpoints 51 66 58 57 45 38 34 48 45
None 49 34 42 44 55 62 66 52 55
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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appendix 5.8
percentage of coverage including far-right standpoints
newspaper dM ds hLn total
n 881 829 646 2356
Anti-progressive 1 1 0 1
Anti-democratic* 5 2 1 3
Anti-establishment/populist* 9 10 4 8
Nationalist* 15 21 8 16
Xenophobic/Exclusionist* 39 27 22 30
Law & Order 4 5 6 5
Traditional Values 4 5 3 4
*) significant at p < .05
appendix 5.9 
non-far-right actor’s attitudes towards the far right (in percentages)*
newspaper dM ds hLn total
n 881 829 646 2356
None 47 57 60 54
Exclusive favourable attitudes 3 4 4 4
Exclusive unfavourable attitudes 41 32 31 35
Both fave. And unfave. attitudes 8 7 5 7
Total 100 100 100 100
*) significant at p < .05
appendix 5.10
debate on dealing with the far right amon nfra* 
newspaper dM ds hLn total
n 881 830 647 2358
Debate 12 10 7 10
No debate 88 90 93 90
Total 100 100 100 100
*) significant at p < .05
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samenvatting (dutch summary)       
sAMenVAtting
inleiding
dit proefschrift gaat over media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts. op welke manier besteden 
kranten aandacht aan deze familie van partijen en organisaties en hoe verhoudt die me-
dia-aandacht zich tot de (electorale) positie van uiterst-rechts? dit zijn de vragen die aan 
de oorsprong van dit proefschrift liggen en relevant zijn omdat zowel in de wetenschap-
pelijke literatuur als in het maatschappelijk debat een belangrijke rol wordt toegedicht 
aan de manier waarop media zouden berichten over uiterst-rechts en de soms marginale 
positie waarin uiterst-rechtse partijen zich bevinden, of de juist volgens velen verontrus-
tende groei van deze partijen. 
uiterst-rechts
sinds de electorale opgang van uiterst-rechts in diverse europese landen eind jaren tachtig 
en begin jaren negentig, staat uiterst-rechts regelmatig in de belangstelling van politicolo-
gen en sociologen. Veel van hun onderzoek is erop gericht verklaringen te vinden voor de 
grote verschillen in electoraal succes die vertegenwoordigers van de uiterst-rechtse parti-
jfamilie behalen. inmiddels staat vast dat een combinatie van individuele kenmerken van 
kiezers (o.a. attitudes tegenover immigranten), contextuele kenmerken (werkloosheidsci-
jfers, variaties in aantallen immigranten) en de gepercipieerde positie van uiterst-rechtse 
partijen (afstand ten opzichte van meest rechtse conventionele partij, (on)democratisch 
imago) in het politiek bestel in onderlinge samenhang het meest bepalend zijn. ook is 
van belang dat uiterst-rechts alles behalve een homogene partijfamilie is. de onderlinge 
verschillen zijn groot. sommige partijen lijken in hun gedrag, historische achtergrond 
en voorkomen (sociogenese) en ideologie sterk op nationaal-socialistische partijen uit de 
eerste helft van de vorige eeuw, anderen hebben daarmee weinig of niets van doen, maar 
delen met de eersten wel een aantal kenmerken waaronder hun positie op de links-rechts 
schaal, een aversie tegen gevestigde politieke partijen (of elites) en een ideologie waarin 
voor buitenstaanders (vaak etnische minderheden) beperkte ruimte is. Wetenschappers 
gebruiken bovendien verschillende termen om de partijfamilie of leden ervan aan te 
duiden: ‘extreemrechts’, ‘radicaal rechts’, ‘racistische partijen’, ‘anti-immigratiepartijen’, 
of ‘rechtspopulisten’. in dit proefschrift wordt de term ‘uiterst-rechts’ gebruikt als over-
koepelende term omdat deze wel alle verschillen binnen de partijfamilie omvat, maar 
niet, of althans in mindere mate, een stigmatiserende (en wellicht verkeerde) indruk geeft.
uiterst-rechts en de media
hoewel er inmiddels een overtuigend complex aan verklaringen voor de variatie in elec-
torale prestaties van uiterst-rechts bestaat, wil dat niet zeggen dat alle factoren voldoende 
onderzocht zijn. diverse auteurs wijzen erop dat de rol van de media onderbelicht blijft. 
deze wordt op een enkele uitzondering na ook niet meegenomen bij de toetsing van di-
verse verklaringen. enkele auteurs vonden wel correlaties tussen de media-agenda en de 
programmatische agenda van groeiende uiterst-rechtse partijen, maar de manier waarop 
uiterst-rechts zelf in de media geportretteerd wordt, bleef tot nu toe buiten beschouwing. 
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dit ondanks dat zowel in de wetenschap als onder voor- en tegenstanders van uiterst-
rechts de assumptie leeft, dat de manier waarop uiterst-rechts in de media komt een se-
rieuze invloed is op het (uitblijven van) verkiezingssucces van uiterst-rechts.
vier aspecten van media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts
Auteurs die wel aandacht besteedden aan media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts beperk-
ten zich meestal tot aandachtsvolume (aantallen berichten in een bepaalde periode) 
en soms formele aandacht (omvang en prominentie van die aandacht). daarmee is 
de manier van berichtgeven over uiterst-rechts nog steeds niet voldoende bevraagd. 
de manier van berichtgeven staat daarom juist wel centraal in dit proefschrift.
om in een gedegen antwoord op die vraag te voorzien is in hoofdstuk 1 een model on-
twikkeld waarin naast (1) aandachtsvolume en (2) formele aandacht ook de inhoudeli-
jke aandacht voor uiterst-rechts en aandacht voor attitudes van derden ten opzicht van 
uiterst-rechts zijn opgenomen. 
substantiele aandacht
de inhoudelijke aandacht voor uiterst-rechts(e) actoren is het derde aspect van media-
aandacht dat we substantiële aandacht (3) hebben genoemd. daarin onderscheiden we 
vier dimensies: representatie (actief, of passief) de verschillende rollen waarin uiterst-
rechtse actoren wel en niet in de krant komen (bij voorbeeld in de politieke actualiteit of 
in juridisch conflict), of er al dan niet stigmatiserende typeringen worden gebruikt en de 
ideologische standpunten van uiterst-rechts waarmee zij in de media naar voren komt. 
support aandacht
voor het vierde aspect van media-aandacht,  support aandacht (4), is gekeken naar de 
mate waarin er aandacht is voor gunstige en ongunstige attitudes ten opzichte van uit-
erst-rechts en naar de mate van aandacht voor debat onder andere actoren over te prefer-
eren omgangsvormen met uiterst-rechts. 
de onderzoeksvraag
Met behulp van dit model van vier aspecten van media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts 
kunnen we de als volgt geformuleerde onderzoeksvraag beantwoorden: hoe berichtten 
nederlandse, duitse en Vlaamse kranten over uiterst-rechts in de periode 1986-2004. 
en welke veranderingen vinden daarin plaats, en welke verschillen zijn er tussen de drie 
landen en tussen verschillende kranten?
opzet van de studie
om de onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden werd een systematisch-kwantitatieve inhoud-
sanalyse uitgevoerd waarbij de vier aspecten van media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts 
centraal stonden (hoofdstuk 2). uit elk land werden drie landelijke dagbladen met ver-
schillende kenmerken (populair vs kwaliteitskrant en van diverse politieke oriëntaties) 
geselecteerd voor het onderzoek. uit elk van die kranten werd alle berichtgeving waarin 
uiterst-rechts voorkwam uit periodes van drie maanden rondom landelijke en europese 
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verkiezingen geselecteerd. in totaal werden 5.292 berichten geanalyseerd. om uitspraken 
te kunnen doen over de relatie tussen veranderende media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts en 
politieke (in het bijzonder electorale) ontwikkelingen, werden er in hoofdstuk zes ook se-
cundaire data gebruikt, verkiezingsuitslagen van uiterst-rechtse partijen en gegevens over 
uiterst-rechts geweld in duitsland (voor de andere 2 landen waren die laatste gegevens 
niet beschikbaar voor de volledige onderzoeksperiode).
het onderzoek is zo opgezet dat de onderzoeksvraag in afzonderlijke hoofdstukken voor 
elk van de drie landen (n.b.: met Vlaanderen als nederlandstalig landsdeel van België met 
haar eigen nederlandstalige politieke partijen) beantwoord is. in het laatste hoofdstuk 
wordt een cross-nationale vergelijking gemaakt, alsmede een vergelijking tussen verschil-
lende typen kranten. tenslotte wordt een theoretische verklaring geformuleerd voor het 
ontstaan en de ontwikkeling van het aangetroffen media-imago van uiterst-rechts. 
de drie landenstudies
de bevindingen van de drie afzonderlijk uitgevoerde landenstudies toen belangrijke ver-
schillen, die specifieke betekenissen hebben in hun afzonderlijke contexten.
nederland
de nederlandse journalisten werden in de onderzoeksperiode voortdurend geconfron-
teerd met nieuwe uiterst-rechtse partijen, waarbij oude kopstukken steeds weer opdoken. 
Bovendien was het boegbeeld van uiterst-rechts in de jaren tachtig en negentig bepaald 
niet sterk in zijn relatie met de media, in tegenstelling tot fortuyn die bij de landelijke 
verkiezingen van 2002 feitelijk de positie van de cd in het polieke landschap overnam. 
het onderlinge verschil in zowel sociogenese als ideologie was, ondanks ideologische 
overeenkomsten, zeer groot. het zou dus niet verbazingwekkend zijn als de media-aan-
dacht voor uiterst-rechts in de jaren tachtig en negentig anders was dan die in de periode 
waarin de lPf de voornaamste partij aan het uiterst-rechtse firmament was.
nu bleek uit de nederlandse casestudie (hoofdstuk 3) dat er in de loop van de tijd inder-
daad een duidelijke verandering in de media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts plaats vond. 
deze ving echter al aan in het midden van de jaren negentig. Vanaf dat moment werd de 
berichtgeving over uiterst-rechts gevarieerder wat betreft rollen, standpunten (substan-
tiële aandacht) en wat betreft supportaandacht. niet direct met de opkomst van fortuyn 
in 2002, maar pas in 2003 en 2004 kwam dat verbredingsproces van de media-aandacht 
in een stroomversnelling, wat in 2004 uiteindelijk wel degelijk resulteerde in het einde 
van de dominantie van het controversiële buitenstaander imago dat tot dan toe de media-
aandacht typeerde.
duitsland
gedurende de hele onderzoekperiode waren er in duitsland steeds dezelfde drie uiterst-
rechtse partijen actief, nPd, republikaner en dVu, hoewel deze partijen niet aan alle 
verkiezingen meededen). in 2001/2 was er kortstondig een vierde partij actief, schill 
Partei, vernoemd naar haar leider roland schill. 
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Van de vier partijen hadden de republikaner op landelijk niveau de grootste aanhang in 
de hele periode. de drie eerstgenoemde partijen hebben een sociogenese waarin banden 
met (ex-)nazi’s of nationaal-socialistische ideologie in meer of mindere mate een vaste 
plek hebben, terwijl de schill Partei sterke overeenkomsten had met de lPf van fortuyn.
de berichtgeving over uiterst-rechts in de duitse kranten was het meest stabiel van de drie 
casussen (zie hoofdstuk 4). Zij bleef het dichts bij het in alle drie de landen in de beginpe-
riode aangetroffen media-imago waarbij de aandacht bijna geheel is gericht op negatieve 
kenmerken van uiterst-rechts en ongunstige attitudes ten opzichte van uiterst-rechts, 
waarbij andere kenmerken niet of nauwelijks voorkomen. de enige variatie in de media-
aandacht in duitse kranten betreft extra accenten op dat media-imago, steeds ingegeven 
door ontwikkelingen in de actualiteit (daarbij werd bijvoorbeeld het geweldadig karakter 
breed uitgemeten). deze waren achtereenvolgens: de verkiezingswinst van de republikaner 
bij de eP verkiezingen in 1989, de explosie van uiterst-rechts geweld tussen 1991-1994, 
een schandaal rond lidmaatschappen van uiterst-rechtse partijen binnen het leger en de 
mislukte poging om de nPd te verbieden in 2002. schill kreeg in vergelijking met zijn 
nederlandse equivalent Pim fortuyn nauwelijks aandacht en verdween na de mislukte 
verkiezingsdeelname geruisloos van het toneel en uit de media. het onveranderlijke zwaar 
aangezette accent op negatieve kenmerken van uiterst-rechts in duitse kranten kan onder-
meer verklaard worden door de hypergevoeligheid in de duitse cultuur voor alles wat in 
verband gebracht kan worden met de meest desastreuze periode in het duitse verleden.
vlaanderen
in Vlaanderen was tot 2006 al enkele decennia slechts één uiterst-rechtse partij actief. Zij 
komt voort uit een bredere Vlaams-nationalistische beweging. deze partij, Vlaams Blok, 
begon een ononderbroken opmars door de verschillende vertegenwoordigingsorganen nadat 
zij naast haar Vlaams nationalisme een exclusionistische boodschap centraal stelde in haar 
programma rond 1985. sinds 1996 geldt er in de Vlaamse politiek de afspraak om niet 
met het Vlaams Blok samen te werken, waardoor zij in een isolement verkeert. in de laatste 
jaren van het onderzoek, ontstond steeds meer discussie onder politici over dit middel.
net als in duitsland en nederland was de berichtgeving in Vlaanderen aanvankelijk zeer 
beperkt in volume en wat betreft substantiële en supportaandacht (hoofdstuk 5). het aan-
dachtsvolume steeg met de electorale groei van het Vlaams Blok. de substantiële aandacht 
deed dat echter niet, en waar aandacht voor stigmatiserende associaties en negatieve ken-
merken van uiterst-rechts afnamen, steeg de aandacht voor attitudes van derden ten opz-
ichte van uiterst-rechts. op die manier veranderde het naar voren gebrachte media-imago 
op zich niet, maar de manier waarop wel, steeds meer in de supportaandacht en minder in 
de substantiële aandacht.
het media-imago van uiterst-rechts
in hoofdstuk zes vonden we voor twee van de drie landen (nederland en Vlaanderen) een 
positief verband tussen aandachtsvolume en de verkiezingsresultaten van uiterst-rechts. 
een zelfde verband tussen de drie andere aspecten van media-aandacht en verkiezingsre-
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sultaten ontbreekt, of er is een tegengesteld verband. toch is er, vanuit cross-nationaal 
perspectief een patroon te ontwaren in de ontwikkeling van de media-aandacht voor 
uiterst-rechts.
in de jaren tachtig was er zeer beperkte aandacht voor uiterst-rechts, zowel in volume, 
formele, substantiële en supportaandacht. de aandacht die er wel was, is zeer beperkt 
en gericht op de controversiële kenmerken van uiterst-rechts: gewelddadig racisme, stig-
matiserende associaties en bijna exclusief ongunstige attitudes van derden. die vorm 
van aandacht is te typeren als een media-imago waarin uiterst-rechts een controversiële 
buitenstaander is.
in de eerste helft van de jaren negentig veranderde een aantal aspecten van de media-aan-
dacht tegelijkertijd met een stijgende electorale populariteit in Vlaanderen en nederland 
alsmede een explosieve toename van uiterst-rechts geweld in met name duitsland. het 
volume van de aandacht steeg, maar ook kwam er iets meer variatie in de rollen en stand-
punten waarmee uiterst-rechts de krantenkolommen haalt. de aandacht lag echter nog 
steeds in grote meerderheid bij de controversiële kenmerken van uiterst-rechts, waaronder 
racistische geweldplegingen en slecht functionerende uiterst-rechtse parlementariërs.
na deze turbulente periode, die ongeveer aanhield tot en met 1995, lijkt het rustiger (of 
zelfs stil) te worden op het uiterst-rechtse front, maar in bredere kringen kwam er steeds 
meer debat over immigratie en integratiebeleid. de media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts  
werd nu echt breder in haar focus. niet langer was de aandacht gericht op attitudes ten 
opzichte van uiterst-rechts van andere partijen exclusief gericht op ongunstige attitudes. 
het algemeen beeld van controversiële buitenstaander dat uit de media-aandacht naar 
voren komt, bleef wel het zelfde, maar werd daardoor minder direct.
in de periode na de eeuwwisseling zette deze trend zich vooral in Vlaanderen gestaag 
voort. in de nederlandse media raakte zij in een stroomversnelling vanaf 2003, als een 
vertraagde erkenning van fortuyn. in 2004 was de media-aandacht in nederlandse 
kranten zodanig veranderd dat het ontstane imago van controversiële buitenstaander niet 
langer dominant is. in duitsland echter, is deze verandering in het geheel niet aangetrof-
fen.
gedurende de hele periode is de media-aandacht cross-nationaal in meerderheid gericht 
op controversiële kenmerken en gedragingen van uiterst-rechtse partijen, groeperingen 
en politici. daarbij bleven bijvoorbeeld in Vlaanderen de toenemende parlementaire ac-
tiviteiten (het aantal uiterst-rechtse parlementariërs steeg iedere vier jaar) onderbelicht. 
Wel verbreedt de focus en werd de manier, waarop dat media-imago naar voren wordt 
gebracht, minder direct en eenvormig.
Betekent dit nu dat de media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts normaliseert, of dat uiterst-
rechts in de media juist gebagataliseerd wordt, bij electorale groei? de bevindingen 
wijzen voor de duitse kranten voorzichtig op het laatste, maar voor de andere twee 
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landen vonden we geen duidelijke aanwijzingen voor het een of het ander. Aan de ene 
kant blijft het controversiële buitenstaander imago intact, aan de andere kant wordt  
het naar mate uiterst-rechts electoraal groeit, van haar scherpe randjes ontdaan.
culturele consonantie
het controversiële buitenstaanderimago dat in alle drie de contexten in de berichtgeving 
uit de jaren tachtig werd aangetroffen, blijkt dus wel opgerekt en meer of juist minder sterk 
benadrukt te worden in de berichtgeving. We zagen dat ondanks veranderingen in de con-
text (zoals groeiende acceptatie exclusionistische standpunten en electorale groei uiterst-re-
chtse partijen), het controversiële buitenstaanderimago in bijna de hele onderzoeksperiode 
in alle drie de landen manifest aanwezig blijft in de berichtgeving over uiterst-rechts. 
gezien de soms sterk veranderde contexten is dit een opmerkelijke constatering. Zij valt te 
verklaren met behulp van theorieën over journalistieke routines, nieuwsselectie en culturele 
archetypen (hoofdstuk 6). omdat de journalisten in de manier van berichtgeven (met name 
wat betreft substantiële en supportaandacht) sterk aansluiten bij een cultureel gedeeld en 
historisch gevoed idee over uiterst-rechts, zijn zij niet genoodzaakt af te wijken van hun 
routine om op deze manier aandacht te besteden aan uiterst-rechts. ook niet als er maat-
schappelijke en politieke veranderingen plaatsvinden, die dit media-imago in verminderde 
mate doen passen bij de feitelijke electorale positie en andere kenmerken van de op dat mo-
ment actuele uiterst-rechtse partijen en andere actoren.
verschillen tussen kranten
in veel media onderzoek wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen populaire kranten en kwaliteit-
skranten. daar deze kranten veelal ook een ander lezerspubliek bedienen, is het relevant 
om te bekijken of er verschillen zijn tussen populaire kranten en kwaliteitskranten. daarbij 
wordt verondersteld dat populaire kranten zich beperken tot de meer sensationele ken-
merken van en gebeurtenissen rondom uiterst-rechts, terwijl kwaliteitskranten een breder 
perspectief zouden hebben en dus meer aandacht voor de minder sensationele kenmerken 
van uiterst-rechts. Voor de eerste verwachting werd geen duidelijke bevestiging gevonden. 
Wel bleken de kwaliteitskranten inderdaad breder en genuanceerder over uiterst-rechts te 
berichten dan de populaire kranten (hoofdstuk 6).
een tweede onderscheid dat werd gemaakt tussen de kranten is dat tussen meer links 
georiënteerde kranten en meer rechts georiënteerde kranten. hedendaagse kranten hebben 
geen directe binding met politieke partijen en ook zijn geen van de onderzochte kranten 
uitgesproken links of rechts, toch kunnen we volgens andere auteurs verwachten dat  de 
links georiënteerde kranten meer aandacht besteden aan uiterst-rechts omdat zij ideolo-
gisch verder van uiterst-rechts af staan en daarom meer reden hebben uiterst-rechts als 
controversieel te duiden. het onderzoek wijst uit dat er inderdaad significant verschil is 
tussen links en rechts georiënteerde kranten, maar niet zo rechtlijnig als aanvankelijk ve-
rondersteld (hoofdstuk 6). links georiënteerde kranten  hebben een meer confronterende 
benadering en leggen meer nadruk op ‘onacceptabele’ aspecten van uiterst-rechts of haar 
activiteiten dan rechts georiënteerde kranten doen.
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